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EASTERN SAGE TO WESTERN MAN

GEORGE WESTON BRIGGS
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MORE THAN FOUR CENTURIES before the close of the second millennium B.C. and nearly a thousand years before Thales (ca. 624-554) fathered Greek philosophy, Thutmose IV of Egypt, whose empire extended into western Asia, took in marriage a daughter of the Mitanni king Artatamma. She became the grandmother of Amenhotep IV, better known as Akhenaton, famous revolutionary, who attempted to supplant the god Amon by Aton.[1] In carrying out his purpose, Akhenaton built for his god Aton a new city, the ruins of which are known as Tel-el-Amarna. The city was situated above the delta of the Nile in the great bend westward of that river. Another king of the Mitanni, Tushratta, gave a daughter to Amenhotep III,[2] father of Akhenaton.[3]

These facts are recorded on clay tablets bearing cuneiform writing found at Tel-el-Amarna, the language of which is Indo-European, and they reveal a correspondence between Anatolia and Egypt;[4] between Mitanni king-subjects and Egyptian emperors. Boghazköi, in Anatolia, was the capital of the Hittites, "Aryans" who absorbed the Mitanni and who made up the ruling aristocracy holding power over a heterogeneous mass of ethnic elements, among whom were also the Hurrians. In the great library of some 10,000 clay tablets unearthed in Boghazköi in 1906-1912, was found correspondence between Boghazköi and Byblos in the north, and Thebes and Amarna in the south. Among the gods named in these tablets is Varuna, whose importance we will consider later.

Arta or *Atta, Ata,* a word found in the names of the two Mittani kings, was used then as it was a thousand years later by the Achaemenian emperors of Persia, for example in *Arta*xerxes. It must have been current in the Near East for a considerable time to have been incorporated in the names of kings of the fifteenth century B.C. It is an

1. J. A. Wilson, *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago, 1951) p. 201.
2. Thutmose IV, 1447-1421; Amenhotep III, 1421-1413.
3. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 230
4. P. K. Hitti, *History of Syria* (New York, 1951) pp. 150, 157.

Indo-Iranian word. In cuneiform characters it is *Arta;* in Zoroaster's *Avesta, Aša;* in Vedic, *Ṛtam. Ṛtam* appears in Old Persian in the days of the great emperors, Darius the First and others. In an inscription at Susa, Darius the Great recorded: "I am Darius . . . king of kings. . . . By the grace of Ahuramazda I made this palace."[5] Ahura Mazda is the Lord of the *Ṛtam.* In an inscription at Persepolis, Xerxes says: "Where the Daivas (pre-Zoroastrian gods of Persia) had been worshipped, there I worshipped Ahuramazda together with 'Rtam the exalted."[6] The basic reference of *Ṛtam* is to the cosmic and moral order. It signifies the universal order prevailing in the world, unfailing regularity, stability. It means for the individual, whether private citizen or administrator, righteousness, justice. It became a well established ideal, both in religion and in government. Its development in Persia and in India follows distinctive patterns, with influences extending down to our times.

Of it Maurice Bloomfield, referring to the discoveries at Tel-el-Amarna, said: "Notwithstanding its early date, it (*Ṛtam*) is superior to any of the earlier conceptions of the Indo-Europeans"; and, "It is unquestionably the best conception that has been elaborated by the Aryans."[7]

Zoroaster (660-583 B.C.),[8] finest example, perhaps, of the Oriental sage, elevated Ahura Mazda to the highest position and enhanced the significance of the idea conveyed by *Ṛtam.* In making Ahura Mazda the *one* God, he ignored or deposed the ancient pantheon of Iran, except that certain of the old gods became aspects or characteristics of Ahura Mazda himself. Xerxes' inscription at Persepolis shows that Zoroaster's reformation took place not without opposition: ". . . by Ahuramazda's will, of such temples of the Daivas I sapped the foundations, and I ordained, 'The daivas shall not be worshipped.' "[9] This means that the old gods stood aside. They existed only because they had existed before. So Herzfeld pointed out, and he added that they

5. R. G. Kent, "The Recently Published Old Persian Inscriptions," JAOS, 51 (1931), p. 213.

6. *Idem,* "The Present Status of Old Persian Studies," JAOS, 56 (1936), p. 213.

7. *Religion of the Veda* (New York, 1908), p. 126.

8. A. V. W. Jackson, *Zoroastrian Studies* (New York, 1928), p. 18; p. 17, n.5, for a review of the problem of the date of Zoroaster. Herzfeld, in *Oriental Studies in Honour of Cursetji Erachji Pavry* (London, 1933), p. 136, fixes his birth at 570 B.C.

9. Kent, *op. cit.,* 56 (1936), 213.

did not belong to the Druz, the evil contestant of Ahura Mazda. Furthermore, he says, with Zoroaster "a universal monotheism replaces a national polytheism, and—exactly as in Ezekiel—an ethical relation of the individual man to his God supplants the cult of their gods by the nation. *Ṛtam* no longer stands for the old social order, the legal foundation of which was the *ius talonis.*" Thus "the era introduced by Zoroaster brings monotheism instead of polytheism, ethics instead of cult, and instead of self-help law, *data,* that is no longer founded on the social but on the religious conception of Good and Evil"; and also, the social order and the cosmos are now based upon an ethical dualism of Good and Evil, and *Ṛtam* "becomes a moral principle, the absolute Good, *Ṛtam Vahištam,*" and, further, "When custom and right are founded upon a religious principle, then the notion of offence against society goes over into 'sinner.' . . . The popular opposite of the ethically new born *Ṛtam,* the principle of Good, is the Druxš, the principle of evil, sin."[10] Druxš means injury, wrong way, lie, evil, over which Ahura Mazda is to triumph in the end after a protracted struggle.

While this basic conflict is an integral part of Zoroaster's system, still, the idea of *difference* is much older than the time of the prophet. For example, as Herzfeld says, "In the political field before the title of 'King of Kings of Eran and Aneran,' there is the distinction of *arya* and *anarya,* where basic differences exist between the terms, *anarya* meaning all the rest of the world; greater than the Greek distinction of Greek and Barbarian which is essentially a difference of language."[11] Zoroaster was, then, a thoroughgoing prophet and religious reformer, whom Sir P. M. Sykes, in his great *History of Persia,*[12] describes as "a worshipper of Ahura Mazda, his national God."

Cyrus, the Zoroastrian, took Babylon in 538 B.C. That event, Professor Hitti points out, "signalized more than the fall of an empire (the Babylonian) including Syria-Palestine. Then and there one era, the Semitic, ended; another era, the Indo-European, began."[13]

The following lines are from the *Gāthas,* the hymns of Zoroaster:

10. Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and His World* (Princeton, 1947), II, 381.
11. *Op. cit.,* p. 717.
12. (London, 1930), I, 152, n.
13. *Op. cit.,* p. 218.

When I conceived of Thee, O Mazda,
As the very First and the Last,
As the most Adorable One,
As Father of Good Thought,
As the veritable Creator of Truth and Right,
As Lord Judge of our actions in Life,
Then I made a place for Thee in my very eyes.[14]

With Truth (Aša) moving my heart,
With Best Thought inspiring my mind,
With all the might of spiritual force within me,
I kneel in homage to Thee, my Master, with the songs of Thy loving praise ever on my lips!
And even at the Last, when I shall stand at Thy Gate as a suppliant,
I shall hear distinct the sweet echo of my prayers from Thy Abode of Songs.[15]

Professor Hitti says:

> There is the Persian influence on Judaism which, strange as it may seem, does not manifest itself until the second pre-Christian century. The form that it takes is a tendency towards dualism involving the evolution of a personal antagonist to the one God. This dualistic conception is carried over into the New Testament, where it takes the form of the opposition of the principle of wrong to that of right, darkness to light. The Jewish progressive organization of an angelic hierarchy and the growth of the belief in the last judgement with its reward and punishment after death . . . involving the weighing of the actions of man by a balance, betray Persian influence.[16]

However, there is still an older influence which was bearing fruit as early as the prophetic age, the idea of *Ṛtam*. It had been impinging upon the Hebrews for a good many centuries. They and their forebears had gone through a long experience of indoctrination in many lands which was mirrored in the radical thinking in Palestine.

We have seen how *Ṛtam* found its way into Egypt, while belonging

14. D. S. Irani, *The Divine Songs of Zoroaster* (London and New York, 1924), No. XXX (Y 31.8).

15. *Ibid.*, No. CXX (Y 50.4). For the figure of the maiden meeting the soul at the bridge, see R. O. Ballou, *The Bible of the World* (New York, 1939), pp. 598 f., taken from *Sacred Books of the East*, XXIII, 314 ff., *Yasht* 22.

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

to Anatolia and to Mesopotamia as well. We must go back, therefore, and retrace our steps from the days of the Mitanni and the Hittites, with our attention centered on the Hebrews. An old name, "Habiru," became the ethnic word for a group of peoples or tribes whom we now know as "Hebrews." T. J. Meek says that the word Habiru "appears from one end of the near east to the other from the twentieth to the eleventh centuries B.C."[17] It is found in documents in Egypt (Tel-el-Amārna), at Nuzi (the far side of Mesopotamia), in Mesopotamia (Babylon) and at Boghazköi. He says also:

> Wherever we meet them the Habiru are aliens, men without a country, adventurers, soldiers of fortune, sellers of their services as best they can and thriving best on war. In Babylon they were mercenaries, as they were among the Hittites and the Hurrians in southern Asia Minor. Among the peaceful living Hurrians at Nuzi and at Arrapha they had to sell themselves into virtual slavery,[18] in order to get a living, either to private individuals or to the government. Amid the turmoil in Syria and in Palestine in the Amārna age (fifteenth century B.C.) they were particularly in their element and are found allied sometimes with the loyalists but more frequently with those revolting against Egyptian rule, or making raids on their own account. They entered the land (Palestine) as soldiers of fortune, making common cause with the rebels of Egypt and ended by conquering some of the land (the region north of Jerusalem) and settling down in it. . . .[19]

Professor Hitti points out that north and south Palestine were settled at different times and by separate peoples: "Israel and Judah were brought into temporary union by David and Solomon,"[20] very soon to separate.

For a thousand years, then, before their appearance as captives in Babylon, the Hebrews and their forebears had been in touch with the idea that flowered in Zoroastrianism and in the great prophets from before the exile. In their turn they enriched in their own way the preaching of righteousness and justice. Herzfeld points out that,

> Already *Jeremiah* (31,29-30) speaks prophetically of the "New Covenant,"

17. *Hebrew Origins* (New York, 1936) p. 7. Those who reject this view of *Habiru* must recognize that the ancestors of the Hebrews had had contacts with many lands over a long period of time. See Wilson, *op. cit.*, and J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Related to the Old Testament* (Princeton, 1950), especially p. 247, n. 47; and p. 486, n. 13.

18. See I. Mendelsohn, *Slavery in the Ancient Near East* (New York, 1949), pp. 18 f.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 9 f.

20. *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

. . . in which the proverb, "The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge" will have no validity. And not much later Ezekiel (18) says, ". . . ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb . . . the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son, but the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him. . . ."[21]

This could have had no meaning except in the idea of *Ṛtam* coming to exaltation. Isaiah (44:28—45:1) speaks of Cyrus as the anointed of the Lord. These prophets belong to the age when the idea of *Ṛtam* was coming to the peak of its significance.

Esther (1:19) depends on Daniel (6:8), where the latter speaks of the laws of the Medes and Persians as unalterable. Darius the Great, in one of his inscriptions, records: "It is not my pleasure that the lowly suffer injustice on behalf of the lofty, nor that the lofty suffer injustice on behalf of the lowly. What is right, that is my pleasure."[22] Herzfeld's comment on this statement is: "These words reveal an administration of justice without regard to social order and status, that means a new one superseding the old law based on it (the cult of the social order). That is, Zoroaster's doctrine is replacing the legal notion based on the Mithra cult."[22] It is to this new code that Daniel refers. We can not but feel that the prophets, all men of heroic stature, as was Zoroaster, with their insistence upon justice and their united attack on the status quo in their society, reflect a long experience with the idea of the *Ṛtam*. They have become a major channel through which we of the West have obtained one of our most fundamental ideas.

Persian influence appears still further. Professor Jackson wrote that, from the time of Herodotus (b. 480 B.C.) onward, there are abundant allusions in the classics to Persian ideas, and continues: "The Greeks were struck with the ideal and spiritual nature of the Iranian conception of the godhead and divinity."[23]

T. R. Glover, an ardent classicist, wrote: "Persian religion greatly interested Herodotus . . . it was not their custom, he says, to set up statues, temples and altars; they counted it foolish to think of God as like a man; they called the whole circuit of the sky Zeus (the Indian Varuna, who is Ahura Mazda, is the encompassing sky. Οὐρανος was the

21. *Op. cit.*, II, 487.
22. *Op. cit.*, pp. 493 f.
23. *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

father of Zeus. Of course the Zeus of the Veda is Dyaus) and worshipped that. They were not worshippers of idols."[24]

Professor Jackson felt also that "there is something of a tendency to underestimate the Persian influence on Christianity."[25]

We turn now to India. As already pointed out, *ṛtam* is an Indo-Iranian word. Among the oldest hymns in the *Rig Vedic* collection, composed some centuries before that *Veda* was completed, are some addressed to Varuna,[26] the most imposing figure amongs the divinities of ancient India. To him the penitential hymns of the *Veda* are addressed. Farquhar remarks that "the most significant trait of his character is that he is always righteous."[27] He is the God of conscience, the source of the *Ṛtam*, the Lord of the *Ṛtam*, the guardian of the order of the world and of man's behavior. Along with other gods of ancient India, he was known in Boghazköi. In India he is Asura, Lord; in the *Avesta* of Persia, Ahura, Lord.

India is the birthplace of philosophy in its deepest sense,[28] and Indians wanted to know what, if anything lay behind *Ṛtam* and its Lord and what it might be. This curiosity appears in speculation within the *Rig Veda* itself, and it develops in other Vedic literature and in the famous philosophies of the Brāhmans. Not later than 1,000 B.C. the idea of unity, of The One, the *Ekam Sat*, the One Being, Whose-Essence-is-One, is sung in one of the latest hymns of the *Rig Veda*. The One is neuter, impersonal. Soon two other words appear, evolved separately, Brahman and Ātman, the former cosmic, the latter psychic in reference, the two used interchangeably for the Real. They make up the term for the Absolute. Here also the names are neuter, as is that of the Real *(Sat)*. One of the great exponents of this doctrine of the One only was Yājñavalkya. He taught that to this realm of the Real man does not belong. There is, however, deep in his heart a de-

24. *The Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1935), p. 93.

25. *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

26. In the *Rig Veda* there are ten hymns addressed to Varuna, twenty-three to Mitra-Varuna, and nine to Indra-Varuna. In Book Ten there are thirty-five references to Varuna. See H. D. Griswold, *The Religion of the Rigveda* (London, 1923).

27. J. N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India* (Oxford, 1920), p. 12.

28. See Georg Misch, *Dawn of Philosophy*, edited in England by R. F. C. Hull. (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 42, 64. "The Indian beginnings of the metaphysical movement pre-dates the other two [China and Greece] by as much as several centuries" (p. 124).

posit of the Ātman. If it were not for this there could be no realization of Reality, the goal of all Indian religious search. The apprehension of Brahman is not mediated by the senses or the mind of the individual. It is intuitively or immediately "known." The deposit of Ātman in the man alone is real. It is identically the Ātman. As Ātman is undivided, with the knowledge alone of this identity the individual vanishes. Faced with this hypothetical Reality—unknowable, eternal, changeless, undivided—man finds that the empirical world where he lives is unreal, transitory, impermanent, created, *māyā*.

The word *Ṛtam,* as denoting the cosmic and moral order of the world, is now replaced by another, *karma,* the orderly procedure, for instance, whereby a man through his deeds determines his own future. The fruits of his actions follow inexorably in repeated incarnations. This aspect of his life is called *saṁsāra. Karma* and *saṁsāra,* deed and rebirth, function together. These words appear for the first time in the *Upanishads.* Yājñavalkya speaks of *karma* as then a secret doctrine. To the individual this matrix, his world, is an intolerable burden, especially as he contemplates repeated deaths. Release from this interminable wandering becomes his most urgent quest, the quest for *mukti* (or *mokṣa*).

By the seventh century B.C., then, Indian philosophers had given us five new terms, *Brahman, Ātman, karma, saṁsāra* and *mukti,* all of which still dominate Indian thought. Indians insist that man's escape *(mukti)* from his world is through "knowledge" of Brahman. Consequently, man's problem becomes the acquirement of right "Knowledge," *Vidyā.* In order to accommodate themselves to the situation which they create, the teachers speak of a higher and a lower, so that Brahman and Ātman, besides being neuter, are also Brahmā and Atmā, personal, involved in the empirical world. Here Brahmā is the Creator; Ātma is the soul. For this situation there is a higher and a lower "knowledge." What a man knows through his mental faculties is called *avidyā,* not-knowledge, because its reference is to the ephemeral, the created order. Real knowledge, *Vidyā,* is of the eternal; it is the realization of the impersonal Brahman-Ātman.

Man's discovery is that his mind *(manas),* being also of the nature of the impermanent or illusory world, is incapable of "knowing" the Brahman which lies outside of it. From the final standpoint all his "knowledge" is ignorance and is useless. Meditation and mental dis-

cipline can take him no further than the borders of his own world. Viewing this "knowledge" *(avidyā)* as a curtain obscuring the Brahman, he learns a new knowledge wherein the veil is rent. This *is* of the transcendental Real, Brahman, Ātman. It is not knowledge in the old sense, but intuition. It does not involve any means such as he uses to know his own world. The Ātman in the depths of his heart[29] is *identically* the Brahman-Ātman, whole and undivided subject without object. This is the "secret knowledge" brought by the sages from the forest. The *Upanishads,* as their name implies, contain it. It is for man a strange sort of knowledge. For this experience of identity, which is *mukti,* can not be described, it has no objectivity.[30] When the teacher has used all the words he knows in an effort to tell what the Brahman is he is in despair, for what he says *tells nothing: "Na iti, na iti."*[31]

These are the words of Yājñavalkya, the great sage of ancient India: "For where there is a duality *(dvaita),* as it were *(iva),* there one sees another. (He runs through the range of the instruments of knowledge). Where, verily, everything has become just one's self, then, whereby and whom would one see. . . .? Lo, whereby would one understand the understander?"[32] Some speak of the Real as *sat* (pure being), *chit* (pure intelligence, not intelligent), *ānanda* (bliss, stillness, silence). Men however seek that supreme realization, that which is ultimate but unattainable to them as individuals. And the sages from the forest were saying: *Tat tvam asi,* You are That; *Aham Brahma asmi,* I am the Brahman. Individual consciousness ends with the individual.

To repeat: because Ātman is Brahman, Ātman knows Brahman. In this there is no duality, no subject-object relation. As Max Müller

29. Misch (*op. cit.,* p. 244) remarks: "The combination of knowledge of the Infinite with the idea of logos, one of whose characteristics is this capacity for increases prevented the Greek thinker from identifying the still depths of the soul with the Absolute after the manner of the priestly thinkers of India."

30. "Whoever knows it not, knows; Whoever knows, knows it not. The unknowing think it within knowledge; The knower knows it beyond knowledge." From the *Kena Upanishad* (Misch, *op. cit.,* p. 267).

31. As Misch says, "Instead of religious belief in the other-worldly God of revelation, we encounter metaphysical knowledge of the immanence of the Transcendental" (*op. cit.,* p. 80).

32. *Brihadāranyaka* 2, 4, 14. Hume's translation. *Ibid.,* 1, 4, 7: "Whoever worships him as the one or other of these knows him not, for in the one or the other of these he is divided. Let him be worshipped as Self, in whom all things become one" (Misch, *op. cit.,* p. 159).

translated the verse from Yājñavalkya: "When the Self only is all this . . . how should he know another, how should he know him by whom he knows all this? How, O beloved, should he know (himself) the Knower?"[33]

The Indian believes that there is something in this immediate experience, an ineffable something which men who return from the forest surely know, and which is for them of priceless value, possessing unworldly satisfaction. Although, like Plotinus, "returning" from his mystic experience, they come back from the forest inarticulate about what this is, still they feel that there is more than a negative answer to their great question. The pattern of this wrestling with religious experience involves two faculties of knowledge, *manas* (mind), functioning only in the impermanent world, and *Ātman* (the Soul), the Knower, functioning in the realm of the Real (if one may use such an expression).

So far, in India, beginning with the idea of order and the good in *Ṛtam,* of whom Varuna is the Lord, we have followed the speculation about what is eternal and what is temporary; traced the idea of *Ṛtam* into a system of order in the world of *karma* and *saṁsāra;* noted the hope of release from the toils of such a world where only individuals exist; the search for experience of the Brahman, the Unknowable, the Silence, the Spirit, the Self (*Ātman*). There is no movement in release. The Ātman *is* the Brahman; nothing becomes the Brahman, for *It* only *is.*

How intimately does this affect Western Man? For an answer let us turn to Plato. Misch points out that the Indians were the earliest of the ancients to break through their limitations into the realm of metaphysics. The next in order were the Chinese and the Greeks. In his chapter "The Primoridal Metaphysical Word," he gives the terms in the following order: Brahma, Tao, Logos. Further, he points out that the Indian approach was from the Subject; the Chinese from the Community; and the Greek from the Physical World.[34] A student of the ancient geography of Asia will note that the great roads of the East over which much travelled besides laden camels terminated in the eastern Mediterranean, in the area where the first Greek philosophers

33. *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* 2, 4, 13. See N. Macnicol, *Hindu Scriptures* (London and New York, 1938), p. 64. Taken from *Sacred Books of the East,* XV.

34. *Op. cit.,* pp. 121 ff.

lived. We have noted that Greeks knew of Eastern thought as far as India long before Plato's time.

> Only at a few points in that world of ancient cultures, in India and China, the two longest lived of the first generation of Far Eastern civilized peoples, and again among the vanguard of the Greeks who had settled along the coast of Asia Minor on the fringe of Oriental civilization—only there did man set forth on the path of spiritual release to which we give the Greek name of Philosophy.[35]

The Greeks must have owed a great deal to the East, some of which we have already noted. We are now interested to point out how Indian thought forms appear in Plato.

Those who are familiar with the *Republic* and recall the figure of the Cave (Books VI, VII) will see the similarity that exists in the framework of thought between Plato and Yājñavalkya (Plato, 427-341 B.C.; Yājñavalkya, ca.: 600). Both are seeking for a religious solution of man's problems; both find it outside of the illusory world, or the world of shadow. In both, the enlightened one comes back from the vision or apprehension of the Real, the one to govern, the other to lead men into that transcendental experience. In both cases, we have a profoundly changed man. For Plato, this man is the *philosopher* who, after he had left the Cave, obtained wisdom; for the Indian, it is he who, having arrived at *Knowledge,* who, as the *Jivan mukta,* free, though still living in the forest, comes back to teach. Both had acquired an entirely different kind of knowledge from that of the Cave or of the world. Like Yājñavalkya, Plato distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge and two faculties, *Nous* and the mind (intelligence or reason). The world of shadows and puppets in the cave is not real, and the objects of desire and ambition there are illusions. They represent a world where *logisticon* (reason) functions. But Truth, Reality, is reached without reference to phenomena at all. *Nous* is the spiritual faculty of divine discernment, a quality of the soul, a deposit in the individual without which there could be no enlightenment. Neither reason nor intelligence, nor any other mental faculty, only *Nous* is the Knower.

The philosopher, then, is the religious man whose transcendental knowledge is "totally different from the original but very limited

35. *Op. cit.,* p. 31.

speculation of the native genius of Greece."[36] Socrates says: "I can not think of any other study as one that makes the soul look on high except that which is concerned with being and the unseen."[37] The philosopher is the person who has reached the ultimate goal for which the religious man seeks. In India all philosophy is motivated by religion, the search for the ultimate experience. Clearly, by the time of Plato the teaching of the Oriental Sages had made a profound impress upon Greek thought.

We have broken the continuity of Indian thought in order to show a fundamental parallelism between the Indian and Greek views of two faculties of knowledge, the higher of which is outside the reach of the lower.

Turning back to the Upanishad era, we consider another great Indian thinker, one who challenged the limitations of Brāhmanic thought, who extended the meaning of *karma,* and offered a way of life leading to the extinction of sorrow, the living peace of *nirvāna* and the ultimate passing of the individual. He was Gotama who became the Buddha, perhaps the greatest of all the sages, not only of India but of Asia. His influence covers Asia as does that of no other man. He, too, is part of Western Man's heritage.

First, there is his work on man's immediate problem; then the rounding out of his teaching. Mrs. Rhys Davids, one of the great students of the Pali literature of the earlier or Hīnayāna Buddhism, recasts in the first person the famous legend telling why Gotama left home.[38] The problem, supposedly kept from the young Raja, has to do with the reason why men grow old, sicken, and die, and with what comes afterwards—the sorry lot of man and the unknown beyond.

> I was driving in my chariot on a day when it seemed good to be alive. I was in the prime of healthy manhood. . . . But there in the wood I met a man, a very old and world-worn man. He saluted me. I responded and wished him well. He said that he was not well, no, not long for this world; another world lay before him. I said, "Will it help you to be thinking about it?" He said sadly, "I wish I knew! We need the telling of the longer lasting of us!" . . . "The longer lasting." It went home; the glory of the woodland waned, and I bid the driver go back. *Who could word that telling?* Then one day I drove

36. E. J. Urwick, *The Message of Plato* (London, 1920), p. 230. See also pp. 33, 39 for a development of the theory of the two faculties of knowledge.

37. *Ibid.,* p. 254; Book 7, 529. Lindsay's translation.

38. *Gotama the Man* (London, 1928), parts of ch. I. The italics are the writer's.

again to the woods, enjoying life. . . . I met the old man again. He was more world-worn; he was ill. I wished him well, but he was now looking for death to end his sufferings. "But you," I said, "will not die" (familiar doctrine of the *Atman*). But he was moaning that all was strange and dark ahead and no man could word him. I went home again and consulted the Brāhmans. They said I was worrying too much . . . I was getting worried. What would be my outlook when I came to be like that sick old man? I drove again to the woods and sought him. I found him lying dead on his bed. . . . A very messenger he was to me. . . . It was the more knowledge that the old man wanted . . . *more knowledge of the things most needful here in our wayfaring.* It was the *lack of this* that sent me home *most looking for a new word.* Could a way of wider outlook be found?

So Gotama sets out on the great search. Already we know his motive. This character of compassion, *karunā,* runs like a golden thread through all of Buddhism; and this spirit dominated his long years as a teacher, culminating when he was eighty. It finds emphasis in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which from India has captivated much of Asia.[39] But he was more than compassionate. He chose the way of hard discipline and renunciation, searching for the new word. What he arrived at, when the light broke under the Bo-tree, was a broadened ethical conception of life. *Karma* took on a new responsibility when he taught that man's deeds bear fruit in society, in those about him, as well as in his own soul wandering from birth to birth. But the narrower way was taught then and is still taught by the Brahmans; and the Buddha's followers have reduced his broader meaning to the former dimensions.

After his enlightenment, he set up his new knowledge in simple form. The *cause* of sorrow is *tanhā,* thirst, or better, selfish desire. No one since has improved upon this diagnosis. Indians from before his time have talked about the "I" and the "Mine," individual emphasis and possession, as the chief cause of human bondage or sorrow. He taught that it must be eradicated by what he called the *Āryan* eightfold path, an orderly series of ethical principles designed to eradicate selfish desire. Gotama was a realist. Even if he had *nirvāna* as his ultimate goal, he worked on the problems of the here and now. "Whether the world is eternal or not, nevertheless, there is here birth, decay and death; there is sorrow and grief, woe, lamentation and despair; and it

39. See C. H. Hamilton, "The Idea of Compassion in Mahayana Buddhism," Presidential address. JAOS, 70 (1950), pp. 145-51.

is the destruction of these things that I do declare."[40] For him the eradication of sorrow could be achieved before the present life came to a close.

> That mendicant, with utter joy and gladness filled,
> Firm in the teaching of the Awakened One,
> Reaches the bliss where all conditions cease,
> Reaches the state of peace.[41]

Jennings wrote:

> The ideal of *Nibbāna,* or the extinction of the [selfish] self, in this life, as taught by the Buddha, is not a merely negative or passive state of extinction, but a positive and active condition implying love, pity and sympathy as well as the final virtue of serenity. Its object is neither repose nor heaven, but universal charity or love. It is not egoistic nor individualistic, but altruistic or social. It aims not at ascetic purity and isolation from the world but at social service . . . self-forgetful, loving activity.[42]

This Middle Way "is the path of duty to be performed every day, here and now."[43] This will lead to the extinction of selfish desire and at the same time of sorrow.[44] The compassion and serenity of the Buddha show in some of the finest statues of him in Asia.

His teaching of *Nirvāna* and the impermanence of the soul *(anatta)* has been much misunderstood. The Buddha was a man of the Upanishad era, and he held that "the source of all things was in the impersonal Brahman, the Divine, the Eternal . . . the Mysterious, the Uncomprehended, the One, All."[45] And his doctrine of the impermanence of the individual is based upon that of the *Param Ātman,* the Utter or Supreme Self.[46] *Nirvāna* was the "snuffing out" of the individual in the self-realization of the Absolute. In describing the *Para* or final *Nirvāna* as *Śūnya,* vacuity, emptiness, he meant what the Brāhmans did by *na itti,* that is, man can not describe that which lies beyond the limitations of his own mind. His comprehensive word

40. F. L. Woodward, *Some Sayings of the Buddha* (London, 1939), p. 307.
41. *Dhammapada,* 381. See Woodward, *op. cit.,* p. 301.
42. *The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha* (London, 1947) p. xxvii.
43. *Ibid.,* p. lxvii.
44. *Ibid.,* p. 545.
45. *Ibid.,* p. lxi. Compare A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism* (New York, 1943), p. 45, and notes 175, 187.
46. *Ibid.,* p. lxvi.

Dharma connoted in its widest sense truth, the norm of dutiful practice. We see here an extension of the concept of the *Ṛtam,* moral order.

Gotama made a profound impression upon India and, through others, Asoka in particular, upon western Asia. By this great emperor (273-233 B.C.), who became an ardent Buddhist, missionaries were sent far and near, to Western Asia and, perhaps, to Rome. He entered into correspondence with Antiochus II (261-246) of Syria, Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt (265-247), Antigonus Gonatus of Macedonia (ca. 277) and others. Buddhist ideas were therefore abroad in the Near East at least two centuries before our era. Some think that this influence is seen in reporting such a miracle as walking on the water. The Buddha is credited with the same "supernatural" deed. Belief in levitation is common in India and, in some circles in the West, down to our day. It is related to the Buddhist *ihana,* certain psychic states akin to the Brahmanistic yogic powers of the same sort, based upon mind control. The character of the man himself and the temper of his spirit were also sources of his influence in the West.

> Never through hate can hatreds cease;
> Love *only* ends them, evermore;
> Love *only* brings all strife to peace;
> Such is the true, the ancient lore.[47]

In our study of India, we have confined ourselves to the time ending with the early Upanishads and the death of the Buddha (487 B.C.). In our pilgrimage back into antiquity, we have followed the movements of a vital idea, seeing how three great sages, Zoroaster, Yājñavalkya, and Gotama, developed it into religious values of the highest worth: Zoroaster's Wise Lord, One God, whose world operates under the principle of righteousness and justice; Yājñavalkya's idea of unity (the absence of subject-object) in the Brahman-Atman, the Reality towards which the creation moves under cosmic and moral law, where the individual soul reaches at last the transcendental state of the eternal, the silent, the peaceful Brahman; and Gotama's enlargement of the sphere of man's moral responsibilities, seeing in selfish desire the cause of sorrow, turmoil, quenchless craving, and pointing the way to their extinction in this life or after many births, the state of serenity, *nirvāna,*

47. K. J. Saunders, *The Heart of Buddhism* (London, 1915), p. 61.

here—and in the end the absolute and eternal state of peace, not unlike that of the Brahmans, the mysterious beyond, endless and ineffable satisfaction, Reality itself.

We have seen these religious concepts assimilated and mediated to the West by Hebrew and Greek, to become our priceless possessions. It is no mean achievement to have propounded so ably the basic principles of justice, to have proposed an answer to the seeming unreality of finite existence, to have found a solution for the world's sorrow, setting up for man the universal characteristics of compassion and serenity. The sages speak to us today in these terms and challenge us in our sorry age to bring them to perfection.

CONFIDENCE AND THE "WILL TO POWER" FROM ISAIAH TO NIETZSCHE

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"IN QUIETNESS AND CONFIDENCE shall be your strength" (Isaiah 30:15). The words of the prophet, if pondered and applied today, would help us to take at least the first steps on the road towards that Power which Nietzsche conceived to be the most adequate expression of a life worth living. Despite all his bombast and rhetoric, he was closer to the vision of Isaiah than his hostile critics and many of his self-appointed disciples are aware.

Quietness is not quiescence, certainly not acquiescence in the ritualistic repetition of expressions of a faith which is no longer a source of genuine confidence. To put one's trust in such a faith, however well it may have served past ages, is to abandon the quest for spiritual strength and to substitute the acceptance of human weakness for a will to power. Quiet confidence must find its source in a vital faith, and if, even then, its application to the manifold problems of the present will not be obvious or easy, at least such assurance will make it possible to face our world and to accept its challenge.

But before one can speak of applying the wisdom of Isaiah—and, perhaps, at least a part of the philosophy of Nietzsche—it will be necessary to consider the nature of whatever confidence is truly available to men of the twentieth century. Granted that there are many men and women in the twentieth century who continue to profess the faiths of other ages, the test of the vitality of their faith may be the adequacy of their strength to meet present problems, just as the confidence we need to define must be tested by the power which it now provides.

Surely, before we can consider the power or strength which genuine confidence may be expected to bring, at least some definition of terms is necessary and some distinguishing of confidence from other attitudes to which it may be related, and with which it is sometimes confused. Rather than attempt a formal definition, it may be helpful to consider the nature of confidence in terms of an Aristotelian mean. An excess of confidence has been viewed, in the traditions of Christendom, as pride; and humility, in some of its manifestations, might well be con-

sidered to be a deficiency of confidence. But whereas pride was regarded, in the Christian tradition, as the most grievous of the deadly sins, humility was accounted one of the most admirable of saintly virtues. In current usage, however, both pride and humility are somewhat ambiguous, and it may be that by considering them, in quasi-Aristotelian fashion, as an excess or deficiency of confidence, we may come to a viable definition of that difficult term.

Not only in the moral theory of Christianity was pride the most deadly of all human vices, but the Greeks, also, had a word—and a theory—for it and called it *hybris*. Though this term is frequently used in discussions of Greek drama and is usually rendered as "pride," it has overtones and meanings quite different from those of Dante's *Divine Comedy*. When Agamemnon returns from Troy, in Aeschylus' *Oresteia,* he hesitates to step from his chariot onto the royal carpet which Clytemnestra has spread out for him—a symbolic snare, it seems, no less fatal than the net in which she plans to enmesh and murder him in his bath. But he hesitates to step on it and gives several distinct reasons for his hesitation—it is hard to imagine Homer's Agamemnon giving thought to any of them: He does not want to provoke or challenge the ever-present enmity and jealousy of the Gods; here is the theologico-ethical concept of pride or *hybris*. But he also suggests that the welcome Clytemnestra has provided would be more acceptable to Priam as an Oriental potentate, had he won victory at Troy; here is a distinction—between Greeks and Trojans—hardly to be found in Homer's *Iliad*—and here is a conception of *hybris* which is, perhaps, better translated as arrogance than as pride.

For the word arrogant seems relatively clear and unambiguous, whereas the term pride is used in such a variety of ways that it tends to confuse discussions of ethics and makes it less useful as meaning an excess of confidence. Even the distinction between pride and being proud, though the shade of difference might be made significant, hardly serves to suggest the shift of meaning these terms have undergone in common usage in our complex civilization. I well remember a student, of Italian Catholic background, who was startled to find those guilty of pride in the bottom-most circle of the *Inferno,* for he said that the priest had urged him and his friends, in a sermon at their church, to be proud of their religion and to take pride in their heritage. Substituting the word arrogance for pride, in explaining the punishment of

Judas, Brutus, and Cassius, did not settle all moral and theological issues, but it at least helped to explain the ambiguity of the word pride. Nor would anyone, noting the glow of "pride" on a parent's face at a college commencement, wish to see in such an expression the evidence of tragic guilt.

Similarly it is "humility" as the acceptance of limitations which is often esteemed in our civilization, though—at the same time—we rejoice in being the heirs of a culture which admired, above all, the *uomo universale* who refused to be limited to any single career and sought to express his genius in all varieties of achievement. Here our humanistic heritage tends to coincide with one phase of scientific naturalism with which, in other respects, it is in sharp disagreement: its conviction of the unlimited possibilities of human achievement in fathoming the depths and exploring the boundaries of the universe—or pluriverse. Yet this very sense of unlimited possibilities may, in turn, bring with it a sense of natural humility. This is quite different from the theologico-religious humility, many of whose aspects are not only uncongenial but seem actually immoral to men of a culture which takes its responsibilities too seriously to place the blame for its own shortcomings of intelligence or effort on cosmic forces over which, admittedly, human beings have no control.

For humility, like pride, has two aspects or involves two attitudes. Only a spiritual boor could fail to appreciate the great instances of genuine humility: a Francis of Assisi or an Abraham Lincoln. In them humility seems to have been intimately linked to confidence—as the extremes are not severed from the mean, in Aristotle. St. Francis' faith was far from orthodox, and Lincoln's confidence shot through with doubt and, not improbably, with deep despair. In them, as in all personality, however simple it appears on the surface, integrity is not a lack of complexity but a rich fabric woven of many threads in intricate pattern. Francis did not forget his worldly youth, and Lincoln's humility may well have been, in part, a product of his humor, which helped to strengthen his confidence by distinguishing what was trivial in man's experience from what is essential.

Far from the humility of Francis and of Lincoln is the attitude of "I don't care" which is a convenient refuge for those who disguise indifference or—it may be—timidity in a cloak of humble excuses and deny responsibilities by a show of self-depreciation. Such an attitude,

whatever it be called, has in it a kind of arrogance or, at least, of that concern with self whose other name is pride. For if false humility assumes the guise of an indifferent "I don't care," arrogance asserts that the cares of the individual demand the interest of others and are, indeed, of paramount importance. Timid humility leads to laissez-faire, while arrogance refuses to leave others the right to reject the demand of the too insistent ego. Indeed, the ego of the arrogant makes claims upon the universe and identifies human interests with the purposes of the cosmos.

Nietzsche's great vision was of a universe without purpose, in which, none the less, men might live lives of ardent and ethical purposefulness. In this he resembles Spinoza, whose masterpiece, though it begins with a God as purposeless as is the Nature of the mechanistic scientist, is truly an Ethics pointing the way to a life of dignity and freedom, though the way be difficult and its achievement rare. Spinoza's confidence was not a faith in any conventional or traditional pattern, though he was nourished by the learning of the Jews and respected the reverence of Christian schoolmen and simple churchgoers. Though he himself began his *Ethics* with God and set his moral doctrine in the framework of theological and metaphysical doctrines, he gives sanction to those who see a good life as an end in itself and accept an ethic without theology.

Such ethical confidence, it seems to me, is the essential doctrine of Friedrich Nietzsche, who seems to differ from Spinoza chiefly in his insistence that "God is dead." Like Spinoza, he sought no guarantee for human values in the structure of the universe. A philosophy which demands of the cosmos assurance that human purposes will achieve victory and fulfillment tends towards that arrogance which puts the interests of the ego in a position which Nature and the human situation do not justify. Nietzsche's confidence, though sometimes expressed in the language of traditional faith and, occasionally, in terms of a belated Renaissance humanism, was neither in God nor in Man, but rather in the possibility of free men transforming themselves into something beyond human nature as now constituted. His confidence was not, I think, even in Supermen, or in anything that could rightly be called Super-humanism. He never gives the specifications for a superman or claims assurance that he can anticipate superman's character in any detail.

Rather, Nietzsche seems to have found his own confidence in the experience of self-mastery, *selbst-überwindung*. But this self-mastery or self-overcoming, though in some ways it resembles the self-discipline of the Stoics, was not the conquest of the emotions by the intellect. Nietzsche, like Spinoza, was convinced that bondage to the emotions could only be overcome by a more powerful emotion. Though he agreed with Marcus Aurelius that "he who conquers himself is greater than he who conquers a city," he did not esteem self-conquest as an end in itself, but only because of the fuller and richer quality of life it might produce. Here, I think, is the source of the Nietzschean "Will to Power," a power which he discerned in *The Birth of Tragedy* as the Dionysiac passion embodied in the ritual of the Greek chorus. "This passion, like the other moments in the tragic rhythm, is felt at so general or, rather, so deep a level that it seems to contain both the mob ferocity that Nietzsche felt in it and, at the other extreme, the patience of prayer."[1]

If the Nietzschean "Will to Power" has often been interpreted and criticized in terms that recall "mob ferocity," Nietzsche himself was, perhaps, not unaware that among its fruits was a quiet confidence that resembled "the patience of prayer." In this confidence and quiet, I think, he found his will to power and something not unlike Isaiah's strength.

1. Francis Fergusson, *The Idea of the Theater* (Anchor Books edition), p. 42.

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS PROPOSITIONS

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ARE RELIGIOUS PROPOSITIONS COGNITIVE? That the question can be put at all indicates that the vulgar-vernacular language used to describe and explain them no longer seems adequate. Once it would have been quite enough to ask: Of what are they cognitive? For if there is a single and necessary epistemological standpoint, a cognitive ground to which all propositions are referable, then there are conceivably a common sense and common premises for all learning. This is the conviction about cognition which has sustained supernaturalistic philosophies. For any supernaturalism turns out to be a vernacular kind of language and reflection which construes even moral and religious sentences by analogy with those sentences descriptive of nature. And it is because the convictions and beliefs about the possibility of such cognition itself have changed, that the vernacular accounts no longer seem relevant. The issue now is to show how religious propositions can be cognitive at all. Any descriptive philosophic account which takes for granted the possibility of cognitive meaning of religious sentences no longer meets the issue. The issue is now stated in the question: Are religious sentences cognitive?

I

Attempts to translate religious sentences into other linguistic-reflective systems are also fraught with difficulties. It has been the claim of some philosophers that there is a unique philosophical standpoint, qualitatively distinct from all other kinds of standpoints. As Kierkegaard noted about Hegel, there are those who contend that philosophy is reflexive, a kind of awareness about awareness, in which transempirical reals are to be apprehended. Conceivably, then, there are at least two levels from which sentences are to be understood: first, as the expression of feelings, sensory intuition, imagination, and issuing in poetry, moral judgments, religious literature, and even empirical science; and, secondly, from the reflexive philosophic and truly cognitive standpoint. In this latter kind of understanding, the achievement is among others the translation of religious sentences into an

even more abstract linguistic system, and the extent to which they can be thus translated is the extent to which they are true. This is by now a relatively familiar treatment of religious sentences by the philosophically sophisticated. Again, this kind of translation coincides with the vulgar view that there is a single philosophical standpoint, that there is a hidden "nature" and "truth" to which such a vantage point gives cognitive access. Here, also, there is ample ground for doubt, for if philosophy is not the cognition of trans-empirical "reals" but only of the forms and modes of reflection and expression, then nothing whatever is gained by translating religious sentences into philosophical rubrics.

On the other hand, it has been irresponsible thinking which has led many technical philosophers who have been otherwise known for their care and precision to insist, without careful analysis, that all religious sentences are simply nonsensical. Instead of the patient and exacting analysis of religious sentences with that kind of neutralization which the dialetical and linguistic tools of technical philosophy permits, we have seen, instead, a quick dumping of religious sentences to the heap called the meaningless. This is understandable psychologically, when one remembers that the vulgar-vernacular philosophies had so defined the religious sentence that even an acknowledgment of the likelihood of its truth seemed to come close to being a religious act.

Religious faith (or "belief" as it too is called) and cognitive belief have been defined so as to be almost indistinguishable in kind. And especially is this apparent when religious sentences and all others claiming to be cognitive are articulated within the same system of language and thought. It has been easy for anyone who denies the cognitive quality of a religious sentence to move too quickly, and by trading on the analogy between religious belief and cognitive belief, to insist that, if these sentences were meaningless, then there could be no faith or belief. This position is clear enough if one thinks about "believing" a descriptive sentence which purports to be true but yet is nonsensical. And contrariwise, to admit that there might be cognitive significance to a religious sentence seems almost to admit that one is a religious man. But, this is all the more reason why precautions are in order. The long discussion in theological history as well as the constantly shifting focus in philosophy ought to counsel even more care and solicitude than otherwise. And where the passions and enthu-

siasms of men are so proximate, as they are in religious matters, more care and precision is essential rather than less.

II

An extreme resolution always tempts the student of these matters. There are numerous illustrations, some of them recent, of such extremes. If one argues that religious sentences are cognitive and make truth claims, then the assent to the truth claim is a kind of belief. If the difference between being religious and being non-religious or irreligious can be cognitively described, then, it has often been urged, this difference is statable in terms of the sentences which are denied or asserted. The use to which creeds and other groups of sentences have been put by religious practitioners is a case in point. But, even here, difficulties have been acknowledged. For even the most avid adherents of creeds have known that assent to the truth claim of sentences is not a sufficient personal qualification to make one religious. Futhermore, the differential between persons that makes it easy for some to respond affirmatively to the sentences and others to respond negatively does not seem attributable to the ostensible truth function of the sentence. Therefore, both from the side of a religious interest and from a somewhat more disinterested cognitive side, there have come serious questions. More typically religiously motivated is the question—how do the personal qualities of the religious life stand related to an act of assent to the truth of sentences, whatever their content? And the cognitive interest is paramount in the question—how do we know religious sentences are true?

Beginning on the side of cognition, it is easy enough to insist that religion is not cognitive at all and that being religious is not "believing," at least in any sense analogous to cognitive assent or belief. This kind of analysis saves cognition from the apparent absurdities of religious knowing claims and yet demarcates an area, attitudinal and emotive, for religion. Arguing from the limits of cognition, one then proceeds to exclude cognitive components from religion, arguing that religious sentences are not propositions and are not cognitive but, instead, are expressions of convictions and attitudes. And these latter are not to be confused with the convictions or attitudes present when we say that something or other is true.

Then from the side of religion there comes a somewhat similar re-

joinder. Sometimes one must admit that the motives for this kind of rejoinder are engendered by a need to defend religion against its learned despisers, but often too the case is made in order, ostensibly, to keep religious faith distinctively religious. Thus it has been often noted that, if religious faith is only an act of assent to true sentences, then this act of belief does not include many of the most important ingredients of religious living. The insistence upon cognitive religious truth gives maximal significance to the act of its acknowledgment. In order to combat the danger of a kind of intellectualism which might attenuate the stress upon other qualities of the religious life, like love, a sense of sin, etc., religious thinkers also push to the extreme of denying the cognitive component altogether. They then identify religious faith, not with belief (erstwhile cognitive), but rather with trust and confidence and loving. In the latter instance, then, one denies cognition in religious sentences for the sake of faith understood as a quality of a man. In the former instance, one denies the cognition in religious sentences for the sake of the intellectual consistency. But, in both instances, the cognitive status of religious sentences is denied, and the endeavor to describe the subject's religious act of belief by analogy with cognitive acts is intentionally decried. And to such extremes have both recent philosophy and also much of recent theology brought the argument. This is the point towards which kinds of positivists and some radical fideistic Protestants seem to converge.

But I should like to suggest that, despite the apparent agreement between two parties otherwise disparate, this position is not as significant as it might seem. One may concur in the attacks upon the systematic constructs in which religion has been described without thereby agreeing that all religions are simply non-cognitive. For to say the latter is to neglect the fact that religious sentences are cognitive, but in somewhat peculiar ways. To deny that they are cognitive in familiar ways is pertinent, for most theologians have been so intent upon saying that they are cognitive, without distinguishing the peculiar sense in which they are so, that criticism is deserved. Perhaps, too, religiosity is primarily a quality of persons, not of sentences, and perhaps religious faith is not analogous to cognitive belief; but one can concede these points and still recognize a cognitive content in the religious sentences.

All of this is a token of the confusion that has long been manifest in

the discussions about cognition and belief, reason and faith. Most philosophers, and certainly theologians, have shared the view that to admit cognitive components in certain kinds of sentences is to admit certain behavioral consequents. But there are no necessary or even probable consequences between the act of admitting the truth of objective cognitive sentences, whatever they concern, and other acts and attitudes of a subject.

Theologians frequently speak as if the admission of cognitive values in an ostensibly religious sentence "necessitates" the religious life, and philosophers seem to be holding in turn that a non-cognitive attitude (if this is what faith is) "necessitates" that religious sentences be non-cognitive. All of this reflects the confusion created by those who, in construing religious sentences as cognitive, also insisted that the cognitive act of believing them was a religious act of faith. This is an ambiguity closely related in kind to that noted in other places between the "is" and the "ought." But in religious theory, principally because the "ought" is so frequently psychologically described, and also because the transformation of the personality is so paramount, the confusion has been between the statement of a truth (the "is") and the consequences that knowing the truth is supposed to effect (the "ought"). Without noting that the nature of the transition from an objective and disinterested apprehension of true sentences to a subjective quality, called being religious is not itself an implication nor a *natural* movement to be described as a relation of cause to effect, the distinction intrinsic to the peculiarity of religious sentences is thereby blurred.

It is with the intention of drawing these distinctions that the following is written.

III

Religious sentences are cognitive, but in a manner which begs elucidation. They are cognitive of a possible way of constituting one's life and daily existence. There are truths about actualities and truths about possibilities. As long as men cannot know descriptively and as an actuality the future which does not as yet exist, they only encounter it as a possibility. A future which is conceived or which is conceivable is a possibility. Perhaps it is to the extent that one has fears and anxieties and concern about himself and others that every man also

tries to conceive and plan his anticipated existence. The rules for describing and conceiving possibilities are stringent, but do not by themselves limit markedly the range of possibilities. Sentences about a possibility are true or false about it considered as an object to be described. And this is cognitive truth—truth as a quality of a sentence. Such truth presupposes that we agree about the definition of the possibility before describing it. Possibilities have names and are definable. There is a correctness in respect to that which is defined and named, even if one names fictions.

But it must be admitted immediately that such cognitive truth is not peculiarly religious. For to cognize possibilities is a prerogative of all kinds of persons, and it is logically conceivable that the knowledge of a possibility might be entertained irrespective of qualities more personal and idosyncratic. Furthermore, one can dawdle with possibilities as do the world's dreamers, the insane, and children. Of course, it is one thing to entertain possibilities and another thing to know about them. The latter presupposes that they be systematic and coherent, free of ambiguities, clearly articulated and defined. But granted this restriction, there still does not seem to be anything peculiarly religious about such sentences as might be said to describe conceived future possibilities. And it is another question altogether to decide which possibility will, in fact, be the one I shall seek to realize.

One might state the matter in another form: To assent to the truth of a sentence about a possibility, even if it were one describing a Nirvana-kind of existence or the converted life of a Christian, does not mean anything more in respect to the subject than that he admits that the sentence is true of the way of life thus named. Everyone who agreed to this description could, ostensibly, from the truth of the description decide not to choose such a kind of life among the several possibilities which there are. Therefore, the admission of the cognitive truth about possibilities does not seem to involve necessarily anything that religion has tried to describe with the word faithfulness or righteousness.

Therefore, it would seem that, to the degree that religious sentences are about future possibilities, they can be cognitive and true, but that the knowledge of this truth is not intrinsically religious. But to say this much is to omit something very important from consideration, viz., the fact that many sentences called religious are also cognitive in a factual sense. At least they claim to be cognitive factually. And it

is the supposed factual reference that has made religious sentences appear to be crypto-scientific and hence occasioned repeated conflicts between science and religion. It is typical of the religious literature of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam to make many factual assertions. It is not my purpose here to suggest that all of them, or even any of them, are true or false. The question of which are true and which false, which are meaningless, etc., has to be decided by empirical investigation, and certainly it is only philosophical naïveté that has credited the idea that all of any group of sentences about matters of fact must be true together or otherwise false together. Both religious apologists and attackers have shared this genial error in the past, thus exciting glee that was incommensurate with either the proofs or the refutations.

But there is a kind of factual claim that is intrinsic to some religious statements. Some religions, and most notably those mentioned above, contend that the future possibility is to be discovered in human history. The history of Israel, taken both as a series of events experienced by Jews and as a narrative about those events, is claimed to be a disclosure also of a possible way of existing. Likewise, the life of a historical man, Jesus, is claimed to be the possibility of a new life. In the latter instance, extremely interesting and difficult things are said; for there are those who say that the possibility was created by his words and language, and others who say that his existence itself is the possibility, even if he had not sketched a new life linguistically. But this is a controversy for theologians—the issue at point is that some religions make cognitive claims about historical events and relate these to the cognitive claims about the possibilities.

Cognitive claims about historical events, even the claims that a man existed or that tribes existed, are hypothetically certain claims. And it is important to remember that sentences used by religious men to assert the factual existence of anyone or any group are probable assertions and subject to the dialectic of all sentences about matters of fact. There is certainly no a priori reason why some sentences about matters of fact are more certain than others. Attempts of religious thinkers to make all the sentences of religious literature both factual and certain led to such absurdities as inspiration and infallibility, both desperate efforts to make secure what could not in fact be made secure.

Once again it must be indicated that the admission of the truth of sentences about matters of fact does not, of itself, produce religiosity. It is most difficult to see that sentences about anything you please in the past can become religious in virtue simply of their truth claim. The admission of a man's existence (or assertion that he existed, was of such an age, height, race, etc.), just as the admission of a people's existence and history seem to be left simply as a cognitive act, best achieved in a state of neutrality and objectivity. Thus, granting that religious sentences are cognitive of either a possibility or an actual existent does not sufficiently distinguish them from other sentences to make them religious, for it is certainly possible to admit the cognitive truth of ostensibly religious sentences without losing the neutrality of the knowing subject, and without becoming a passionately religious man.

But at this point it is well to remember again what the more speculative and braver philosophies (and theologies) attempted. We have admitted two kinds of cognitive truths that are ostensibly to be found in religious propositions, but metaphysical philosophies have proposed a way to connect these two and thus make these cognitive truths more specifically religious, much less neutral and detached. First, however, the setting must be remembered. There were and are today people who report that there was an ancient people called Jews, who did so and so. With more detail we learn that they believed they were chosen and that this made them heavy with the responsibility of being priests to all nations. Thus far we have two kinds of cognition: reports about an existing people and an account of a possible way of living (perhaps also the remark that some of them lived this way, others did not, etc.). Other persons might say there was a man, and that by him a new way of life was preached. Classical philosophies in the service of these claims tried to resolve the two questions: Why should the possibility be here? and, Why should I choose this possibility among others? Classical supernaturalism attempts to give a kind of present tense linguistic description in which God can be understood and described as equally related to past, present, and future. In this present tense language system, the historical events and future possibilities are treated in non-temporal language, and cognitive links are purported to stand forth between otherwise disparate and discontinuous events.

Thus it was and is argued that *because* of God, therefore the possibilities do exist and are to be actualized. Of course, one cannot deny that the kind of cognition which claims to know that sentences about God are true, appears richer and also appears more religious, in virtue of its subject matter, than knowledge of historical events in their historicity and knowledge of possibilities ever can. But this is the question. Attempts to show that one has cognition of God and that sentences about God are meaningful and/or true are vitiated by epistemological considerations. Therefore it seems both more expedient and befittingly modest to let the cognition of religious sentences rest at what it is, viz., claims about historical existence (in some faiths) and claims about possibilities. Therewith, however, it must be admitted that we do not seem to be in the position to show cognitively why any possibility is thus asserted, or that it ought to be asserted, or that it ought to be actualized. We can only begin with the cognitive assertions and test their veracity if we choose, but not include them in any broader cognitive claim which might seem to make cognition itself religious.

But then the question arises as to whether this analysis does justice to the uses given religious sentences. We have admitted that, as cognitive truths (supposing them cognitive and omitting those which cannot be shown to be), there is nothing intrinsically peculiar either about their content nor the act of believing them. There is, in other words, nothing religious in either instance. This is to say that the act of belief in a cognitive sentence is not an act of religious faith. Attempts to enlarge cognition to include a trans-empirical object (God) has the superficial merit of introducing a religious content into the sentence and making the act of believing such a sentence a religious appearing act. In another context I argue that this is theological superstition, and, in any case, it is insupportable on cognitive grounds.

But how can religious faith be distinguished? Religions differ at this point, but let us begin with the most complex first—those religions which make historical claims. Religious faith for such religions does suppose that one believes in a proposition that, e.g., a people or a person did exist. Here there are historical grounds for the belief. The belief is cognitive; its meaning is delineated by the evidence the sentence accounts for. Secondly, all religions seemingly described a possibility—a way of living and of personal being that is at least conceiv-

able, however difficult it may be to actualize. Again, one may believe that the description is true—one may further believe that this possibility is presented in historical concreteness (thus the second is combined with the first). However, neither of these acts of belief by itself nor both together are acts of religious faith, but, depending on the religion, they may be necessary is order that the act of religious faith takes place. (This is an issue that again must be discussed by theologians, for it involves the differentia between religions, most notably those of Christianity and Judaism as over against perhaps some of those of the Orient.)

The peculiarity of the religious act of faith, or belief as it too is sometimes called, is that it requires not simply that I hold certain sentences to be true, but rather that I am becoming the possibility thus described. This latter act is non-cognitive, but probably pre-supposes the cognitive acts noted above. To become a possibility is to admit an interest, an enthusiasm, a passion for the possibility heretofore only cognitively described. The cognitive act of belief is qualitatively distinct from religious faith, as disinterested apprehension is from interested pursuit. The peculiar difficulties of discussion at this point have been more typical of those religions which involve both a disinterested knowledge and an interested enthusiasm, less typical of those religions which minimize the significance of an historical locus for the occurrence of the possibility. But it seems clarifying, to me at least, to distinguish the cognitive sentences, admitting their religious neutrality whatever their religious use, and then also to separate the cognitive act of belief from the religious act of belief as objectivity is separated from subjectivity, as contemplation is from enthusiasm.

The confusion in religious discourse may be described this way: insisting upon the importance of the cognition of a (religious) possibility, religious faith becomes confused with cognitive belief; insisting upon the non-cognitive aspect of faith, religious sentences mistakenly are assumed to be non-cognitive. Here, instead, a distinction is drawn. Religious sentences are cognitive but are not religious in virtue of this. As cognitive, since sentences describe the possibility of a religious life and believing these sentences is a neutral cognitive act. But becoming religious is a matter of having a non-cognitive enthusiasm and interest in becoming the possibility that can be cognitively described. To translate the sentences into this non-cognitive and passionate context is to

put the sentence to a truly religious use. Thus, both cognition and faith can be delineated in relation to the same sentences, the first being non-religious and dispassionate, the second being religious and passionate. But a possibility which can be objectively known and yet subjectively reduplicated is properly called religious when it is remembered that the stress is upon the latter, the reduplication and becoming, rather than the former, the act of awareness.

IV

All of this is a proposal that cognitive-appearing sentences in religious discourse once again be examined closely. It is being here proposed that a sentence, for example, in which it is asserted that a man is God (and, e.g., all other sentences about an incarnation) be read as, there is or there was (as the case may be) a man who is (or announces) a new possibility, a new way of life. To say this much is to stay within the cognitive. The details about this possibility which contrast it with other possibilities can be added and usually are in more discourse.

This is to assert further, that men do not have knowledge of a divine being who has divine qualities. Religious sentences, including the above, are phrased as if they do. The mode of arguing by analogy, therefore, suggests that the incarnation is a kind of surprise, because it means the juxtaposition of divine qualities and a human being. Whatever justice this may have done to the passions men have felt, this does not do justice when considered from a cognitive standpoint. For *cognitively* men do not encounter a divine being. Men might call certain qualities, with which cognition has to do, divine, and this for various reasons, some of which might be appropriate. But, that these qualities are *known* to be of a divine being is another matter. Here the structure of language seems to have invited the confusion, and many other features of reflective and linguistic usage have sustained it. The cognitive meaning of the God idea is given only by the order of ethical and logical possibilities as this is augmented by long experience of the race. The Hebrews and Christians utilized the first of these (ethical possibilities), certain Greeks the second, and most of Western theology has tried to wed the two into one by insisting the God could be *known* as an actuality, an existing being with attributes. What I am here suggesting is, therefore, only that the cognitive content of religious sentences be admitted to be as limited as it is. To say a man is God or that the world

is created by God (to choose another salient example) is to say something cognitive, but, when such sentences are analyzed, they say among other things—this man is (or taught) a kind (to be specified . . .) of possibility or the world and things in it are like gifts—they are given—and can be understood so. It is the qualities of the possibility that are the cognitive grounds for the divinity claim.

The analysis of the sentences of Christian literature into *kerygma* and *didache* made by C. H. Dodd and others, roughly corresponds to the distinctions noted here. The didache sentences, which are defined as moral teaching, are there distinguished from the kerygmatic sentences, which are factual and historical. From a standpoint of an epistemological analysis, however, this distinction is only approximate, for it is characteristic of religious sentences that a declaration of possibility be given within a factual and historical assertion. The didache sentences are specifications of the possibility and identify it in contrast to all other possibilities; furthermore, in the New Testament they enjoin and persuade and stimulate and, therefore, are not simply cognitive but much else besides.

This position here argued does not deny the importance of religious cognition. With rather technical reasons which will be considered in a later paper, it can be shown that the extent of cognitive significance of a religious sentence depends upon the peculiarity and specificness of the possibility it names or describes. That many religious sentences describe only in different modes and words the same possibility may be the case; but that all do so becomes doubtful as one begins to read the religious literature. There are some striking differences among religious and moral teachings. And one must remember, too, that there is no a priori way, nor any ultimate metaphysical intuition from which one can leap into this array of possibilities and decide which is true, which are religious, which are only ethical or non-religious, etc. The fact that the possibility which religious sentences describe is peculiar means that its source in history is a problem. Some religions, at least, do not describe a possibility that is in accord with the wishes of the majority, and this draws attention not only to the question of the source of such possibilities but also gives a clue as to why it has seemed plausible to some to claim that anyone who advances such a possibility might be called unique if not divine.

A related issue has to do with the question of the desirability of this

possibility. When persons have argued that religious propositions are emotive or, as Freud did, that they are wish-fulfillments, they seem to have taken for granted that the religious possibility expressed the wish. Interestingly enough, most religious theories, i.e., sentences about religious sentences, have denied this. The declaration of the possibility can be cognitively encountered when it is specifically declared, and this should indicate that a religious sentence is not so individuated as to lack all intersubjective reference. But granted this reference, it is argued further that the possibility thus declared is not possible to do or to be, by which it is meant, I take it, that it is not desirable to all who recognize it cognitively as a possibility.

The fact that a possibility must be cognized before it is significantly realized is also a requirement of some religions—this insistence reflecting the view that, otherwise, the religious possibility might not actually be met, because one's own wish might then be determinative. Such niceties again belong to another kind of analysis, but suffice it to note that religious sentences are not easy to believe in. If they were only wish-fulfillments, it would be a little difficult to understand the stress that has been put upon the cognitive and identifiable character of the religious possibility. And, likewise, if religious faith were only unrestrained subjectivity, then it is difficult also to understand the large stress which has been given to showing that faith is something unexpected—this because it is thought so widely that the reduplication of the qualities of life which such a possibility describes is so difficult a matter.

V

In conclusion it might be said that this paper urges that the endeavor to interpret religious sentences as cognitive of trans-empirical realities be given up. And this for two reasons: one, that there is no epistemological warrant for such kinds of assertions (even if there is an intuition of such realities, this would be an event, an occurrence, but not a warrant for the truth of sentences!); and secondly, that the attempt to use knowledge of a trans-empirical Deity as the ground for the possibility so occuring in a given instance and also as the reason for my pursuit of it—this was also a mistaken argument. It seems more appropriate, therefore, to urge that religious sentences can be cognitive of historical events and, also, that they are the occasion for the cognition of a possibly new and definitive mode of life. But the religious act of faith is not to believe

the truth of the description of the possibility nor even the historical claims. Perhaps such an act of belief is a necessary condition for religious faith, but it is not itself religious, for religious faith peculiarly is the passionate and enthusiastic becoming of a possibility. Faith is not belief—cognitive belief—but is instead a non-cognitive translation of a heretofore cognated possibility into the concreteness of one's idiosyncratic character.

This point of view seems to do justice to both the restraints that are induced by ruled reflection and the uses to which religious sentences are in fact put. What this point of view omits is the luxurious claims that there are cognitive truths about God Himself. But in the nature of the case, these are allowable only from God's point of view! And the attempted simulation of a God's cognitive grasp does honor neither to the religious life nor to the proper use of language and reflection.

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. JUNG: A REVIEW ARTICLE

THE BOOKS TO BE REVIEWED HERE represent the first fruits of a mighty project undertaken by the Bollingen Foundation, the publication of a complete edition, in eighteen volumes (scheduled to appear at the rate of two a year), of the writings of Dr. C. G. Jung, of Zürich. Hitherto, students of the great Swiss psychologist have found to their chagrin that most of his important works are out of print, and many remain untranslated. This new edition, the first complete English edition, will be most welcome to those who have shied away from his difficult German. The translator, R. F. C. Hull, has, apparently, not been baffled by it, for the text is clear and pleasantly readable, certainly no small achievement. The original texts have been considerably revised by an editorial committee composed of Dr. Jung himself, Sir Herbert Read, Dr. Michael Fordham, and Dr. Gerhard Adler. An English edition is being published simultaneously by Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. Though the volumes are numbered chronologically, they will not appear in that order, since it has been deemed advisable to publish the untranslated and more important out-of-print works first.

For this reason, the first to appear is *Psychology and Alchemy*,[1] the first English translation of *Psychologie und Alchemie* (Zürich, 1944). Jung's interest in alchemy began a long time ago, but it was not until 1936 that he published his first important work on the subject, "Traumsymbole des Individuationsprozesses," in the *Eranos-Jahrbuch 1935* (Zürich, 1936), followed by "Die Erlösungsvorstellungen in der Alchemie," in 1937. These two lectures, in a greatly expanded form, compose the core of the present volume, preceded by an "Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy," and followed by an "Epilogue," and an extensive bibliography of 540 items, of which 324 are alchemical works dated before the eighteenth century. In his Foreword, Jung justifies his use of so many illustrations (270 reproductions from a great variety of rare texts and manuscripts) by "the fact that symbolical images belong to the very essence of the

1. C. G. Jung: *Psychology and Alchemy*. Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. (Bollingen Series XX.) Collected Works, Vol. 12. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. xxiii, 563 pp. 270 illustrations. $5.00.

alchemist's mentality. What the written word could express only imperfectly, or not at all, the alchemist compressed into his images; and strange as these are, they often speak a more intelligible language than is found in his clumsy philosophical concepts" (p. vii).

In Part I, Jung expounds his own idea of the identity of aim in alchemy and analytical psychology, i.e., "individuation," which means, in this context, the restoration of repressed or rejected aspects of the psyche to produce a "whole man." In alchemy, this psychological process is expressed in symbolic or allegorical terms, ostensibly relating to the chemical constituents of matter, but actually relating to the archetypes of the collective unconscious. Alchemy operated "rather as an undercurrent to the Christianity that ruled on the surface," in which a masculine Trinity dominates, while the feminine aspect of divinity (the "Mother Goddess" of the ancient world) is rejected and repressed into the unconscious. Alchemy, rooted in Gnostic thought, was attempting to restore the primeval quarternary. One of its central axioms appears in a saying of Maria Prophetissa: "One becomes two, two becomes three, and out of the third comes the one as fourth," in which "the uneven numbers of Christian dogma are interpolated between the even numbers which signify the female principle, earth, the regions under the earth, and evil itself," i.e., the rejected "fourth." For alchemy, as well as for analytical psychology, the aim is to recognize and accept the "dark," negative, or inferior aspect of nature, and by accepting, to transform and reintegrate it into the whole.

In Part II, "Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy," the examples chosen are images depicting "the centralizing process, or the production of a new centre of personality," i.e., the "self," which is both center and circumference, embracing conscious and unconscious. The material consists of extracts from a series of some 400 dreams and visions, covering a period of ten months in the analysis of "a young man of excellent scientific education." In this section of 172 pages, eighty-one dreams and "visual impressions" are discussed in such detail, and with such wealth of associated material from religious symbolism from all over the world, and such variety and richness of illustration, as to completely defy any attempt at an adequate review. Perhaps the simplest and truest comment to make is that it furnishes a liberal education in the labyrinthine ways of the human psyche! The culminating experience of the patient was a "Great Vi-

sion" of the World Clock, which made a deep and lasting impression on him, an impression of "the most sublime harmony." This "clock" (like all circular forms) is a Western equivalent of the great Buddhist symbol, the *mandala,* which Jung discusses in great detail in relation to these dreams. The *mandala* is a symbol of totality, representing the restored psyche, with all its elements organized into a geometric pattern around a center, the "self," and all contained securely within the bounding circle. The chaos within has been ordered into a microcosmos; "wholeness" has been attained.

Part III, "Religious Ideas in Alchemy," will be of greatest interest to the student of religion, for in it Jung attempts to give a historical survey of alchemical ideas and their impact on the religious thinking of Western man for more than seventeen centuries. In Chapter 5 of this section, "The Lapis-Christus Parallel," he traces the development of the identification of the alchemical "opus" with the Christian "work of redemption" and the identification of the "Lapis" with Christ, back to early Gnostic sources. In the *Margarita pretiosa* of Petrus Bonus (early 14th century), the dual nature of alchemy is clearly stated: "The art is partly natural and partly divine or supernatural," and this dual nature is also illustrated by a sixteenth-century engraving in which a laboratory and an oratory are shown together in a large room. The identification of the "opus" with the Mass is found in a number of texts, especially among the followers of Paracelsus. In these texts the ultimate aim of alchemy appears as an attempt "to produce a *corpus subtile,* a transfigured and resurrected body, i.e., a body that was at the same time spirit." Part III ends with a fascinating discussion of the unicorn: in alchemy equated with Mercurius, "who, in his volatile form of *spiritus,* is a parallel to the Holy Ghost." In ecclesiastical allegory, the unicorn becomes a symbol of the Incarnation, i.e., the Holy Ghost caught in the lap of the Virgin and incarnate in Christ. This section concludes with a discussion of the unicorn in Gnosticism, and in the religious traditions of Persia, India, China, and of Judaism. "These assorted unicorn symbolisms aim at giving no more than a sample of the extremely intricate and tangled connections between pagan natural philosophy, Gnosticism, alchemy, and Church tradition. . . . I hope that these examples have made clear to the reader just how far alchemy was a religious-philosophical or 'mystical movement' " (pp. 450 f.).

The next book to be considered here is *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*,[2] a work long out of print and much sought after, which is of special importance because it sets forth in a concentrated form the very heart of Jung's system and is generally considered the best introduction to his work. The present greatly revised and expanded edition reveals the changes and development of his thought since their original publication in German in 1943 and 1945. Since the present version differs so drastically from the originals, it was decided to include the original texts in an Appendix, because of their historical importance, marking, as they did, the turning point in Jung's development and the end of his intimate association with Freud. Jung's Prefaces to the first five editions are also included, illustrating his open-minded attitude toward his own theories and his empirical method, which makes theory completely expendable in the search for more exact knowledge.

In the first essay, "The Psychology of the Unconscious," Jung surveys the history of psychoanalysis, from the pioneer work of Charcot, Janet, and Bernheim to the development of his own system and the consequent break with Freud. To Dr. Josef Breuer, of Vienna, he attributes a discovery, in the early eighties, "which became the real starting-point for the new psychology," that is, the systematic use of a method for which one of his patients devised the name, "talking cure." But it was Freud, of course, who probed more deeply beneath the trauma and found its roots in erotic conflict. In Chapter 2, "The Eros Theory," the Freudian conviction "of the fundamental, indeed, exclusive, importance of sexuality in neurosis" is discussed. Jung readily admits that it is

> grounded on a true and factual principle. But it makes the mistake of being one-sided and exclusive; also it commits the imprudence of trying to lay hold of unconfinable Eros with the crude terminology of sex. In this respect Freud is a typical representative of the materialistic epoch, whose hope it was to solve the world riddle in a test-tube (p. 27).

In Chapter 3, "The Other Point of View: The Will to Power," he deals with Nietzsche's Will to Power and Alfred Adler's use of the power principle in his theory of neurosis. This is followed by "The

2. C. G. Jung: *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*. Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. (Bollingen Series XX.) Collected Works, Vol. 7. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. lx, 329 pp. $3.75.

Problem of the Attitude-Type" (Chapter 4), in which Jung attempts to reconcile these incompatible theories of Freud and Adler by means of his own theory of psychological types. "With Adler the emphasis is placed on a subject who, no matter what the object, seeks his own security and supremacy; with Freud the emphasis is placed wholly upon objects, which . . . either promote or hinder the subject's desire for pleasure." In pondering his differences with these two colleagues, Jung was forced to the conclusion that there are two distinct types of human mentality, which see things from opposite viewpoints, i.e., extravert and introvert. And thus, one of his most important concepts came into being. The typology, discussed succintly here in twenty-three pages, was later expanded into a large volume, *Psychological Types*. In Chapters 5 and 7, Jung's second key concept, the collective unconscious and its archetypes, was launched upon the stormy seas of controversy, and still remains an object of hostile criticism. It has led to the accusation that Jung has joined the long line of "scientist turned mystic," but a careful reading of these chapters should surely dispel that error. He concludes the essay with these remarks regarding the thorny path of the pioneer: "Not the criticism of individual contemporaries will decide the truth or falsity of his discoveries, but future generations. . . . So every man whose fate it is to go his individual way must proceed with hopefulness and watchfulness, ever conscious of his loneliness and its dangers" (p. 117).

The second essay, "The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious," is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with the relation of the personal to the collective unconscious, and the effects resulting from the assimilation of material from the unconscious. It is by means of the transference that the unconscious contents are projected onto the analyst and thus made manifest to the patient. In this process, the archetypal, collective elements become apparent and can be differentiated from the personal aspects, e.g., the Father-God archetype, with which the personal father image is so often confused. But this activation of the archetypes has its dangers; it may result in a state of godlike inflation, or its opposite, a feeling of helplessness and irresponsibility in the face of the collective forces. Here the collective must be clearly differentiated from the personal in order to avoid the perils of identification. Here Jung introduces the *persona* (mask), "an arbitrary segment of the collective psyche," a kind of pseudo-person-

ality designed to meet the collective requirements of society, both concealing and protecting the true individuality.

In the second part, "Individuation," Jung describes the function of the unconscious in the process of becoming "a single, homogenous being," i.e., "self-realization." "The aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest oneself of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and the suggestive power of primordial images on the other." Here he introduces the *anima* and the *animus,* the constellation of repressed feminine traits which form the "soul-image" in man's unconscious (and vice versa for woman). In its negative aspect, the anima represents the repressed inferior, weak aspects of the outwardly strong male. In a neurosis, the anima (or animus) may become split off into an autonomous complex which must finally be transformed into "a function of relationship between the conscious and unconscious," so that the ego is "disengaged from all its entanglements with collectivity and the collective unconscious." The essay ends with a section on "The Mana-Personality," which is especially instructive for the student of religion, in its bearing on the personality of the divinely inspired prophet, the "God-intoxicated" man, the "miracle man," etc. And there is also the problem of the projection of the "mana personality," with its component of "wonderful power," onto the figures of the gods.

The next book to be considered, *The Development of Personality,*[3] consists of eight papers on subjects mainly related to child psychology and education. The first, "Psychic Conflicts in a Child," is one of a series of lectures on "The Association Method," delivered at Clark University in 1909. It deals with the case of a little girl of four and her attempt to discover "the facts of life," at the time of the birth of a baby brother. In a Supplement written for this edition, Jung observes that his views have changed considerably since this lecture was written. He has found, in more recent experience with children, that though the stork story, or similar euphemisms, may undermine a child's faith in the parents' veracity and that the simple truth must be told, nevertheless, it is a mistake to insist upon its acceptance, since most

3. C. G. Jung: *The Development of Personality.* Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. (Bollingen Series XX.) Collected Works, Vol. 17. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. viii, 235 pp. $3.75.

children actually prefer some fanciful explanation. The child's mind must be left free and not be "forced into a concretism of outlook that would preclude further development. Side by side with the biological, the spiritual, too, has its inviolable rights."

The second paper is a translation of Jung's Introduction to the German edition of *The Inner World of Childhood,* by Frances G. Wickes. He agrees completely with Mrs. Wickes that "the things which have the most powerful effect upon children do not come from the conscious state of the parents but from their unconscious background," because of "the identity of the psychic state of the child with the unconscious of the parents." The aspect of the parental unconscious which affects the child most powerfully is "that part of their lives which *might have been* lived had not certain somewhat threadbare excuses prevented. . . ." It therefore behooves parents to be always "conscious of the fact that they themselves are the principal cause of neurosis in their children."

The five following papers represent Jung's somewhat less known contribution to the field of educational psychology, under the following titles: Child Development and Education; Analytical Psychology and Education; The Gifted Child; The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education; and The Development of Personality. They reveal his intense interest in the prevention of neurosis by methods of education which take account of the unconscious factors. He conceives of the school as "a means of strengthening in a purposeful way the integration of consciousness," for, without education, children would remain largely unconscious, that is, in a primitive state, intelligent but ignorant, "and therefore unconscious of themselves and the world." This interest in education is by no means fortuitous for Jung's system. "It is obvious that the purpose and inmost meaning of this new psychology is education as well as medical." In fact, for adults, therapy is essentially re-education. He believes that it is just as essential for the teacher as for the parent to be conscious of his own conflicts. He pays his respects to the modern fad of "personality training" with the observation that to attempt to produce in a child the qualities of "definiteness, wholeness, and ripeness," characteristic of personality, is to produce "a premature pseudo-adult." For the adult, "The achievement of personality means nothing less than the optimum develop-

ment of the whole individual human being. . . . A whole lifetime, in all its biological, social, and spiritual aspects, is needed."

The last paper in this volume, "Marriage as a Psychological Relationship," was first published in Germany in 1925. A truly "psychological relationship" presupposes *consciousness*, i.e., an understanding of unconscious motivation, a condition seldom found among the young at the time of marriage. Thus the choice of a mate is all too often made on the basis of unconscious projection of unresolved mother or father complexes. Therefore, in middle life, when the change to conscious realization of personality begins, the serious crisis in marriage ensues, especially when the rate of spiritual development of the partners shows a wide discrepancy. The anima and animus projections of the early relationship break down, and a new relationship must be created on the maturer basis of genuine psychological understanding.

The papers included in this volume present an enlightening view of Jung himself and his many-faceted outlook on life. Here there are none of the esoteric aspects of his thinking which tend to make him seem remote from the common life, but rather a down-to-earth practicality and human warmth which bring him closer to us.

MARGUERITE BLOCK

The last volume to be reviewed here, *The Practice of Psychotherapy*,[4] represents an attempt to gather into one basket Jung's specific contribution on questions of the practice of psychotherapy. It is at all times difficult to analyze and to compress so extraordinarily rich and prolific a creation as that of Jung's into a number of categories for the necessary purposes of approach and of presentation. The category of psychotherapeutic practice, for instance, is, of course, not confined to the papers selected for this volume, but pervades and informs his entire lifework. Indeed, as he has acknowledged time and again, the edifice of his general contribution to the science of psychology rests upon the broad foundation of his psychotherapeutic observation and experience. One need only reflect upon the fact that his great investigations in the realms of mythology and comparative religion were orig-

4. C. G. Jung: *The Practice of Psychotherapy*. Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. (Bollingen Series XX.) Collected Works, Vol. 16. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. xi, 377 pp. 14 illustrations. $4.50.

inally prompted and subsequently fructified by continued contact with the unconscious material produced by his patients. This is also true of his researches into Gnostic symbolism and the abstruse imagery of the alchemists.

Part I, "General Problems of Psychotherapy," consists of nine articles published originally in Swiss and English professional journals, or in previously published volumes of essays. Those wishing to obtain a systematic clinical presentation of Jung's psychotherapeutic procedure are apt to be disappointed, for this is not as yet to be found, either in the works of Jung or in those of his pupils—at least, not in the form of the clinical presentation of so-called case material in which a clear correlation between the step-by-step analytical procedure and its transforming effects upon the ego-attitudes, on the one hand, and the external situation of the patient, on the other hand, would be convincingly established. Aside from the immediate therapeutic concern with the individual patient, Jung's time and work have been devoted to the task of establishing a valid empirical and theoretical basis for his concept of the dynamics of the unconscious. And, since this centers upon the observation of growth and transformation processes within the human psyche, any clinical presentation of their individual manifestations would have to wait upon the wider acceptance of this particular frame of reference, if manifold misunderstandings are not to hinder or invalidate the increase in clinical data.

Part II, "Specific Problems of Psychotherapy," is composed of three articles, the first dealing with the therapeutic value of abreaction, first published in the *British Journal of Psychology,* in 1921, and the second, a paper on the practical use of dream-analysis read at the sixth congress of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy, Dresden, 1931. The third article, "Psychology of the Transference," constitutes the volume's major component, occupying approximately one half of its length. It was published as a separate book in the original German edition (Zürich, 1946). It is, to me, a matter for regret that it has become associated in the present volume with a number of articles of a more general nature, however much they may contain that is valuable and stimulating.

Any reader approaching the "Psychology of the Transference" with the natural expectation of finding in it a systematic approach to the clinical transference situation, as it is commonly understood, will find

himself surprised, and perhaps bemused, by the fact that the author has used a series of ten alchemical pictures from a sixteenth century German treatise to illustrate and develop his thoughts on "transference." He will also discover that, in the course of this "meditation upon the theme of transference," as it might be called, the author has arrived at a concept of transference which departs radically from the conventional point of view. Not only does it include the analyst as an equal partner and participant, but it also extends the concept of transference to include all types of interpersonal relationships. Here Jung offers for the first time a theory of interpersonal relationships as an integral part of his approach to the dynamics of the total psyche. In the course of this momentous work, transference thus becomes equated with human relationships, and with the successive stages of their evolution synchronous with the inter-development of the respective partners. The reason why the ten alchemical representations were used by the author for his own "opus" is that he regards the alchemist's symbols as spontaneous products of the unconscious. As such they reflect in an uncensored fashion its dynamisms (and, may we add, its vagaries?).

It is manifestly impossible to do justice, within the confines of a short review, to the manifold fascinating implications of this study on transference. Even Jung's thirty-four page introduction to the alchemical section is so densely and profusely filled with ideas, observations, and references that it seems to call for an appraisal longer than itself. It can, therefore, be only mentioned briefly that it incorporates valuable hints and references to various aspects of the transference in the clinical patient-therapist relationship, such as the "transference neurosis," the erotic aspect of transference phantasies, the relation between instinct and meaning, or spirit, respectively, and certain parallels between the stages of healing through individuation and the phases of the alchemist's "opus." As a final remark, I cannot refrain from quoting the translation of the motto with which Jung prefaces this study, and which is so characteristic of the tenor of his entire work: "I inquire, I do not assert; I do not here determine anything with final assurance; I conjecture, try, compare, attempt, ask. . . ."

VIOLET DE LASZLO

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies in the Iconography of Cosmic Kingship in the Ancient World. By H. P. L'Orange. Oslo: Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning, 1953. 207 pp. 140 illustrations. N. Kr. 25.00.

This is an extremely able and interesting attempt to recognize and describe the various symbolic devices by which ancient artists and architects sought to convey the notion that the king was not merely a temporal ruler but was endowed, at the same time, with cosmic character and significance. The sovereign, L'Orange finds, might be identified with the sun, and his attendant courtiers with the stars. The royal city might be laid out on a plan designed to reproduce the pattern of the universe. The throne might be surmounted by a "celestial" canopy and be set in a star-vaulted hall which revolved on its own axis. Or again, it might be portrayed as borne aloft on a chariot drawn by eagles or cherubim. At his installation, the king might be lifted high, seated in the middle of a round shield representing the heavens. And often he might be figured stretching out his (right) hand in a gesture of power elsewhere attributed to gods, e.g., to Yahweh in the Old Testament.

With rare ingenuity and acumen, the author traces this cosmic imagery through Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine iconography, and documents his discussion with no less than 140 illustrations drawn from all types of art. One may wonder, however, whether he has really grasped the basic implications of his theme. For the fact is that the endowment of the king with cosmic character and significance is but one aspect of the fundamental parallelism between the real and the ideal, the punctual and the durative, the empirical and the transcendental, which was a standard premise of all ancient and primitive thinking. When, therefore, a city or a building is depicted as a mere earthly replica of some heavenly counterpart, what is important is not that it may happen to be the city or the palace of the king, but that through this device there is conveyed the notion that the here and now is but the temporal phase of a universal there and then. Accordingly, the symbols which L'Orange discusses are only *incidentally* symbols of cosmic kingship; *primarily*, they are symbols of that wider concept which cosmic kingship itself articulates.

On a few points the author seems to have fallen victim to his en-

thusiasm. Thus, his suggestion (p. 10, n. 1) that the references in *The Thousand and One Nights* to palaces divided into twelve sections, each comprising thirty chambers, reflects a cosmic pattern, while not impossible, overlooks the common use of twelve and thirty as schematic numbers (cf. Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature,* Z 71. 8, 11). Similarly, his interpretation of Psalm 89:37 ("His throne shall be as the sun before Me; it shall be established as the moon") as indicating the "astral assimilation" of the throne of David, ignores the parallel phraseology of Psalm 72:5, whence it is clear that sun and moon are mentioned only as symbols of permanence. (Tallquist, *Hakedem,* I.4, cites a Babylonian counterpart.) Again, the assertion that the Babylonian ziggurat represented a cosmic pattern repeats a view upon which specialists have recently cast doubt; see, for example, A. Parrot, *Ziggurat et Tour de Babel* (Paris 1949), p. 47. The same is true also of the statement that Egyptian temples were sometimes built on such a model; see H. Nelson, *The Biblical Archaeologist,* VII (1944), 47. Doubtful also is the author's view that the colossi fronting a Mesopotamian temple really represented the ζῷα supporting it as a kind of cosmico-celestial structure. The fact is that these colossi are actually called "protective genii" (*shêdu* and *lamassu*) and they are described in one case as "monsters which guard the royal path." It is thus apparent that they were conceived primarily as sentinels.

On a few points, it is possible to add grist to the author's mill. Thus, it is pertinent to observe that, under the Han dynasty of China, the capital was laid out to correspond to the configuration of the Great Bear and the Little Bear joined together, with the palace in the position of the Pole Star; see J. J. L. Duyvendak, *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress for the History of Religions* (Amsterdam, 1951) p. 137. Reference might also be made to Satapatha Brahmaṇa xiii, 8. 1, 17, where the cosmic pattern is attested for Vedic places of worship. So, too, the use of the word "heaven" for the ceiling of a palace or hall, might be illustrated from the Akkadian "heavens of gold" (*shamê sha khurāṣi*) in Behrens, *Assyr.-bab. Briefe* (1906), pp. 64 f. The word is also used in this sense in the oracle of Ishtar-bêl-daiani to Esarhaddon in II R, 61.1—Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar* (1914), p. 131. In the Syriac Peshitta, "heavens" is the rendering of "rafters" (Hebrew, *qoroth*) in the description of the Temple in I Kings, 6:16 and elsewhere. But caution is in order, for "heaven" may be used simply in

the tropical sense of "upper covering," as in French *ciel* and English *ceiling,* and as in the *coelum camerae* of Vitruvius, viii, 3. After all, Greeks used the word οὐρανός (heaven) to denote even the *roof of the mouth!*

In his discussion of the outstretched and upraised arm, the author does not appear to distinguish sufficiently between gestures of power and those of salvation. "To make long the hand" was a common Semitic idiom for "to be vigorous"; it is used in one of the Ras Shamra texts to denote sexual potency. When an emperor is depicted in this manner, therefore, it is not necessarily to be assumed that he is extending divine salvation to his subjects; he may simply be exhibiting his prowess.

These, however, are trivialities, and in no way obscure the fact that L'Orange has made a highly valuable contribution to the entire subject of divine kingship—and more especially, to the wider concept which underlies it—by supplementing the literary evidence from a rich source which so many of us have been tending to neglect. We may hope that his arm will be upraised and his hand extended to continue these fruitful studies.

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Studies in Chinese Thought. Edited by ARTHUR F. WRIGHT. (Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations, No. 1, The American Anthropological Association, Vol. 55, No. 5, Part 2, Memoir No. 75.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. xiv, 317 pp.

Of recent years anthropological studies have outgrown their preoccupation with the minor cultures of primitive societies and have moved venturesomely into the richer and broader realm of intercultural studies of major civilizations. The anthropologists, as well as the specialists in related fields who are also interested in comparative morphology of cultures, have attempted to develop valid methodologies for generic characterizations of the cultures of the world. Anthropological studies have been developed from a loose collection of disparate studies in the physical, social, cultural, linguistic and other

fields into an integrated approach toward an overall view of man and his societies. This approach toward a total pattern of culture helps the world gain a new vista of understanding by avoiding the coloration of ethnocentricity and bias.

For promoting better world understanding, the Ford Foundation of recent years has been financing studies of various civilizations—Islamic, Indian, Chinese, etc.—in an effort to get a whole picture of the major cultures of the world. The present volume, *Studies in Chinese Thought,* is one outgrowth of this program. For two years a group of scholars in the fields of Sinology, anthropology, and philosophy engaged in a series of conferences and discussions that resulted in the nine studies in this volume. The work reveals the progress that has been made in methodology for Sinological studies. All of the contributors have tried, creatively and earnestly to the best of their ingenuity, to bring new methods into their work rather than to rely exclusively upon traditional approaches. It is, as Robert Redfield and Milton Singer point out in the foreword, an excellent example of interdisciplinary co-operation.

The book, as the title suggests, consists of studies in Chinese *thought* rather than Chinese *philosophy.* This emphasis accords greater scope to the consideration of the interrelationships between political, social, and biographical events in the development of ideas and values. We are reminded of Spengler's statement: ". . . the destiny of Man can only be understood by dealing with all provinces of his activity simultaneously and comparatively and avoiding the mistake of trying to elucidate some problem, say, of his politics or his religion or his art, solely in terms of particular sides of his being. . . ." This method emphasizes world view, the total pattern of culture, rather than discrete events. It is an approach from the side of cultural interrelationships into value structures. It attempts to be objective, to avoid the coloration that may be imposed upon it by the subjective standards of another culture. Of this scientific trend the editor of the volume points out in his introduction that its ultimate goal is a "characterization of Chinese thought in terms which . . . accurately describe and interrelate every mental production of the Chinese, both past and present." By the methodology the editor so excellently describes, Sinology may attain some such fulfillment.

In this volume four of the essays deal with philosophical problems.

These four essays are entitled "Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy," by Derk Bodde; "A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism," by W. Theodore de Bary; "The Problem of 'Knowledge' and 'Action' in Chinese thought since Wang Yang-ming," by David S. Nivison; and " 'History' and 'Value': The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China," by J. R. Levenson. These essays analyze such concepts as the ideal of harmony as a dominant Chinese world view, the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and action, the psychology of intellectual choice in a changing society, and attempts to determine the basic issues of adherence and divergence of a group of thinkers. Four of the remaining essays, those by Arnold Isenberg, I. A. Richards, Achilles Fang, and Arthur Wright, discuss the art of translation and its role in developing international understanding. These essays stress the necessity of the translator for a thorough comprehension of the whole range and context of Chinese thought. The one remaining essay discusses the function of non-linguistic symbols as an aid to providing knowledge of culture in depth and in obtaining insights into the mind of the Chinese people.

All these papers are focused toward the new methodology of characterization and comparison of cultures. Some of them are strictly concerned with the application of anthropological technique, while others stress analysis and evaluation of the ingredients of Chinese philosophy for further comparison and synthesis. Professor Bodde's study is a fine selection and excellent elucidation of most of the essential ideas and concepts of Chinese philosophy. It is a well organized framework for historic and analytic study which could be produced only by one who has thoroughly mastered his Chinese studies and gained deep insights into the Chinese mind. This essay may also serve as a guide to the study of his well-known two-volume translation of Fung Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy*. The eighteen-page introduction to *Studies in Thought* is by Professor Wright. It contains in essence the findings of the following nine studies, accurately and intelligently described and characterized. Professor Wright fully elucidates the various historical and analytical methods and points urgently to the need for further research. It is, indeed, an excellent introduction to the work and a guide to future studies in Sinology as well.

However, the program for such a work is not one without difficulties and limitations. The scope is, first of all, a vast one, and the source

materials in the field are relatively limited. These sources, Chinese classical literature and other written materials, reveal values, ideas, and ideals developed by thinkers living centuries ago. Analyzing and tracing their development and reflection in the present day is not the same thing as deriving value systems and thought patterns directly by investigation and comparison of cultural phenomena as they now exist. Some values and ideas have become obsolete and no longer play a role in the lives of living men. Second, the materials used in developing these studies were the products of the Chinese literati, whose thinking often bears little relationship to that of less sophisticated men. As Professor Bodde points out ". . . the thought patterns we have been describing, while definitely typical Chinese thinking on a sophisticated and philosophical level, are not necessarily always equally typical of thinking on other less sophisticated levels; sometimes, indeed, cases of obvious contradiction occur." As to the materials discussed in the essays on translating, again heavy emphasis is on classic literature, the spoken language of the ancients, which is far from modern spoken Chinese and which, indeed, since the Chinese Renaissance, has not been taught extensively even in the schools.

Above all, the cultural approach to the study of "national character" or "world view" opens out a vast field. To begin work in such a field is at best to hope that we may one day gather fruits from ground still largely untilled. Perhaps we may find it worth while to recall Professor Kroeber's statement about the anthropologist's work: "Our equivalents of the physicist's hypotheses are not something we formulate to begin with. They emerge gradually and pile up as we rearrange and reinterpret our facts by trial and error: they are mostly an end-product. . . . There are, strictly speaking, no proofs in this method; but there is an increasingly more concordant understanding of widening areas of knowledge and therefore a sounder understanding." We may well bear this in mind as we read this work and realize that it represents the advantage and limitations of the method it has chosen.

To increase our ability for "rearranging and reinterpreting" the facts to gain "sounder understanding" we must develop, first of all, our "keener sense," or, in the words of Gestalt psychology, "higher insight." Professor Richards, in his essay, speaks of Robert Bridges' definition of wisdom as lying in "the masterful administration of the unforeseen," and goes on to say that a peculiar duty toward man's self-

completion is toward not merely increased communication between diverse tongues but between entire cultures as well. Here we may suggest that the ideas of self-completion in Chinese philosophy make their contribution along with, and possibly beyond, those of modern scientific technique.

CHUNG-YUAN CHANG

New York City

Religious Trends in Modern China. By WING-TSIT CHAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. xiii, 327 pp. $4.25.

The material in this book was first presented in the new series of Lectures on the History of Religions, sponsored by The American Council of Learned Societies. The lectures were delivered as The Haskell Lectures in 1950 at the University of Chicago, and at other American institutions of learning in the same year.

The book is noteworthy for its documentation as well as for its exposition of one of the most puzzling aspects of Chinese spiritual life. The author has been objective in his presentation. It is indeed a scholarly achievement to collect such scattered and scarce material in order to make Chinese religious life in the last fifty years understandable to other nations. Professor Chan's insight is apparent in his division of his subject into the religion of the Chinese intelligentsia and that of the masses. His doubt about calling Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism the three religions of China is justifiable.

China has never produced a religion which, in the strictest sense, is represented by a Bible, a Church, and a Hierarchy. Laotze's *Tao-Teh-Ching* and Chuangtze's *Nan-Huan-Ching* of Taoism and the Six Classics of Confucianism have had quite different interpretations in different periods. Though the Six Classics were officially ordained many times by new regimes in China as the guiding principle, they were never regarded as the Bible of the people. The author points out, in the first chapter, how the movement to make Confucianism a state religion failed during the period from 1910 to 1920. Nor has Taoism ever been instituted as a religion in the pattern of Christianity or Islam. And as for Buddhism, many schools of its thought never obtained a foothold in China; only those suitable to Chinese mentality.

This book puzzled me at first, because there is no chapter on Christianity, which to me is a typical religion in modern China. On the other hand, there are chapters on Confucianism and the religion of the intellectuals. But I have never thought Confucianism is a religion. The author, however, has cleared up many of the questions that came to my mind when I saw the title of the book.

Except for the chapter on the religion of the masses, and that on Islam, the book discusses primarily philosophical trends related to religion in modern China. The author mentions many Chinese scholars who, in the last five decades, by re-examining Chinese Classics and Buddhist translations, arrived at certain philosophical commitments. Such commitment may lead to a certain kind of faith, but that faith is rather metaphysical in nature, and can hardly be called religious. Many laymen of Taoism and Buddhism and Confucianism, too, seek their "enlightenment" through learning, practicing, meditating, or intuitive awakening. They seem to live the life of a philosopher rather than that of a convert. But this remark does not pertain to the religions of the Chinese masses.

The author is right in dividing Chinese religions into two levels, but the demarcation line between the two is not a clear-cut line. There is not so much contrast in religious devotions as the author states when he says: "The ignorant people go to deities primarily to seek blessings, particularly those of children, wealth, and long life. The enlightened people worship not to seek favors, but to pay respect. They have only thanks to give, no advantage to seek. They merely honor Heaven, ancestors, and teachers" (p. 143).

Many traditional ceremonies are, however, celebrated by the Chinese intelligentsia with religious sentiment and formality; for example, the New Year celebration, and the marriage ceremony. (Most modern Chinese have two marriage ceremonies, one in a public place, and one at home.) Other ceremonies include those for the funeral, ancestral worship, visiting the family graveyard, for birthdays of the living, or anniversaries of the dead. The enlightened do seek blessings and favors, but they do so in either of two ways—by praying to their ancestors or deities, and by good deeds. Since the author has made such a wide demarcation between the religion of the enlightened and that of the ignorant, I wonder if he might consider only foreign-returned scholars as enlightened.

Professor Chan also says:

> The masses follow the beliefs and practices of the three systems and join various religious societies, with Taoism as the center. Hodous is correct in saying that "folk religion is behind and within the three religions." I may add that it cuts across, includes, and extends beyond the three religions, with the Taoist element dominating. The enlightened, on the other hand, follow the three systems primarily as philosophies, with Confucianism as the center (p. 143).

In my opinion this statement would stand analyzing. If the so-called "folk-religion" refers to paying homage to Ti-Chang-Wang Pusa (deity of Hades), the Jade Emperor (deity of Heaven), Buddha, Avalokitesvara, Lung-Wang (deity of water), and Tu-Ti (deity of earth or village god), it represents different social functions. Those who attend such occasions are not necessarily committed to any religion, but the initiatives certainly come from religious groups. Celebrations of the birthday of the Jade Emperor and of the Deity of Hades are organized by Taoists, while the birthday of Buddha is celebrated by Buddhists. Although the common folk in China may join societies, they *know* which god they are worshiping and to which society they belong. I do not think there is much mixing between Taoists and Buddhists, but there is a great deal of mixing between Confucianists and either Taoists or Buddhists. Only Confucianism cuts across Taoism, Buddhism and Christianity, because it is so deep-rooted in the Chinese mentality. To an open-minded Chinese, most of the religions are aimed at doing good, so that they have no prejudice against any religion that serves such a purpose.

Another important aspect of the religious life of the Chinese masses is the ancestral worship, which deserves much more attention. The author seems to have by-passed it. He says: "On the religious side, only ancestor worship continues, chiefly in the rural areas. Even here signs of decline are obvious and definite" (p. 19). But during World War II, I should say, eighty-five percent of the population, the farmers, were living in accordance with old traditions. At that time I traveled extensively in Szechuan, Kueichow, and Kiangsi provinces, and found that farmers and townsmen worshiped before their ancestral shrines. On the Clean and Bright Festival (Ching-Ming, on the second day of the second month), a visiting party with old and young was generally seen around the tombs with their offerings. The tombs were rebuilt with new soil. I even saw such scenes near the battlefields in Hunan

province. What I want to say is that ancestral worship is declining, but that the decline is not caused by desertion from their faith or lack of gratitude toward their ancestors, but by upset circumstances—wars, poverty, loss of homes. As long as Chinese farmers remain in their agricultural life, they will keep their old traditions.

There are also a few remarks I want to make on Confucianism, which, as mentioned before, is so deep-rooted in Chinese mentality. Yet what influence has it exercised over Chinese spiritual life? Most modern Chinese scholars see Confucius only in the *Analects* or the *Book of Proprieties.* They have reduced Confucius to a teacher of morality and politics. They say Confucius never had a system of thought on the reality of Nature. They draw support by quoting from the *Analects* that the "Master did not talk about . . . heavenly spirits, he seldom discussed . . . Heavenly Mandates, his discourse about man's nature and the way of Heaven cannot be heard" (p. 241).

Still, I think it can be pointed out that Confucius did talk about heavenly spirits and the Way of Heaven, and had his own metaphysics and religious insight. All of these are in the *Book of Changes* (I-Ching), but unfortunately this book has been neglected. In my opinion, if a person is open-minded, he should see that Confucius is not merely a moral teacher but a great philosopher. The way to see it is to have a new look at the *Book of Changes.* In the Commentaries of that Book, Confucius expounded his view of reality. According to his philosophy, there is always fullness of reality in Nature, for the miraculous creation is continuously accomplished within it. And in the miraculous creation there is potency of God. This insight should have prepared the way for a civilized religion. If there was to be an affirmation of religion in modern China, as the author hoped (pp. 236-61), that would have had to come, in my view, from a renewal of the primitive spirit of Confucianism. Hu Shih, Fu Ssu-nien, and Fung Yu-lan have never lived up to that expectation. The author gave them much more credit than they deserved.

As the author pointed out, during the period of the "Intellectual Renaissance," a new school of thought was started in China, the outstanding scholars of which were Ou-yang Ching-wu, Liang Sou-ming, Hsiung Shih-li, and Ma I-fu. They were interested in Buddhist Wei-Chih and Sung Confucianism, and finally turned to and were inspired by the *Book of Changes,* because here they saw the original and primi-

tive spirit of Confucianism. This new school of thought is actually a synthesis of Buddhism and Confucianism. It was intended to answer the urge for a new philosophy of life. Ou-yang's and Hsiung's philosophies were fairly expounded by the author, but not those of Liang Sou-ming and Ma I-fu.

There was another group of Chinese intelligentsia who were interested in "breaking down the china shop of Confucianism." They were often inspired by a very superficial understanding of western philosophy and science. As the author says, they created a period of intellectual doubt and a spiritual upheaval. Consequently, China as a nation has been overshadowed by an active nihilism.

When the author refers to Dr. Hu Shih's article *Shuo Ju* ("On the Literati"), and praises it as "an epoch-making and permanent contribution to Chinese scholarship" (p. 25), this seems to me to be taking a polite attitude toward a Chinese authority. Otherwise, one would not fail to see that the article was intended to launch a deadly blow at Confucianism. Dr. Hu's interpretation of literati in general, and of Confucianists in particular, is based upon the explanation of the word *ju* in Hsu Sen's Characterology. But that this is rather misleading, I hope to have an opportunity to discuss further at another time.

In the author's painstaking list of Chinese equivalents for the proper names given in English, a few seem to have been omitted. I did not find such equivalents for Ching Hsi-chang (p. 163), Shao Yung (p. 259), Wen Ching (p. 196), Wu Yu (p. 17), Wang Ching-chai (p. 196).

SHIH-CHUAN CHEN

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The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation; or The Method of Realizing Nirvāṇa through Knowing the Mind. Introductions, Annotations, and Editing by W. Y. EVANS-WENTZ. Psychological Commentary by C. G. JUNG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. lxiv, 261 pp. Colored frontispiecé, 8 plates. $7.50.

For over a quarter of a century, students of Tibetan lore have had abundant reason to be grateful to Dr. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, the distinguished anthropologist, for his sympathetic, conscientious translations of Tibetan texts, all richly provided with comprehensive eru-

dite introductions, a wealth of supplementary footnote data, and full indexes. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead,* published in 1927, was followed by *Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa,* in 1928, and *Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrines,* in 1935. Now, to all who have become dependent upon the three uniform volumes named above, the present and fourth book in the series will come as another and very welcome standard work of reference.

The present volume contains translations of three Tibetan texts, prepared by the author-editor with the assistance of five Tibetan scholars; four of whom were Lamas, one a lay-official. Preceding the translations is a psychological commentary by Dr. Carl G. Jung, the eminent psychologist; a general introduction by the author, with descriptions of the colored frontispiece and eight photographic reproductions, which include an exposition of the iconography and symbolism.

The translation of the first text, "An Epitome of the Life and Teachings of Tibet's Great *Guru* Padma-Sambhava," gives an account of the amazing life of the famous Indian teacher, known to history and legend as the illustrious founder of Tibetan Buddhism. A short time after A.D. 747, when he arrived in Tibet by invitation of King Thī-song De-tsan *(Khri-srong Lde-bstan),* Padma-Sambhava and the Indian Pundit, Shānta-Rakshita, became the co-founders of Sam-ye *(Bsam-yas),* the first important Buddhist monastery in Tibet. Shānta-Rakshita was well-versed in the literature of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, while Padma Sambhava is credited with the mastery of occult sciences and the esoteric doctrines which, according to tradition, are transmitted orally by a spiritual preceptor to his personal disciples.

Anyone who expects to find in this biography a record of credible events will probably be surprised to learn that Padma-Sambhava is regarded as a great Culture Hero, the divine personification of Tibetan idealism, whose supernormal exploits, outrivaling many of those recorded in Greek epics and Arthurian legends, often occur in a setting of magic and miracle. To the inhabitants of the high plateau of Tibet, such events do not seem fantastic or unbelievable; even his name, Padma-Sambhava, "Born from a Lotus," clearly indicates an immaculate birth. To the uninitiated, any Tibetan biography must seem heavily weighted with irrational elements. It might be of passing interest, however, to note here that Tibetans, in common with other Buddhists,

are not required by their religion to accept any idea or doctrine on faith or authority. On the contrary, they are constantly cautioned by precept of the Buddha not to believe anything unless it is in accord with reason and experience. Fact and fancy may very well convey exoteric and esoteric concepts to the initiated.

From the Biography we learn that many of the esoteric teachings of Padma-Sambhava were put into writing by the celebrated teacher himself, and then hidden, often in caves, so that they might be recovered and revealed to the faithful centuries later, at the proper time. In this category is the second and most important Tibetan text translated for this volume. This profound treatise is "The *Yoga* of Knowing the Mind, the Seeing of Reality, called Self-liberation." The teachings of this yogic text, according to its colophon, were formulated by Padma-Sambhava to serve as a guide to the mental preparation and intuitive process by which a devotee may transcend his own human consciousness and attain the nirvanic goal. As Dr. Evans-Wentz states: "*Nirvāṇa* cannot be intellectually realized, because it is beyond intellect." Elsewhere Professor Radhakrishnan says: "The consciousness contemplated in *nirvāṇa* is so different from the ordinary human consciousness that it should not bear the same name. Rather it is non-consciousness . . . ," within which dawns the realization of the eternal "unique Clear Wisdom."

And so we might ask: how does the aspirant proceed? Here in only thirty-eight pages is the exposition in concise, aphoristic teachings, rendered into lucid English with rare linguistic ingenuity. Study the text on pages 202-40; peruse the editor's Introduction and annotated commentary. Here, through the erudition of two Tibetan Lamas and the perception and wisdom of the editor, the student can investigate the initial steps leading to the intellectual comprehension of the "*Yoga* of Knowing the Mind in its Nakedness." Advancing beyond the first stages, the aspirant for wisdom may, through meditation and mastery of the yogic precepts, advance to intuitional insight "without recourse to the postures, breathings and other techniques commonly associated with the lower *yogas*."

The translation of the third text, "The Last Testamentary Teachings of the *Guru* Phadampa Sangay" (*Pha-dam-pa Sang-rgyas*), follows the metrical form of the original. Considering the difficulties of translating Tibetan verse into English, to superimpose upon them the added

difficulties of composing the corresponding English couplets might well tax the skill of the most resourceful scholar. Only a poet can translate poetry. An accomplishment such as this is enviable indeed, for even a scholarly prose version might not convey, in every instance, the meaning of Tibetan idioms which have no precise equivalents in our racial consciousness. Because the Yoga system established by Phadampa Sangay parallels that of Padma-Sambhava, this translation has been included that it might serve as an independent commentary on the Yoga of "Supreme Enlightenment" expounded in the second text. The Introduction, text and commentary occupy only twelve pages.

The following critical examination of Dr. Jung's "Psychological Commentary" has been contributed by my colleague, Dr. Stanley A. Leavy, Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Yale University:

Dr. C. G. Jung, the eminent psychologist, provides a commentary to this book, in which he undertakes to demonstrate the relations obtaining between the concept of Mind developed or assumed in the "Great Liberation," and that of the Unconscious in Western thought. In doing so he has particular reference to his own psychological system, but a non-Jungian reader may still observe that, mutatis mutandis, many of his comments apply generally. Western psychology has at last produced an investigation of the mind that reveals it to contain the substrate of the experiences which are attained in the discipline of Yoga and in that of the Buddhist systems of meditation. Dr. Jung takes up, point by point, the main theses of the document and shows analogous concepts in psychology.

At the same time, and especially in his introductory pages, Dr. Jung presses the distinction he has made between Eastern and Western thought, on the basis of his typology of "introversion"—"extraversion." Eastern thought is introverted, turning attention to the inner world of intuition and idea; Western thought is preoccupied with the mastery of the exteral world, to the degree of handling thought itself as if it were external. Hence the essential differences between the metaphysical and religious systems of the two spheres. At the present time an interaction between East and West is under way. The West's neglect of the inner world and the East's disregard for the *Sangsāra* world are being countered by irresistible crosscurrents. Meanwhile the study of the Unconscious in the West proves that Western man has within him the

potentiality for as rich an experience of inwardness as his Oriental fellows.

Jung warns, however, that it is not by the adoption of the Eastern disciplines that Western man is to attain his own fulfillment. We are the product of our own kind of historical process, and must develop our own methods—by which Jung seems to mean especially his analytic psychology of awareness of the unconscious depths within us. Jung also makes pertinent philosophical criticism of the cognitive conclusions of mystical experience: "Liberation" and "union" are inner states, and Eastern ideas of the abolition of individual existence within them are not tenable. Although Jung presents little here that is not stated in his other writings, and although he makes a few polemical distortions of other psychologies than his own, these pages are a valuable setting for the volume which follows them, and are themselves a significant link in the bridge between East and West.

It is obvious that there is, in addition to the main purpose of this book, another aim no less important, which is to assist in fostering among Western students a better understanding of Eastern religious ideals. To accomplish his lofty objectives, Dr. Evans-Wentz has brought to this volume of masterly translations more than thirty-five years of study and research in the field of Tibetan Buddhist culture. Unlike many Western scholars, he has lived in Himalayan areas where he could seek out learned Tibetans to assist in translating Tibetan texts. Most of these texts were heretofore unknown to Western scholars and librarians. Moreover, through special permission, certain esoteric teachings which serve as a necessary commentary have been incorporated in the General Introduction and in the extensive mass of textual annotations. These higher lamaic teachings were orally transmitted for centuries down through a long line of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist teachers and, hence, to the editor, who actually sat at the feet of one of them as an accepted disciple. Such scholarly devotion can but evoke profound admiration, and mitigation of the critical attitude expected of a reviewer. Although the editor himself does not expect this volume to be free from errors, who, indeed, except the editor and his Tibetan mentors, has the knowledge to detect any?

Wesley E. Needham

Yale University

Ancient Israel. By HARRY M. ORLINSKY. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. viii, 193 pp. $2.50. Paper, $1.75.

There is real need for a book of this nature. It was written for college survey courses and intends to reduce the vast scope of Israelite history and religion to terms understandable by the average educated person. The author has documented the course of Israelite history with many illuminating contributions from archeology and Near Eastern literature. As he conjures up before the mind's eye the Canaanite mythology, the Black Obelisk of Shalmaneser, the Assyrian Royal Annals, the Lachish Letters, the Weidner tablet, and the Elephantine papyri (among many others), the reader is made acutely aware that the Hebrews did not develop in a cultural vacuum.

Orlinsky is not long in stating the fundamental premises of his approach. His method is strictly historical, but not provincially so, for he recognizes the contemporary impact of the Hebrew tradition. More specifically, he shares an attitude of cautious historical conservatism which is widely prevalent in modern biblical study. From an earlier scholarly skepticism which dismissed most of the Old Testament as unreliable myth and folklore, "the pendulum has swung the other way" to a new respect for its substantial historicity.

With the general principle that the Old Testament narrative is to be given the benefit of the doubt, no fault can be found. One must renege, however, when it comes to some of the applications. Is it not pushing credibility beyond all endurance when Josephus is cited in support of the fantastic census figures in Numbers 1:46 (p. 33)? In a subject so baffling as the Egyptian bondage and exodus, no one can criticize the author for grasping one horn of the dilemma by identifying the Hebrew descent into Egypt with the Hyksos invasion. But to conclude from this "that the Biblical version of the Hebrew sojourn in Egypt derives from the same period as the events which it describes" (p. 34) is highly questionable. For all its socio-cultural accuracy, can the Joseph saga be called history in any strict sense? Do we really gain anything by willingly confusing the categories of folk literature and history?

Lest these extreme instances be overemphasized, it should be insisted that the author is no pedantic literalist. In treating the records of the conquest of Canaan, he fully acknowledges the play of religious

imagination, the conflation of sources, and the likelihood that scattered battles have been attributed to the hero Joshua. He also sees through the shrewdness and duplicity of David. With a sly touch of humor he notes that, while David became "a figure beyond reproach and beyond compare," it was a strange quirk of fate that "his good lived after him, whereas his evil was interred with Solomon's bones" (p. 78).

Graver doubts are raised by what many will regard as misinterpretations of the religion of Israel, stemming partly from too uncritical a reading of the materials and partly from a failure to penetrate the ethos of Israel. A valiant defense is made for the thesis that practical monotheism and the biblical notion of covenant originated in the patriarchal age, but this view is unwittingly betrayed when the patriarchal covenants are admitted to be between equals. The author is unconscious that this is precisely the gulf that separates patriarchal religion and Mosaic-prophetic religion. In the latter case, whatever else the convenant may be, it is between a *self-sufficient* God and *dependent* Israel and not between "equals"! In fact, much of the dynamism and numinous quality of Israelite faith eludes the writer's rather rational constructions of the covenant. When he says that Abraham (cf. Gen. 18:22-33) and Job, in questioning God, "wanted only to see justice done, to understand and define God's powers, to have the contract properly drawn up and fulfilled on both sides" (p. 30), he fails to realize that nowhere, except among the "false" prophets, does the Old Testament guarantee to man this prerogative or satisfaction. To be sure, the covenant reveals something of the constancy of God, but never does it confine him to the humanly calculable or manipulatable. The Hebrew peered into a glass darkly, whereas one often gets the feeling that Orlinsky substitutes a transparent pane of glass.

The final chapter on the Hebraic Spirit succinctly sets forth the contributions of the prophets: their recognition that communal life stands or falls on its fidelity to the divine will, that faith must be expressed in works, ritual supplemented by social justice, and that all men are equals before the deity and thus brothers in the covenant. He further discusses three misconceptions often foisted on the prophets: that they indulged in extensive prediction concerning the future, that they thought of their own sufferings as substitutionary, and that they spoke of a universalism of all mankind. These are proper caveats against

interpretations of the prophets which ignore their historical context. Nevertheless, the warnings provoke as many questions as they answer. Is it fair to dismiss Hebrew Messianism as the product of sheer desperation instead of a logical fruition of faith in God's righteous rule on earth? Is it not misleading to identify the Suffering Servant so emphatically with Second Isaiah himself, without at least some discussion of the many more accepted alternatives? Is it sound exegesis to read the notion of vicarious atonement out of Isaiah 53, simply because it is without precedent in the Old Testament?

With a chronological summary and several pages of annotated suggestions for further reading, the book concludes. On several points of interpretation, some religious and a few historical, the reviewer is critical, but the net result is a first-class introductory work for the uninitiated, and one that can be read with profit by the mature student and scholar. Its brevity should tempt no one to disdain. In short compass this book contains the precipitate of years of study and reflection.

NORMAN K. GOTTWALD

Columbia University

Leon da Modena and the Kol Sakhal. By ELLIS RIVKIN. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1952. xii, 144 pp. $2.50.

Was Leon da Modena (1571-1648) a crypto-heretic or a staunch upholder of the Rabbinic tradition? A whole galaxy of Jewish scholars has wrestled with this question since 1852, when Isaac Reggio first published the heretical tract, *Kol Sakhal* ("The Voice of the Fool"), together with Modena's incomplete refutation, and advanced the theory that Modena was the real author of both. Exactly one century later, Professor Rivkin has written a very readable monograph in which the entire affair is recapitulated in some detail, with a view to demonstrating that Modena was really a "talented defender of the faith" and "an enlightened spokesman for Rabbinic Judaism" whose reputation was unjustly beclouded with suspicion.

The virtue of this monograph lies not so much in its originality as in its clear, well-documented, and interesting exposition. The problem of Modena's relation to the *Kol Sakhal* is an overworked field in Jewish scholarship, and no genuinely fresh view or final adjudication of the matter is likely to come forth unless new data turns up. Although

Rivkin has conscientiously re-examined the sources and secondary literature pertaining to this problem, he has not produced any new data, and his views are based on the very same facts which were available to his predecessors. There is much to be said in favor of the monograph which digests, classifies, and interprets an accumulation of scholarly lucubrations on some subject. Rivkin, however, has chosen not to content himself with merely taking stock of what has accumulated in his field and setting the course for future research. Instead, he has taken the field against all his predecessors, and even claims to have solved the problem! This has vitiated some of the good purpose which this book might have served. But first, why has Modena evoked so much scholarly interest?

Modena was probably the foremost representative of Italian Jewry to the world at large. As a renowned rabbi, he preached brilliant sermons in Italian to a wide audience which included many gentiles; as a facile writer with a flair for style, he authored dozens of books and hundreds of poems whose intrinsic merit is slight, but which faithfully mirrored the spirit of Italian Jewry in the Renaissance and were influential in their time; and as an accomplished polemicist, he wrote the official rebuttal of Uriel da Costa's theses against Rabbinic Judaism. Thanks to his autobiography, we know more about the private life of Modena than we do about almost any other prominent medieval Jew. Modena was an infant prodigy who, in addition to the traditional Jewish education, also received an excellent grounding in music, dancing, and languages. Plagued by personal tragedies, financial difficulties, and an addiction to gambling, he plied twenty-six occupations—by his own count—in order to make ends meet. He was well read in Christian literature, taught Hebrew to many Christian scholars, and regularly took part in theological discussions with Christian clergymen and nobles with whom he was intimate. He was interested in acting and wrote some plays, but he also devoted himself to alchemy and was a confirmed believer in astrology. Modena wrote polemical tracts against Christianity, the *kabbalah,* and metempsychosis. He also composed a dialogue giving the pros and cons of gambling, a treatise in Italian on Jewish laws and customs, a treatise in defense of the Rabbinic tradition, and booklets on mnemonics, practical jokes and riddles. Modena was a colorful and complex personality who reflects the foibles and virtues of the Renaissance in its wane, with its curious

mixture of modernism and medievalism, of intellectual probing and gross superstition, of sophisticated skepticism and simple piety. It is no wonder that his checkered life has provided ample nectar for a beehive of scholars.

In spite of the abundance of information about Modena, however, the crucial question about his life, namely, his relation to the *Kol Sakhal,* remains unresolved. In recent years, scholars—especially Sonne, Baer, Rosenthal, Klar, and Shemu'eli—have sorted and clarified the available data and arrived at certain tentative conclusions. Notwithstanding their avowed disagreement with one another, I find that there is a remarkable degree of accord among them, so much so that it is possible to formulate a consensus which conveys the sense and direction of their collective findings. Following the brilliant studies of Sonne, these scholars agree that the core of the *Kol Sakhal* is not the work of Modena but rather of da Costa or a member of his circle. All these scholars, except Baer, who is still uncertain about this, agree that Modena tampered with this work by interpolating from other heretical works, and perhaps even added his own impress to the formulation of some of the arguments. But none of these scholars—and this is the crucial point—concludes that Modena was a heretic. The dialectical nature of Modena's thinking and his penchant for polemics endowed him with the capacity for presenting both sides of an issue with equal empathy and facility. There is a world of difference between the relatively trivial issue of gambling and the grave issue of the validity of the Oral Law. But just as Modena was able to present the pros and cons of gambling with equal vigor and then decide against gambling, he was also peculiarly suited to entertain the pros and cons of Rabbinic Judaism and then tip the balance in favor of the Rabbis. (As a matter of fact, this point of view was already prefigured by Sh. Bernfeld in his monograph on Modena. Even though Bernfeld believes that Modena is the real author of the *Kol Sakhal,* he does not consider him to be a crypto-heretic.) In any case, contemporary scholarship has definitely gravitated away from the Reggio-Geiger hypothesis that Modena was a crypto-heretic, to the view that he was *essentially* an exponent of Rabbinic Judaism!

It is therefore surprising to find Rivkin presenting himself as the sole champion of Modena's sincerity as a defender of the Rabbinic tradition, and arraying all other scholars who have dealt with this

problem (with the possible exception of Baer) against himself. Thus, by lumping together all previous scholarship on this problem from Reggio to Sonne and Shemu'eli in one bill of indictment, Rivkin has managed to write off the prodigious labor and findings of his predecessors. This tour de force is accomplished by the simple assumption that any scholar who holds that Modena left his personal imprint on the *Kol Sakhal* is *eo ipso* accusing him of being a heretical subversive. But while the question of Modena's tampering with the *Kol Sakhal* is germane to our understanding of his complex personality, it cannot by itself determine whether or not he was a heretic. This is the point of recent thinking on Modena, and Rivkin has missed it. The real issue between Rivkin and his fellow scholars is not whether or not Modena was a crypto-heretic but, rather, whether or not he tampered with the *Kol Sakhal*. By failing to recognize the *locus standi* of present scholarly discussion on his subject, Rivkin has unfortunately placed himself in the position of a knight-errant tilting against windmills.

I should also like to take exception to the background chapters on the rise of heresy in the seventeenth century which comprise a considerable portion of the monograph under review. It is difficult to understand how a discussion of heretical movements in the seventeenth century can ignore that heresy of heresies, Sabbatianism, which convulsed Jewish life for more than a century, or how the author of a monograph on the *Kol Sakhal* could overlook the spiritual affinity between this heretical tract and the Messianism which pervaded Jewry after the catastrophic expulsion from Spain. Surely, the *Kol Sakhal* is no pure and simple rationalist out to dethrone the God of revealed religion in favor of the God of Reason. The heresy that springs from genuine rationalism does not differentiate between the Bible and the Rabbinic tradition; the *Kol Sakhal,* however, carefully levels his attack only against the Rabbis, who, in his view, have falsified the true meaning of the Scriptures, whose authority he does not question. The reader who wishes to grasp the true nature of the *Kol Sakhal* need only take notice of the following passages which Rivkin himself dutifully cites in a later chapter, where he gives a straightforward section by section summary of this tract:

> In their efforts to remain the rulers of the people, the rabbis have been the pillars of the Exile; for they support and maintain the Exile. Had it not been for their teachings the peoples of the world would long since have adopted Judaism. . . . How good it would have been for Israel if the sages of the

Mishna had . . . not permitted the addition of a single law. Then perhaps Israel would not have reached its present degradation, its horn would long ago have been lifted up, and its salvation would have come (p. 87).

Clearly, the *Kol Sakhal* is primarily motivated by a passionate desire to end the "degradation of the Exile" and not, as Rivkin would lead us to believe, by the need to establish the supremacy of the "logical processes of human reason." In Rivkin's interpretation, the widespread incidence of heresy among Jews in the seventeenth century is merely an echo of the rationalist movement which was building up in the world at large. We feel, however, that under his rationalist skin, the *Kol Sakhal* was at least as much a spiritual kinsman of Shlomo Molcho and Sabbatai Zvi as he was of Descartes and Sir Isaac Newton. The Messianic hope of the Jews has known many garbs, and some of them have led to heresy and apostasy. The Messianic drive to liquidate the Exile, whether by Zionism or acculturation, is as much the driving impulse of rationalistic Reform Judaism as it is of romantic Kabbalists. As long as Rivkin insists on fitting Jewish history into the Procrustean bed of general history, he is bound to remain obtuse to the realities of Jewish existence, and his interpretations of the phenomena of Jewish history are likely to lapse into glib generalizations and oversimplifications.

It would be unfair to close this review without mentioning the virtues of this monograph. The scholar and student will be grateful for the thorough annotations and full bibliographical references, as well as for the criticism of some of the arguments of Reggio and Geiger. For the general reader who has no access to Ephraim Shemu'eli's Hebrew monograph on Modena, Rivkin has written absorbingly about a highly technical subject.

New York City MILTON ARFA

The Survival of the Pagan Gods. By JEAN SEZNEC. Translated by BARBARA F. SESSIONS. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. (Bollingen Series XXXVIII.) 376 pp. $6.50.

The highways and byways on which the gods of the ancient Greeks and Romans travelled in their stubborn resistance to annihilation have been traced by many scholars; few have told the story of these fascinating migrations as well as Jean Seznec in his *La survivance des*

dieux antiques, published in 1940 by the Warburg Institute. It is a pleasure to report that this book is now available in an excellent English translation, graced by illustrations not infrequently superior to those of the first edition. The physical appearance of this volume is, indeed, worthy of its distinguished text.

That the old gods had never died, and that it was precisely the supposedly hostile Middle Ages which insured their survival, is hardly news. Yet it is Seznec's merit to have presented the various aspects of this long and complex history, and its aftermath in the sixteenth century, in an unusually compact and well documented form. He treats his theme with authority without becoming pedantic or losing himself in side issues, no matter how tempting. In short, his volume is a handbook in the best sense of the word. While clearly indebted to the researches of men like Warburg, Saxl, and Panofsky, Seznec's book follows more the aims and the methods of his teacher, Emile Mâle, and it is no mean praise to say that it can take its place side by side with the works of that great scholar.

The first part of the book deals with the three interpretations of the Gods which insured their survival: the euhemerist theory, according to which the Gods were human beings; the physical theory, which connected and identified them with cosmic powers, particularly the planets; and the "moral" tradition, which interpreted them allegorically as embodiments of hidden truths. These three interpretations were combined in the medieval encyclopedias, the "summae, trésors, and miroirs" in which all the learning of past and present was collected. Seznec shows the Byzantine and Arabic influences in these interpretations and makes clear why the Church, despite occasional outbursts of hatred against the heathen idols, found it generally more useful to make peace with them and to exploit their reputation for its own end.

A second part of the book deals with the physical shapes in which the Gods survived, and the many strange disguises which they assumed in this process. He describes the MSS. of the Aratea type, which were still faithful to classical patterns, and one of which played an important part in the fifteenth century; the Arabian astronomical MSS., which transformed the Gods into Oriental figures; and the still stranger images made under the influence of lingering remnants of Babylonian astrolatry, which permit Mercury to appear as a bishop

and Jupiter as a monk. He finally describes the creation of images solely on the basis of textual descriptions, like those found in "Albricus" (A. Neckam?), Petrarch, Bersuire, and the unknown author of the *De Deorum Imaginibus Libellus* of about A.D. 1400.

Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Gods and their ancient shapes were again slowly "re-integrated." Yet, in the manuals and dictionaries of the middle and later sixteenth century (Gyraldus, Conti, and Cartari), the hybrid images reappear in what the author describes as a "regression," a return to the Middle Ages, fostered by a "bookish and barbarian" taste and a pervasive love of complex and far-fetched allegory. Although branded in Seznec's words as "a dangerous fraud," these allegorical interpretations exerted a vast influence. They appear in untold *masques* and *triumphs;* in paintings by Vasari and Zucchi; in the writings of Ronsard, Rabelais, and Montaigne; and in books published even in the late seventeenth century in Germany and Spain.

For a book of this type, the author gets involved rather deeply with the question of whether there was, or was not, a "Renaissance." In fact, the reader sometimes wonders where Seznec stands in the controversy between the defenders of the Renaissance as a distinct phase in the development of Western civilisation and the pan-medievalists, who would like to annex it all. He stands, of course, where most sensible people stand; he sees the strong continuity in thought and imagery, but also the many distinctive features which mark the Renaissance. Yet his arguments suffer from the limitations of the theme. In his discussion of the Quattrocento, for instance, Seznec deals at length—and quite properly so—with such mythological cycles as Cossa's frescoes in the Palazzo Schifanoia in Ferrara, Agostino di Duccio's reliefs in the Tempio Malatestiano in Rimini, and the engraved series of the Tarocchi. While these works are of central importance for the theme of the survival of the Gods, they are insufficient for the characterization of an age which produced also artists like Donatello and Masaccio, Uccello and Piero della Francesca.

Since the problem of the Renaissance is for Seznec primarily the problem of the literature on, and the representations of the Gods, he sees it somewhat like a dress-rehearsal of a play which never opened. For a glorious moment the actors appear in their "proper" shape, but fate condemns them to assume soon again their ugly, mean, and time-worn outfits. He treats with scorn the agents of this debacle, the au-

thors of the sixteenth century handbooks on mythology who, instead of looking at the classical models accessible to them, fell back on medieval texts and illustrations. Aesthetic prejudices seem here to be joined to a nostalgic concept of the ancient world not unlike that which Seznec himself describes as characteristic of Poussin. It is probably not an accident that he speaks of "baroque shapes" and "a baroque pantheon" as disdainfully as any eighteenth century polemicist.

All this, however, does not detract from the merits of the book. It remains a remarkable feat of gathering up in one handy volume an incredible amount of widely scattered information. No relevant piece of writing of the earlier literature seems to have escaped the author's attention. For the new edition, the bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Gombrich's important study on Botticelli's allegories is, at least, mentioned in footnotes, though it surely deserves inclusion in the bibliography. Curiously enough, no reference whatever is made to Panofsky's *Studies in Iconology,* which has so many points in common with Seznec's book, and in several chapters adds important new material to Seznec's main theme.

I found very few errors of fact (to mention two: the February miniature in the *Très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry* is a snow-scene and does not show the Duke "feasting and fighting" (p. 76); the print mentioned on page 201 is a woodcut, not a wood-engraving), and an occasional misinterpretation of a picture (the deities of figs. 18 a and b do not "launch hostile bolts"). One might finally wish that the captions were more informative and that, at least approximate, dates were given for all the works illustrated. These are minor complaints which easily can be corrected in a second edition which Mr. Seznec's book does not only amply deserve but most assuredly will soon need.

Barnard College JULIUS S. HELD

Michel Servet: hérétique et martyr, 1553-1953. By ROLAND H. BAINTON. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1953. 148 pp.

Hunted Heretic: The Life and Death of Servetus. By ROLAND H. BAINTON. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. xii, 270 pp. $3.75.

The fourth centenary of the burning at the stake of Michael Servetus provided the occasion for the publication of Professor Bainton's

biography of "the hunted heretic." It appeared in both French and English. The groundwork was laid while the author was on a Guggenheim fellowship in 1926. Meanwhile, he has published numerous books and articles concerning the religious and intellectual life of the sixteenth century, accumulating the data and gaining the perspective which enabled him to give us this authoritative account. It is a new biography, based upon a fresh reading of all the pertinent sources. It is supplied with a complete bibliography and a large number of excellent illustrations.

In a style that makes all his works fascinating to layman and scholar alike, Professor Bainton has portrayed every important phase of the life of Servetus within the framework of the dynamic and diverse tendencies of the Renaissance and Reformation. He shows how this typically Renaissance *uomo universale* sought to master all knowledge as a linguist, theologian, geographer, physician, and physiologist.

The author enumerates and describes the intellectual tendencies which flourished in the Iberian Peninsula during the first decades of the sixteenth century and strongly influenced the Spanish-born Servetus: Renaissance ideas, furthered by Cardinal Ximenes, who used the New Learning in the service of the Church; Ockhamistic Nominalism and fideism, taught at several Spanish universities by the *Moderni;* mystical teachings of the Alumbrados, who stressed inner spirituality at the expense of outward ceremonies; Erasmian ideas of simple piety and high regard for the power of the gospel; heretical views of the *Marranos,* or converted Moors, and the *conversos,* or converted Jews; and Protestant doctrines, freely discussed by such intellectual leaders as Juan de Quintana, the Franciscan patron of Servetus. His heresies concerning the doctrine of the Trinity were, Bainton shows, aroused primarily by the questions raised by the *Marranos* and *conversos,* who could not understand the doctrine, strengthened by the reading of the works of Richard of St. Victor, William of Ockham, Robert Holcot, Pierre D'Ailly, John Major, and Gregory of Rimini, who called the doctrine unfathomable; and substantiated by his own study of the Bible, where he failed to find the word Trinity or any reference to three persons and one substance. His subsequent attacks upon the scholastic interpretation of this doctrine made it necessary for him to flee from Spain, which had again revived its austere orthodoxy, particularly in the face of the widespread criticism of its doctrinal

laxity. His sojourn in Protestant lands enabled him to construct his own doctrines, drawn largely from the early Church Fathers, especially Tertullian and Irenaeus, whose works were being printed in Basel at that time. These doctrines he first presented in his *De Trinitatis Erroribus,* the publication of which brought upon him the ire of the Protestant leaders and compelled him to flee to France, where he remained under an assumed name until 1553, when his identity was disclosed and he fled to Geneva.

Bainton renders the average reader an invaluable service by giving the historical background of every major point in the thought of Servetus. This he does with respect to the non-theological as well as the theological works of the heretic. For example, he prefaces his discussion of the two editions of Ptolemy's geography with an explanation of the attitude of the men of the Renaissance toward this subject, and also shows how Servetus' statement concerning the aridity of Palestine was later used against him. In discussing the *Syruporum Universa Ratio,* he relates at length the importance of sixteenth-century views concerning astrology. His masterful summary of Servetus' discovery of the pulmonary circulation of the blood contains not only a scientific survey of what his contemporaries knew about the blood, but also a discussion of the connection between Servetus' scientific and religious views and his belief in the fundamental unity of all things.

The author, however, devotes his chief attention to the theology of Servetus. In his analysis of the *Christianismi Restitutio,* he points out that the chief contemporary influences upon the development of the heretic's own theology were, first, Neoplatonism, from which he obtained, among other things, his conception of God as the ultimate One from whom emanate the essences which infuse man, and his doctrine of light as the bond between the corporeal and the spiritual, as the visible form of all things; and, second, Anabaptism, from which he obtained his conception of the *restitutio* of primitive Christianity, as well as his views concerning baptism. His doctrine of man, Bainton shows, was composed of Catholic, Renaissance, and Anabaptist ingredients, for he believed that man could co-operate with God in effecting his salvation, could rise to become united with God, and could experience the resurrected Christ through baptism. It is significant that Servetus was originally accused on thirty-nine counts, but that he was condemned on only two, anti-Trinitarianism and anti-paedobap-

tism. The Justinian Code prescribed the death penalty for both the denial of the Trinity and the repetition of baptism.

The dramatic story of the persecution of "the heretic and martyr," from his first encounter with the Inquisition to his death at the stake, is told with remarkable insight and objectivity. The author enumerates and analyzes the various moot questions that have arisen out of the persecution and trial. Two of them he discusses at great length. The one has to do with Calvin's role in making Servetus' identity known to the Catholic Inquisition. The other concerns Servetus' relation to the Libertines, the political enemies of Calvin. In describing the conflict between Servetus and Calvin, he does not condemn either man, but objectively and judiciously points out those fundamental convictions of both which made reconciliation and compromise impossible. Servetus' doctrine of the Trinity, in which he denied that the Son was co-eternal with God the Father, could not be accepted by Calvin, who believed that such a doctrine would endanger men's souls. Servetus' conception of man detracted from Calvin's conception of the honor and majesty of God. Servetus' denial of infant baptism conflicted with Calvin's belief in the Church as an ongoing communion of saints.

The significance of the trial and death of Servetus in the struggle for religious liberty the author has related elsewhere. Here he deviates from his detached narration only at the close of the book, where he warns us that "our slogans of liberty need continually to be thought through afresh," and concludes by stating that "seldom do we reflect that we who are aghast at the burning of one man to ashes for religion do not hesitate for the preservation of our culture to reduce whole cities to cinders."

HAROLD J. GRIMM

Indiana University

The Broadening Church: a Study of Theological Issues in the Presbyterian Church since 1869. By LEFFERTS A. LOETSCHER. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954. 195 pp. $4.75.

"Social and intellectual changes have been rapid and far-reaching in the United States since the Civil War. What has been the effect of these changes on the religious thought of the American Churches?" With

these words, Dr. Loetscher introduces his thoughtful study, and proceeds to provide at least part of the answer by a careful analysis of the theological trends in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, a Church that was "in the thick of the struggle most of the time," so that "much that transpired in it—with appropriate changes of places and names—finds broad parallels in many another leading American Church." Its story, he declares, is "a kind of theological barometer of the times."

In 1893, in one of the most famous heresy trials in the history of American Christianity, Professor Charles A. Briggs was suspended as a minister of the Presbyterian Church because of his "liberal" views regarding the Bible. In 1935, Dr. J. Gresham Machen, the fundamentalist leader who had taken a leading role in the organization of an independent Presbyterian foreign missions board because the regular board was too liberal, was himself suspended from the ministry of the denomination. Between these two dramatic incidents a theological revolution had occurred. Focusing on theological issues, but without neglecting some crucial sociological factors, the author has delineated the anatomy of this revolution. In the late nineteenth century the "New School" wing of the Church, influenced by the direction of contemporary theological thought, cautiously accepted biblical criticism and sought to revise the Westminster Confession. But solid and stubborn opposition came from the "Old School" tradition, which was committed to a somewhat scholastic and rationalistic method of deducing theological doctrine from a Bible considered to be verbally inspired and inerrant. Strong at Princeton and in the midwest, the forces opposing theological change carried the day; revision was defeated, Briggs and, a year later, Professor Henry Preserved Smith were suspended, and, later still, Professor Arthur C. McGiffert withdrew from the Church in the interests of peace.

The general theological trend of the early twentieth century was favorable to the liberal movement. Furthermore, the American denominations—the Presbyterian Church conspicuous among them in this—were highly successful in mushrooming a vast range of activities, institutions, and programs. Tension between the theological extremes jeopardized this vast enterprise. To keep its extensive machinery running smoothly, the Church centralized its administration; but at the same time, to keep

the inner tension from tearing it apart, it decentralized its control over the theological beliefs of its ministers. Therefore, Loetscher declares, "as the Presbyterian Church dealt with these theological issues, the forces that were really decisive in the discussion were not theological, but ecclesiastical; not ideological, but sociological and physical" (p. 92). This has meant that "the Church's theology has been living in a modest colonial house, more and more overshadowed by the skyscraper of the Church's active work" (p. 93). This thesis of a double movement of administrative centralization and theological decentralization is the central one of the book, and contributes to an understanding of how the liberal element could win an assured place in the life of a church that had so roundly defeated it not long before. By the fourth decade of the new century the extreme conservatives who challenged the inclusive policy—and in so doing threatened the Church's unity and the success of its program—often found themselves by one road or another outside of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. With this victory of the moderate liberals in the middle thirties the book closes.

This study should have a wide reading both within the Presbyterian Church (where it can contribute much to self-understanding and can help to heal the scars of past feuds), and, beyond it, by all who would deepen their understanding of American religion since the Civil War. To be sure, one wishes that Loetscher had analyzed the nature of the liberal theological wing as clearly and coherently as he probed the roots and character of the conservative party. His statement that American theology met the radical change in the cultural patterns of the twentieth century in three different ways is an oversimplification—it is to be hoped that the author will develop further the sensitive leads suggested in his discussion of the three, leads that point to a considerably more complex picture. This reviewer would venture to emphasize that the victory of moderate liberalism came in part, at least, because of certain soundnesses and strengths in its position, however deficient it may have been in some of its aspects. But this study as a whole, combining as it does theological competence, historical insight, and careful probing of the sources, is the kind of study that is perhaps most needed at this point in the study of American church history.

Robert T. Handy

Union Theological Seminary

The Religious Bodies of America. By F. E. Mayer. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1954. 587 pp.

The title of this work is slightly misleading. This is not a sociological treatise on religious *bodies,* but an exhaustive and comprehensive discussion of religious *beliefs.* It is, as Dr. Mayer points out in his Introduction, a comparative study of the great historic creeds, their genesis and their articulation; it is an approach to religion through what the German universities term "Comparative Symbolics."

Now H. Richard Niebuhr, a generation ago in *The Social Sources of Denominationalism,* argued strongly against this way of evaluating the religion of the United States; he found so many American denominations coterminous in membership with a caste, a race, a geographic region, that he considered theological considerations to be secondary. Many who read *The Religious Bodies of America*—particularly when they find Dr. Mayer wrestling with "the formal and material principles" of something like Pentecostalism—will be mightily tempted to agree with Niebuhr. A single example will suffice: Mayer asserts that "revivalism . . . can flourish only in the soil of Arminian doctrine" (p. 315, n. 8)—and yet throughout American history Calvinistic Baptists have held revivals. One cannot get a grip upon the beliefs of an American denomination by discussing it almost entirely in terms of the formal dogmas.

But it is not fair to chide a book for what it is not; this is the organizational scheme which Dr. Mayer has chosen. He stands within a great confessional tradition, and therefore has organized his material in confessional terms. He readily concedes that no arrangement of the several Christian positions for discussion can be fully satisfactory. If the reader is surprised to find the Anglicans grouped with the Reformed bodies, he should remember that, in Dr. Mayer's perspective, the Lutheran and Calvinist and Arminian influences in Anglican history are more significant than the Episcopate itself; Mayer as a Lutheran believes that church polities are a matter of option. If the reader is bothered by Mayer's inclusion of Buddhist communities in America in the class of Theosophy, or of American Judaism among the "Anthropocentric and Anti-Trinitarian Bodies," he should remember that, granting Dr. Mayer's premises, these are logical classifications. (I would have preferred to see *more* written about American Judaism than Mayer's three

pages, but inadequate treatment of Judaism is a failing among American Christian scholars generally. Since Dr. Mayer is not the first to sin I shall not cast the first stone.) Within the limits of the method he has chosen, Mayer has done a remarkable job of presenting the historic beliefs of the American religious bodies, copiously, with ample documentation, and in a style that enables the reader to follow the, at times, highly complex discourse even without formal theological training of his own.

But it is a perilous and heroic task that the author has set himself, to survey from his own denomination's perspective the entire spectrum of religious belief in America. He holds "the conviction that the Lutheran Confessions are a full and correct witness to . . . divinely revealed truth" (p. vii). It is proper that he should say this; "the only true objectivity," says Sigmund Neumann, "is the recognition of one's own value judgements." But Dr. Mayer also considers himself under "the obligation to censure and to correct every doctrinal trend which threatens to undermine or destroy the unity of faith." At once, a barrier is raised between him and many of his readers, including, I suspect, a good many of his Lutheran readers.

The admonition of one's brethren is a delicate business. The book is filled with descriptive terms like "alleged," "so-called," "dangerously close," "imagine," which will unfailingly alienate members of the sects being described. Jacob Albright's "conversion" away from Lutheranism in 1796 is set in quotation marks (p. 341); Otterbein "purported to have had a deep religious experience" (p. 340); Wesley could not "actually" have read Luther, or he would not have said what he did about him (p. 303, n. 47); Swedenborg "boasted" of his revelations (p. 512); the antinomians "pretend" to elevate the Gospel (166); and so on. Understandably in a Lutheran, expressions like these reach their climax when Mayer speaks of the Church of Rome. Thus the bull *Unam Sanctam* is "infamous" (p. 23); Rome's separation of the religious and secular vocations is "sinful" (p. 170); and it is "by God's Providence" that the United States was not settled by Roman Catholics (p. 199). Whether one agrees or disagrees with the papal claims, this is hardly the way to treat them in a scholarly discussion. This matter of tone is a real stumbling block, even though in almost every case Dr. Mayer quotes extensively enough from the writings of the sect concerned so that it has its argumentative "day in court."

What is more serious is that Dr. Mayer's zeal leads him at times to errors of interpretation, and at times even of fact. Minor factual errors in a work as large as this—some merely typographical (e.g., p. 447, "1850" for "1830")—are of course inevitable. But when he calls Walter Rauschenbusch's social views "the extreme form" of the Social Gospel (p. 279)—when his antimillenialism leads him to say that "even" the apostles believed in the Second Coming (p. 419)—when, forgetting St. Francis, he declares that Roman Catholicism "unlike the Eastern and the Lutheran Churches . . . leaves little room for joy" (p. 13, n. 11)—when he virtually equates Catholic Action and the Social Gospel (p. 27)—when he calls neo-orthodox eschatology "this-worldly" (p. 483)—when he shows, again and again, a lack of empathy with the tradition of mysticism (e.g., pp. 131, 407, n. 22)—it shakes one's confidence in his often admirable systematic exposition of the beliefs. In a book as thorough, scholarly, and logically organized as this one, it is a matter for deep regret that its author has so often been carried away by his own conviction (p. 283) that "Tolerance of error will sound the death-knell of true religion."

PAUL A. CARTER

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Catholicism in America: a Series of Articles from "The Commonweal." New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1954. 242 pp. $3.75.

This short volume brings together a series of articles which appeared a while ago in The Commonweal magazine. The articles, except those of Reinhold Neibuhr and Will Herberg, are from the pens of American Catholic laymen, and deal with a number of aspects of American Catholic life. In particular, they have as their principal object the clarification of those situations in which the American Catholic stands apart from his fellow-citizens and follows a course which, to many a non-Catholic, seems foreign, undemocratic, and highly dangerous to the well-being of this Republic. Dr. Conant is not the only one who considers the Church's separate school system a divisive influence in American life; the dismissal of some doctors from the staff of a Catholic hospital in New York State because of their attitude toward birth-control in dealing with hospital patients was, to

many, an unjust and high-handed procedure; the refusal of Catholic welfare agencies to remain affiliated with the New York City Welfare Council after the admission to membership of the Planned Parenthood League led to charges of "rule or ruin"; the statements of some prominent Catholic clergymen on a couple of imported and domestic films brought out cries of censorship and minority domination. There is surely no need to labor the point further. There are many areas of daily life in which the purposes and methods of most Catholics do clash with those of the non-Catholic majority.

The most encouraging thing, as I see it, about these short essays is their willingness to walk all around these conflicts, to try to understand as many as possible of the contingencies involved, to see other shades of color than white and black, to appreciate the fact that the suspicions and doubts of most non-Catholics are sincere, and not the product of conscious bigotry. This sort of goodwill does not, perhaps guarantee a complete meeting of minds in the immediate future, but at least it foreshadows a time when such controversies will generate some real light and little or no heat. In fact, it seems likely that Catholics whose minds run in the same channels as do most of these essayists are likely to reach a modus vivendi with many non-Catholics of goodwill sooner than with some of their own co-religionists.

The mention of a split among Catholics on many of the issues with which this book is concerned requires that some necessary distinctions be made, especially for the benefit of non-Catholics. There is not, nor can there be, any division among groups of Catholics about the Church's teachings in matters of dogma and moral principles. It is only when concrete application of these principles has to be made that differences arise as to which principles are applicable, or how the circumstances of the case may modify such application. James O'Gara's article on "The Catholic Isolationist" may serve as a fine illustration of this, for certainly no two groups could be farther apart in their thinking about America's role in international affairs than, for example, the editors of the Jesuit weekly, *America,* and the editorial of the Brooklyn diocesan paper, *The Tablet,* yet both approach the subject from the same set of moral principles.

There is a sense in which this disagreement among Catholics on many a vital issue may be regarded as healthy and as a means of reducing the fears, more or less well-grounded, that some non-Catholic

Americans hold about the state of affairs which would come to pass if ever the Catholics should become a majority in this country. One of the ways in which this book can be of help in calming the troubled waters of controversy between religious groups is by showing how far from reality is the picture of a monolithic Catholic power, unanimous in its thinking on every subject, from labor relations to liturgical music, or censorship of films. At least one half the essays are tracts, some fairly polemical in tone, advocating the writer's view on some subject and deprecating the opinions of Catholic opponents on the same matter. Incidentally, the reader might have received a more complete picture of the Catholic mind had one or more members of that section of Catholic opinion opposed to *The Commonweal* or *America* group been invited to contribute to this symposium—perhaps The Paulist, Father Gillis, or Patrick Scanlan of the Brooklyn *Tablet*.

Though these articles were, in the first instance, addressed to Catholics for their instruction and edification, they should prove profitable to a much wider circle. The problems aired in this book are not peculiar, for the most part, to Catholics. Others are deeply concerned about religion's role, or lack of role, in education in America; objectionable books and films are a problem to the non-Catholic as well as the Catholic. I do not think that complete answers to such difficulties are to be found in the volume, but, taken as a whole, the set of articles may help all religious groups in America to work together toward satisfactory solutions.

GEORGE B. FORD

New York City

A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion. By C. J. DUCASSE. New York: The Ronald Press, 1953. x, 441 pp. $4.50.

Introduction to Religion. By W. L. KING. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. xvi, 563 pp. $4.50.

Of these two books, one consists of a philosopher's observations concerning religion, and the other is a comprehensive introduction to religion by an author whose approach, while fundamentally historical and cultural, does achieve the quality of genuinely philosophic ap-

praisal and evaluation. Professor Ducasse writes from long years of work and reflection as a philosopher, and his book reflects the qualities of sanity, moderation and critical thinking which are the proper fruit of philosophy. This book is the product of a mind whose scrutiny of any subject matter would be philosophical. An illustration is the author's specific rejection alike of religious dogmatism and the false messianism of science (though in the light of his concluding paragraphs, one wonders if Ducasse altogether escapes the latter). For this spirit of critical reason in the study of religion we must be grateful. Fully acknowledging the book's virtues, certain fundamental criticisms must be advanced. For one thing, the author's study of the subject of religion during the past two decades, as indicated in his bibliography, is surprisingly meager. He shows little awareness of either the men or the ideas which, in the past twenty years or so, have literally re-made religious thought. His historical bibliography is likewise spotty. But what is more important than names is the apparent lack of awareness of genuinely important ideas.

An example of this lack is Ducasse's summary rejection of the arguments for the existence of God. It is a rejection which shows no awareness of such contemporary work as that of Paul Tillich or R. L. Calhoun, or of the great historical systems of thought. Professor Ducasse is entitled to reject these arguments (in this rejection I would join!), but he is most certainly not entitled in the name of philosophy to reject them as lightly or easily as he does. The subject has enormously more significance than his brief treatment begins to suggest.

Such attitudes are typical of a certain provincial ignorance concerning religion which characterizes a great number of American philosophers. There is, indeed, a mutual alienation of philosophy and religion in the contemporary mind, which is a double tragedy, for it impoverishes philosophy and leaves religion a prey of irrational and anti-rational dogmatism. Professor Ducasse would surely have written a better book if he had taken the trouble to acquaint himself with significant contemporary religious thought—and also with important chapters in the history of religious thought.

Another defect which follows from the previous one is that the book presents little or no continuity, required or provided by the subject matter. It consists rather of self-contained essays on whatever aspects of religion happen to strike the author's interest or fancy. I could not

avoid the impression of real disproportion in this respect. For example, there is a chapter on witchcraft (with illustrations) which is both longer and considerably more interesting and lively than the chapter on God.

The author's viewpoint, one gathers as the book proceeds, is a kind of wistful agnosticism. We may note in this connection his preoccupation with the question of whether or not a person has any right to "believe" religiously without rational basis or ground. He feels that many religious people do so, and, with a mixture of condescension and tolerance, he concedes a possible right to do so. This reader found himself rejecting this proposal on both historical and personal grounds as one which no vigorous religion would for a moment wish to accept. It would likewise reject the recurrent suggestion that religion be used to bolster human morality.

King's book contrasts sharply in many ways with Ducasse's. It works from a very full range of human religious phenomena—from all the major religions of the world, and from all the manifold aspects of religion. As a consequence of this kind of study, King's generalizations, in contrast to Ducasse's, have the virtue of being well-grounded in fact; and of being derived from factual study.

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of this book is its comprehensive and architectonic quality. Designed basically as an introductory text, one must conclude that it covers well the ground of introducing students to a wide variety of religious phenomena. As a text its one possible defect is that of length, which is so great that it would leave little time for the reading of primary sources. While primarily a textbook, it is much more than a conventional textbook. Indeed, it might appropriately be termed a philosophical scrutiny of religion—if by this term we may designate a careful, comprehensive and critical approach to relevant facts.

If there is a basic criticism to make of this book, it is that the genuinely distinctive aspects of biblical religion are lost in the mazes of elaborate classifications, undertaken largely from a history of religious approach. Thus, for example, little is said of revelation and faith as religious categories, mystical insight being the main type of religious knowledge considered. Even less is said of history as a basic religious category. But despite these emphases, one is impressed, on the whole, with how much rather than how little of the biblical viewpoint finds its

way into the book. For example, there is excellent discussion of the doctrine of creation and its important implications.

It is both interesting and significant to compare the conclusions of these two books. At the end Ducasse asks, What could be better than religious faith? and replies: scientific knowledge of human phenomena (parapsychological knowledge of paranormal facts, as the author characterizes them) which may yet save man from self-destruction. King concludes in contrast: "The ultimate question for man, is, then, not whether he will have *a* religion or *no* religion, but *which* of the many religions, or current substitutes for them, he will espouse as his faith."

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

Williams College

The Existence and Nature of God. (Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXVIII.) Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1954. 282 pp. $3.00.

In April of 1954, the American Catholic Philosophical Association met for two days in Milwaukee to consider the two ancient questions about God, viz., whether He exists, and, if He does, what kind of an existing being He is. Six addresses were delivered, seven round table discussions were held, but I shall not be able to discuss all of these.

The Presidential Address, "God as a Function in Modern Systems of Philosophy," was delivered by James Collins. He shows how four philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, use God as an element in their systems.

Descartes searches methodically for a presuppositionless beginning, an absolutely first principle; he criticizes as unreliable the medieval point of departure, viz., the physical world as beheld in the senses. Descartes begins with the finite substance of the thinking self as revealed in intellectual intuition. God is then invoked as the guarantor of the way back to the methodically surrendered world. God "closes the gap" (p. 4) between the introspective certainty of the thinking self and the retrospective doubt about the extended world. God is used. He is a tool. He is not sought for in and for Himself.

Spinoza, in turn, undertakes a critique of Descartes' finite substance.

He finds this starting-point a compromise. If substance is that which requires nothing but itself in order to exist, then there is only one substance. Spinoza substitutes this infinite substance which is God for the finite substance of the thinking self as the first principle of his *Ethics*. Descartes' crooked path (from self to God to world) is made straight; in Spinoza the orders of ideas and things are deduced *directly* from the substance of God. The recession from the senses has come full circle; the empirical world is now a geometrical deduction. God, not "being *qua* being," has become the proper subject-matter of metaphysics.

Coming to Kant, Professor Collins shows how his rejection of the realistic a posteriori proofs of God's existence was dictated, not so much by his conviction of God's transcendence as by his commitment to a theory of existence which, in turn, was dictated by the phenomenalistic theory of knowledge he received uncritically from the hands of David Hume. In other words, Kant had less a theory of existence than a doctrine on "the conditions for a certain type of existential *knowledge*" (p. 11). The concept of God denoted nothing existential in Kant's philosophy, since it was ineligible to be a concept of possible experience in the first place: it was not temporal, or finite and representable, or synthesizable with the apperceptive field. Existence, for Kant as for Hume, is always a relational question, a matter of system, context, and homogeneity with the remainder of experience. Even assuming this to be true, Professor Collins maintains that it is irrelevant to the traditional a posteriori proofs, for these proofs allege to attain not to God, or even a concept of the existence of God; they prove not even "precisely God's existence but rather the truth of our proposition that God exists" (p. 13).

Professor Collins concludes his address with a rather too cursory examination of Hegel. He finds that Hegel destroys the reality of the creature-creator relation by sublating both terms as moments in the Idea of Absolute Spirit or Thought. Some day one would like to read a paper by Professor Collins on the function of God in British empirical philosophies.

Vernon Bourke writes an interesting critique of "Invalid Proofs for God's Existence." These invalid proofs are: varieties of ontologism, Augustine's proof from man's eternally true judgments, Leibniz' proof from the principle of sufficient reason, the proof from the natural desire for a summum bonum, the proof from the experience of being

morally obliged, the "universal consent of mankind" proof, the "supreme watchmaker" proof of Deism, fideistic proofs, and others.

Peter W. Nash studies the relation of "ordinary knowledge" of God's existence to a "philosophical demonstration" of his existence. His testimony as to the ordinary or pre-philosophical knowledge of God comes from Oscar Wilde, Leo Tolstoy, and St. Augustine. His thesis is that the "sense" of God that such men have, though enveloped in affectivity and sentiment, is radically cognitive. Father Nash seems to be saying that, as our "subjective" summum bonum fails to bring us the happiness we seek, humility comes, and with it a virtual affirmative judgment that God, the objective summum bonum, exists. He joins Maritain in endeavoring to remove from the traditional proofs "the appearance of a metaphysical algebra" (p. 75).

Two remaining papers bear directly on the subject of proof. Professor Vincent E. Smith shows cogently that the physical proof, from movement, of a first unmoved mover, is an indispensable prolegomenon to the metaphysical and theological proofs of God's existence, for it is only in the physical proof that man comes upon separated (i.e., immaterial) substance, thus learning that being is not coextensive with mobility. It is only subsequent to that discovery that the subject-matter of first philosophy—"being *qua* being"—is established in its full metaphysical generality.

Father Wolter devotes an interesting paper to the structure of Duns Scotus' proof for the existence of God, defending it against a prevalent misconception that would assimilate it to the ontological proof. Father Brady appends a short paper on the reactions and criticisms of Scotus' proof by five fellow Franciscans. The fifth of these critics is William of Ockham, who, Father Brady assures us, "did not criticize Scotus because he was English and Scotus reputedly Irish—*qui raro concordant* (Mauritius a Portu)—nor to show off his learning, but out of excessive respect for the demands of demonstration" (p. 130).

Professor Richard McKeon, of Chicago, delivered the Association Address on "Contemporary French Philosophy." In this penetrating address, delivered from the heights of an almost inter-planetary level of generality, French and American philosophies are contrasted, compared, and restated. With Gilson, McKeon believes that "All philosophy is a metaphysical experience pushed to its limit concerning the content of an idea" (p. 26). Accordingly, McKeon undertakes to restate

and put into communication with each other those metaphysical experiences that are called "scientific positivism," "pragmatic naturalism," "existential phenomenology," and "thomism." As he does so, he remains, all the while, keenly alive to the danger that "philosophies are transformed into opinions in restatement" (p. 17).

How are such diverse philosophies philosophically manageable? Professor McKeon accomplishes this by reducing contemporary French philosophy to "manageable philosophic form" by treating it "in the still larger frame of philosophical problems that come to the fore in both French and American philosophy when existence, experience, history—and, if the problem were explored more fully, language—are made primary facts in philosophic speculation" (p. 18). As McKeon makes abundantly clear, the influence of the method of dialectic is powerfully in evidence in almost every form of contemporary French philosophy, independently of whether it begins with existence, experience, or history. And "even efforts to establish non-dialectical metaphysics on 'being' rather than 'existence' have been adjusted to the involutions of that dialectic" (p. 22). In America, on the other hand, experience and existence are usually explored by the method of inductive science and the method of "logistic."

Some idea of the scope of this paper can be gathered by listing the philosophers treated: Merleau-Ponty, Le Senne, Lavelle, Marcel, Sartre, Dewey, James, Gilson. The paper also recounts a personal anecdote—rare for McKeon—of a conversation he had with Sartre and of some suggestions he offered Sartre about American and French philosophy in view of the latter's then pending trip to America. "My suggestions were not helpful to Sartre—although he did urge me to expand and publish the analysis I had outlined, remarking wryly that it would have more significance and pertinence to existing problems than the abstract metaphysical speculations on which I was engaged" (p. 20). We should be grateful that Professor McKeon has taken his own suggestions to heart, and has produced a paper that so ably "communicates between" so many diverse philosophical experiences, and that it accomplishes this task instructively, irenically, wisely, and briefly.

Round table discussions were held on logic and method, metaphysics, philosophy of nature, moral and political philosophy, history of philosophy, and philosophical problems. Only one round table will be mentioned, Mr. McTighe's paper on "The Finite God in Modern

Thought," with comments by Lottie Kendzierski. If to characterize God, with Brightman and James, as finite, comes to Mr. McTighe "rather as a shock," it is, as he says, "worse still" (p. 212) to hear Him characterized, with Hartshorne and Whitehead, as a finite-infinite being. He "is set to wondering how such a viewpoint could ever be considered, let alone be set forth as a rational account of the nature of God" (p. 212). But since, historically, it has been so set forth in all its philosophical indecency, it receives from both discussants extended if unimaginative treatment. The texts, especially of the Whitehead-Hartshorne view, are all there, but the rational coherence and the relevance to religious experience are never seen from the inside. A daring and almost (if anything) too rational "rational theology" is transformed, in restatement, into a vacuous "opinion." Also, it ought to be remarked, this panentheistic metaphysics arose not to bridge the "antinomy between the God of Christian philosophy and the God of theology" (p. 235), but to bridge the gulf between *both* of these and the God empirically found living in the religious experience of a man at prayer.

JOHN MURRAY CUDDIHY

The Image of God in Man. By DAVID S. CAIRNS. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 252 pp. $4.50.

The doctrine of man's creation "in the image of God" has led to some notoriously slippery theological distinctions. The biblical uses of the phrase defy systematic treatment. Protestant reformers rejected the Roman Catholic handling of the doctrine, not only because they detected an erroneous exegesis in the distinction between "image" and "likeness," but especially because they wanted to declare that the effects of the Fall were apparent through the whole of human nature. Liberal theology has cherished the theme of man's divine spark, and has made the *imago dei* one of the foundations of the doctrine of the "worth of human personality." More recently Brunner and Barth have had their famous controversy about the "formal image," which Brunner holds remains with fallen man, a debate which seems to take a fresh turn with each new volume of Barth's *Dogmatics.*

Into this maze of difficulties Mr. Cairns has ventured, and it is cause

for satisfaction that he makes his way with clarity, scholarly penetration, and common sense. This is an uncommonly good book in contemporary theology and one that, for all its modesty of spirit, has some fresh and highly pertinent things to say about the Christian faith as the answer to man's plight.

Cairns takes the general line of Brunner and Barth as he argues for the "biblical" view of man against alien philosophies. Yet he takes the theme which the liberals consider seriously, that of the sacredness of man, as a central issue in modern life, and he argues that the Christian faith, understood through the Bible, does uphold the dignity of man over against contemporary doctrines such as those of Freud and Marx, to mention the two which he discusses at some length. Supporting his argument by a careful study of the biblical materials, he argues that there is a clear teaching in both Old Testament and New of a universal image of God in man which is not lost in the Fall, and which is the basis for a universal confrontation of man with God, the Absolute Thou. He further refuses to countenance some recent rejection of the doctrine of the "fatherhood of God," for there is a clear sense in which the universal fatherhood is taught in the Bible, though Mr. Cairns, of course, does not find the center of the Gospel at this point.

But to this universal image there must be added in the Christian doctrine of man that image which may be defined as man's spiritual response as a free being to God's command. This image is lost in the Fall. Cairns follows a clue offered by Augustine in stressing that the image of God thus conceived involves the *power* to obey and to respond to God, and this power is not in natural man's possession. Without grace man cannot grow in the direction of a right relation to God. The carefully worked out historical part of the argument can only be mentioned here. Cairns follows the tangled trail of Christian anthropology through the Church Fathers, Aquinas, the Reformers, down to the present day. He summarizes wide reading in the extensive critical literature, as well as first-hand judgment of his own on the significance of the *imago dei* in the history of Christian thought.

This reader is left with two unresolved problems concerning the argument for Cairns' own position. One concerns his theological method. He declares for the "biblical" view of theological matters; but this present volume does not develop the norms of biblical interpreta-

tion. Probably the clue lies in Christology as the key to biblical interpretation, but this point needs further development, it seems to this reviewer.

The other question is related to the first, for it concerns the possibility of discussion between Christians and non-Christians. Does the universal *imago dei* for which Cairns contends offer a point of contact between the Christian faith and the rational reflection of natural man? His answer here does not seem wholly clear. With Brunner he wants to assert a universal confrontation of man with God. The universal "image of God in man" is the basis for this. But, also with Brunner, he wants to deny any validity whatever to "natural theology." But how can you have one without the other? Certainly natural theology will never be complete or "adequate" from a Christian point of view, but some rational reflection about divine things seems possible for man who does bear in his own nature a structural relationship to the divine. These questions at least suggest that Mr. Cairns has raised some fundamental points and given an important discussion of them. It is a valuable book on a theme which touches every human life.

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

Union Theological Seminary

Christian Faith and Natural Science. By KARL HEIM. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. 256 pp. $3.50.

The Transformation of the Scientific World View. By KARL HEIM. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. 262 pp. $3.50.

These are books by a distinguished theologian who is also a metaphysician, and who understands the discoveries and theoretical implications of modern science. They complement each other in dealing with the relation of the sciences to religion, especially the faith of Christianity.

The first book is the more metaphysical of the two. For Dr. Heim the fundamental clue to an interpretation of man, the universe, and God is a hierarchy of *spaces.* Personal existence—the ego—is tied to an objective body in three-dimensional space. The only place where I have an inner picture of reality is in my brain. All I know is my own constant self, but this ego can never be grasped objectively. Its reality

and the encounters between it and other egos and the world belong in a region outside the three dimensions of the body, in a *non-objective* space. The body and the ego thus belong to different spaces. Each person's non-objective space is different from every other person's. We suspect that other human individuals are like us, as to a lesser extent are other natural objects. These all possess a substructure which is essentially psychical. The important idea is that there is a mode of being which differs from observable, objective existence.

The various objective spaces—Euclidean, with three dimensions, and the various Riemannian spaces—as well as non-objective space, are all *polar*. They each have an aspect of before and after, here and there, now and then. Transcending such polar space is a *superpolar* one, a separate, all-embracing space which is where God dwells. He alone is absolute and can say to Himself, "I am that I am." In other spaces, with their continuous polar cycles, we are caught between *relativism,* the values of which come into being and then may cease to be, and *positivism,* in which we try to establish some arbitrary point in the cycle to which everything can be related. We can escape from this dilemma only into the superpolar space of God, which cannot be understood by reason but is disclosed to us as sight might be to one born blind. This is the great revelation of Jesus.

In *The Transformation of the Scientific World View,* Dr. Heim discusses the profound changes in our thinking which have been brought about by the revolution in modern physics. The old absolutes have collapsed. Absolute matter, the basis of materialism, is no more. The dualism of corpuscles and waves cancels each, and matter is known only by its localized and intermittent effects. Absolute space is gone, through the theory of relativity with its concept of the curvature of space and the constancy of the speed of light under all conditions. Absolute time is gone, since there is no time scale without conscious beings. The physical world by itself has no temporality, but simply *is.* Absolute determinism is gone, since laws are statistical and the behavior of ultimate physical particles is unpredictable. Quantum mechanics rules out determinism mathematically. A-causal decision *can* happen. This collapse of the causal-mechanical world picture has made room for God. He is the superpolar reality, the only absolute. To rebel against God is to set up something else as absolute—such as matter or man.

Uncertainty as to the future, which these conceptions introduce, is banished by Christ's revelation of the existence of God in superpolar space. In a polar mode of being only the past is certain. To go beyond the frontier of the future we must exist in a new space, accessible through faith in God. No intellectual demonstration will suffice for this. All scientific observation and calculation are in the polar world and can be transcended only by faith in something higher, working through conscience.

The universe is not a dead mechanism but governed personally by the will of God. The human will is an instrument of God, and faith gives access to a sphere beyond all earthly powers. Nature is not mechanical but psychical. The words "causality," "fate," and "destiny" are not found in Christ's teaching. Miracles happen, not by the interjection of God's power to overrule natural processes, but as acts of a personal control which is always operating.

There is no sharp line, Dr. Heim believes, between the living and the lifeless. In all nature, from atoms and crystals to organisms, there is evident a "wholeness tendency" which pulls matter together into forms, which are constantly maintained. Its demonstration in experimental embryology and other fields is well discussed. This tendency to wholeness is the foundation of goal-seeking and purpose, so that in all nature we can recognize a psychical element. Only in non-objective space can we catch a glimpse of how this tendency operates. Even here we cannot penetrate very deeply but are like deaf men at a concert, who see objectively the motion of the instruments but cannot perceive the harmonies they create.

These are difficult ideas to follow, and Dr. Heim discusses them in that rather complex metaphysical style which the Teutonic mind so often favors. It seems doubtful whether the concept of God as a being in superpolar, non-objective space will save many souls, but the author's intelligent interpretation of the data of physics and biology may well reassure some for whom there have been intellectual barriers between science and religious faith.

The present reviewer is in hearty agreement with Dr. Heim's position that the wholeness tendency, so conspicuous in bodily development and function, is the basis for all psychical phenomena. Whether this tendency operates in the inorganic, however, seems more doubtful. That nature is controlled by the personal will of God and that man's

will can become a part of it is a challenging concept. "No quantum jump can happen without your Father in heaven." One is reminded here of Schrödinger's conclusion that "I—I in the widest meaning of the word, that is to say, every conscious mind that has ever said or felt 'I'—am the person, if any, who controls the 'motion of the atoms' according to the Laws of Nature."

EDMUND W. SINNOTT

Yale University

BOOK NOTES

A Study of Orissan Folk-Lore. By KUNJBERHARI DAS. Santiniketan: Visva-bharati Press, 1953. VIII, 183 pp. Rs. 6.

The last fifty pages of this book consist of Oriya verses of various sorts: ballads, songs of men at work, love songs, and religious verse, written in Devanagari characters and translated into English. Similar materials are also scattered throughout the volume, and there is much description of folkways, of festivals, and of worship and characterization of divinities, mostly in localized forms, interspersed with songs. All of this belongs to the "mass" literature of Orissa, wholly a folk product. The poets work over incidents in the Epics and Purānas, which are the sources of their inspiration. For example, "Draupadi is portrayed as a village woman . . . complaining of her residence in a potter's house." The Great War started as a quarrel between village boys at play. "The marriage of Shiva and Parvati reminds one of a young village girl married to an octogenarian."

The creators of this literature are of three types: eminent poets addressing themselves to the masses, village poets, and "lip-composers" of songs. In the first group, Sāralā Dās, "the father of Oriya literature and worthiest representative of the people's culture," was of the mass (p. 124), a shudra, a plowman. The second group produces enormous quantities of songs, which are printed and sold at fairs and festivals. The third group is made up of ordinary villagers, whose themes are strictly of the village, whose songs, for the most part, consists of short jumbles of words which take hold of the rustic and are sung over and over again.

An interesting institution is the *Pālā,* a means by which religious teaching is mediated to the people. A *Pālā* consists of six persons—a chief singer (who represents and expounds a scholar-poet-teacher) and his chorus. It assumes a special dress, ornament, and paint decorations, and uses drums for accompaniment. *Pālā* parties engage in contests or debates on religious subjects, carrying on extemporaneously, often for a month or more (p. 67). The songs are "long, crude and complicated." The *Pālā* was created in an attempt at Hindu-Muslim unity, and some results may be noted. Disciples of Bhallavāchārya, who were taught by Ismila gurus, are Muslims who retain and observe Hindu rites at home (p. 73). Satyapīr, originally of dual character (*Satya,* Hindu; *Pīr,* Muslim), is now simply a Hindu god. Much comes within the range of the *Pālās'* interests, as Tantric, Yogic, and sectarian names indicate.

This collection of folklore is well analyzed and valuable, its only fault being the scrappy nature of the descriptions. Professor Das, a member of the staff at Santiniketan, has devoted many years to collecting Orissan folklore, a considerable amount of which has been published. This volume was prepared at the suggestion of the head of the Department of Graduate Studies and Research at the Visvabharati, and appears as Number 16 of the Visvabharati Annals.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Islam. By Alfred Guillaume. London: Penguin Books, 1954. 208 pp. 50¢.

After some recent books on Islam which seem morbidly anxious to avoid saying anything critical about this religion lest Muslims be offended, it is refreshing to read this new Pelican Book (A.311) by Professor Guillaume, of the London School of Oriental Studies, which not only pays tribute where tribute is due, but is frankly critical where criticism is justified. To give an adequate account of both the Islam of the orthodox schools and the modernist Islam of our day in brief compass necessarily calls for drastic condensation, and the author is to be congratulated on the way in which he has compressed so much into the limited space at his disposal. The book begins with a brief account of the background out of which Islam came and apart from which it is hardly intelligible, and then in eight chapters deals with the Prophet, the Book, the Empire, the apostolic Tradition, the Sects, the early development of theology and philosophy, the Sufi mysticism, and Islam today. This is followed by a brief, and perhaps unnecessary, comparison of Islam with Christianity, a very useful glossary of commonly used technical terms, and some suggestions for further reading. The author is at his best in discussing the apostolic tradition and the growth of the legal system. The most disappointing section is that on Islam today, which devotes too much attention to the modifications of Muslim law made necessary by modern conditions, and apart from some account of the reinterpretations of doctrine suggested by such Indian Muslims as Muhammad Ashraf and Muhammad Iqbal, has little or nothing to say of the rich development of modernist thinking on theology, both systematic and practical, and the very numerous reforming movements which today are active from Morocco to Indonesia, some frankly reactionary and some over radically progressive, but all of the utmost significance for the future of Islam in the modern world.

A. J.

Jüdische Geisteswelt: Zeugnisse aus zwei Jahrtausenden. Edited by Hans Joachim Schoeps. Darmstadt and Geneva: Holle Verlag, 1953. 357 pp.

The publisher of this attractive anthology has recently instituted a series of such volumes of selections, to be under the general editorship of Hermann Noack and under the series title "Geist des Abendlandes." Previous volumes of the series have dealt with the intellectual life of the English, French, and German nations. Although religious writers have been incidentally represented among the included selections, the emphasis has been on philosophic and literary rather than religious interest. Thus, the volume edited by Hans Joachim Schoeps, of Erlangen University, differs in two ways from its predecessors in the series: it is primarily concerned with religious matters, and it is not a national anthology but that of an ethnic minority, in its "western" experience, at any rate. Despite this evidence of the survival of a shadow of the Nazi rejection of the Jewish contribution to German civilization, it is a wel-

come note to find this book included in such a series, and edited by so distinguished a Jewish scholar as Schoeps.

There is a wide range of selections included here, and perhaps it is carping, under the special circumstances to which I have called attention above, to criticize Schoeps for what he has chosen to include or to omit. Yet, in the perspective of the two thousand years of Jewish intellectual life that the volume covers, it seems strange that the largest section of the book, nearly fifty pages, is devoted to presenting a group of recent selections headed "German Jewry," and that one of the pieces here presented *in extenso* (thirteen pages, when Maimonides has been granted less than nine!) is a selection from a work written by the editor when he was twenty-five years old. Surely both the relative size of this section and the amount of space given to his own work are indicative of a certain lack of historical perspective. Furthermore, it seems to me strange that an earlier section, "Modern Materials for the Spirit of Judaism," includes only French and German sources; there is here no evidence of the rich mine of Jewish thinking both in Eastern Europe and in America, and certainly no trace of the vital recent thought in the Holy Land. Again, although the editor allows about half as much space to the Talmudic world-view as to German Jewry, the selections he has made do not include the most characteristic type of Talmudic literature, the legal, or better, hermeneutic discussion. Thus an erroneous impression of the Talmud emerges from the book. These, it seems to me, are the chief points with which one might take issue.

For all these, the book is a most useful and attractive one. It contains some selections that are not readily available, like J. J. Schudt's early eighteenth century description of divine worship in the Frankfurt synagogue, and some of the local ordinances of medieval Jewish communities. The supplementation of a purely chronological arrangement with a topical breakdown for recent times is helpful to the reader.

J. L. B.

The Gospel before Mark. By Pierson Parker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. ix, 266 pp. $6.50.

This is a book of literary criticism of the Gospels dealing with some phases of the synoptic problem. It, therefore, operates in a somewhat technical and highly complicated realm, in which only those with some experience can judge the process and the evidence, and they can do so only by minute checking of the linguistic statistics. Otherwise, the author's views are likely to be approved or disapproved on insufficient grounds. Their unfamiliarity, their contradiction of familiar modern assumptions such as the priority of Mark, their apparent similarity to phases of older and rejected theories like the Tübingen hypothesis, the Ur-marcus theory, or the doctrine of written Aramaic originals, will repel some readers or skimmers of the book, on quite inadequate grounds. On the other hand, the result of Dr. Parker's thesis in vin-

dicating the primitiveness of the Matthean account of the Virgin Birth and of much else in Matthew, and in confirming the accuracy of the accounts of gospel origins in Papias and other early Christian writers will appeal to other readers for reasons quite different from the validity of the argument here adduced.

The position presented is original and well worked out. It is clearly stated and repeated from several angles. It leaves undisturbed parts of the usual synoptic solution—the existence of Q, and the dependence of Luke on Q and Mark and other material (L). Its unusual feature is its rejection both of the dependence of Mark on Matthew (the Catholic view) and of the dependence of Matthew on Mark (a common Protestant view), and its new proposal that both Matthew and Mark derive from a common lost document, which for convenience is denominated K. Thus, of three potential solutions of such problems of literary likeness, it adopts one which, in this case, is unusual, though identical with the type of argument by which parts of Matthew and Luke are traced to a common lost document called Q. Parker's views of the history may be given in his own words:

> The K Gospel was written in Palestine, probably in Aramaic, and, with considerable likelihood, by the apostle Matthew. It appeared in the face of the Judaizing controversy, at a time when not only Paul but Peter had gone over to the gentile side. It made its way to Rome, possibly in Aramaic, more likely in a Greek translation. There, under Peter's influence, it was abridged and its content revised by John Mark, himself an active missionary to the Gentiles. Meanwhile it was preserved and prized by the Jewish Christian community in Palestine. It was made the basis for later Jewish Christian expansions, the most notable of which was the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Before that, but long after the Judaizing controversy had ceased to be of moment, this original Gospel was combined with the Antiochean saying, source Q to make the present Gospel of Matthew (p. 155).

As should be done with such proposals, the thesis is argued systematically by evidence from language and style (Part I), from structure (Part II) and from Content (Part III). The linguistic argument is the most complex and difficult to follow, though it is eased for those ignorant of Greek by giving (except in the supporting lists of the appendices) the Greek words in English transliteration and translation, and though it appears to be in accordance with the only kind of procedure possible when one tries to argue in such matters from vocabulary.

At another stage the argument requires correlation with a supposed reconstruction of early Church history as affecting the gospel perspective. As the quoted passage indicates, Parker holds that the Judaistic controversy affected the gospels as much as he thinks it did, the other epistles as well as Galatians. His reconstruction of the play of Jewish Christian or anti-Gentile forces, of Gentile Christian or anti-Judaistic forces, and of the combination between them, will remind the reader of the views of F. C. Baur and, more recently, of

S. G. F. Brandon. He does well to work this and other implications of his theory out in detail. Both his own theory, as well as rival theories like the Two-Document Hypothesis and the Four-Document Hypothesis, are to be judged not by themselves alone, but by comparison in full. What each theory seems *not* to solve as well as to solve must be compared, for any theory will seem to explain some of the data. The best the student can do is to judge which hypothesis seems the most probable, or, better said, the least improbable. A brief review, or even a first reading, of a book like this hardly provides enough ground for a mature answer.

HENRY J. CADBURY

The School of St. Matthew. By KRISTER STENDAHL. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1954. 249 pp. Kr. 18.

Only rarely are doctoral dissertations of much importance, but in this volume we have the rare exception. Presented in 1954 at Uppsala by a young Swedish scholar, this thesis was written and defended in English. It is a mature, careful, thorough and provocative piece of research, with wide implications for many aspects of New Testament study.

Stendahl's major objective is to define correctly the milieu for the composition of Matthew. He finds this milieu in a school, not for converts in the pre-baptismal period, but for teachers and church leaders. Accordingly, the Gospel takes the form of "a handbook and a storehouse for teaching, preaching and church government." The closest analogies may be found not only in the Didachê but in the Qumran Manual of Discipline. All three contain summaries of doctrines and ethics, impregnated by the eschatological atmosphere in which the sect lived. Each school provided a setting of study and instruction in which the sacred traditions were systematically organized and interpreted in the light of the Old Testament.

According to Stendahl, "the almost conclusive argument" for this position is provided by the manner in which Matthew used the Old Testament. The larger part of the volume is devoted to laying out this evidence in great detail. Each citation and allusion is examined with care, and the possible reasons for each variant are weighed. In many cases the manner of quoting is similar to the type of scriptural interpretation to be found in the Commentary on Habakkuk in the Dead Sea Scrolls. This fact points to the existence, not of a special text of the Old Testament, nor of a separate book of Testimonies, but to the consistent policies of a scribal school.

The volume advances the boundaries of Form Criticism with its more precise description of one important *Sitz im Leben*. It extends and corrects the accent on liturgical influence to be found in Carrington and Kilpatrick. It adds further obstacles to the theory of Aramaic originals for any of the Gospels. It helps us to understand the motivation and function of quotations in other

New Testament writings. All in all, it is an illuminating study. American scholarship should welcome the news that Professor Stendahl is now teaching at Harvard Divinity School.

PAUL S. MINEAR

The Gospel of the Spirit: A Study of the Fourth Gospel. By E. C. COLWELL and E. L. TITUS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. 190 pp. $2.50.

This is a fresh and readable interpretation of the religious ideas of the Gospel of John. The literary problems of the book, the author's method and purpose, and the relations to its cultural milieu are discussed only to help the reader understand what the present interpreters find to be his presentation of the religious character of Christianity. They believe he used not only Luke and Mark but also Acts and the letters of Paul. What he omits from the Synoptic portrait of Jesus and from the theology of Paul is as significant for understanding John as what he shares or elaborates. The most unfamiliar feature of the book is its view that the controlling idea of this Gospel is the Spirit. Jesus receives it at the baptism, and gives it to his disciples when he leaves them. "Not only in an allegorical sense but in a more literal one, this is a 'spiritual gospel' " (p. 41). I am not sure that this is proved. That it can be asserted is only another evidence of the elusive manysidedness of this baffling gospel. At any rate, the authors are quite right in stressing again the relative unimportance of the term *logos* (pp. 143-47) and, indeed, of philosophy in general. This book can be recommended to readers of quite varying backgrounds, whether beginners or well-informed. I believe the only footnote to employ Greek words (p. 128) has chosen a wrong one.

By its avowed dual authorship this book raises for the detective or higher critic some literary problems not unlike those that some persons find in the gospel that it discusses. A partial answer may be found in the acknowledged but not indicated "extensive quotations" from Colwell's earlier *John Defends the Gospel* (1936), now out of print. They include much of chapters 2, 4 and 6 in the new volume, but the material in the other three chapters mostly is new, and the whole book is differently organized and gives a different impression. Chapter 3, "The Evangelist's Method," is a useful summary, but otherwise the additions of the new volume are less valuable than the material retained or omitted from the old one.

HENRY J. CADBURY

Sanctorum Communio. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung über das Symbolglied. By ISTVÁN BENKÖ. Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1951. 92 pp.

Dr. Benkö's dissertation was accepted for a doctorate at Basel upon recommendation of Professors Cullmann and Stähelin. It is a study of the background and meaning of the latest phrase to be incorporated in the Apostles' Creed, "the communion of saints." Scholars have long debated whether the *sanctorum* represents originally a masculine *sancti* or a neuter *sancta*. The latest discussion

in English, which appeared perhaps too late for Dr. Benkö to use, is in J. N. D. Kelly's *Early Christian Creeds* (pp. 388-97), where the masculine *sancti* is favored. This, the more traditional view, was rejected in favor of the neuter *sancta* by such scholars as Zahn, von Dobschütz, Elert, and Cullmann, and with this group the author aligns himself. Specifically, he believes that *sanctorum communio* originally referred to the sacraments of Baptism and Eucharist.

His principal line of argument is that the addition of *sanctorum communio* is the result of a long development in the Western Church, beginning with Callistus and Cyprian, in the doctrine of the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins. Originally, the third section of the Creed listed the primary gifts of Baptism: Holy Spirit, Holy Church, Remission of Sins, and Resurrection of the Flesh. But once the ancient tradition was broken, by the newer penitential disciplines developed in the third century, the Western Fathers taught that remission of sins could be obtained after Baptism by the ascetic means of prayer and almsgiving, and, in particular, by participation in the Eucharist.

The author notes that specific references to Baptism are rare in Western creeds, and suggests that, at the time when the Eastern Churches were adding to their creeds "one Baptism for the remission of sins," a parallel development was taking place in the West in the addition of the *sanctorum communio,* as a reference to the remission of sins in the sacraments. He does not accept the theory that the Western clause is of Eastern origin, though he notes that a literal translation of it (with the neuter *sancta)* would mean unmistakably in Greek a reference to the sacraments, especially the Eucharist.

Without identifying the exact place of origin of the phrase, the author believes that it arose about 350. He points to an interesting parallel in *Sermo* 214 on the Creed, by St. Augustine, in which the phrase *communione sacramentorum* occurs between the phrases *sanctam ecclesiam* and *remissio peccatorum.* There is, however, no evidence that the North African Creed ever contained the clause "communion of saints." Of the four early instances of *sanctorum communio* adduced by Dr. Benkö, the meaning is not as clear as he contends, for suspension from the sacraments is equivalent to some kind of excommunication, which is, in turn, expulsion from the Church.

The real difficulty with the author's thesis comes when he deals with the earliest expositions of the Creed, with this added clause, in Western writers, such as Nicetas, Faustus of Riez, and the pseudo-Augustinian sermons. For none of them takes *sanctorum* as referring to the sacraments. The best Dr. Benkö can do is to suggest that the phrase is a generation older than Nicetas, and that already its meaning has undergone a change. This is well-nigh an admission of defeat!

It is perfectly true that the phrase can mean the sacraments, and Dr. Benkö is probably right in insisting that it is unlikely that the phrase originally had a double rather than a single meaning. But he has neglected to give sufficient attention to the following points: (1) by ignoring the investigation of the place of origin of the phrase, he cannot treat systematically the change of meaning. If

the phrase first arose in Gaul, it would be necessary to explore more thoroughly the whole Gallican tradition. It is significant that both Faustus and later Caesarius refer the clause to the "saints" in the technical sense, and Nicetas is not far removed from this interpretation. Thus, (2) the author has not paid enough attention to the significance of the development in the fourth century of the cultus of the saints. Hence the new clause need not necessarily be a mere repetition or definition of the clause about the Church. Much less is there any need to view it as a counterblast to the Donatist claim of being a "holy" Church. It is much more likely to represent something of the newer developments in Christian eschatology in the fourth century, as it gives a narrower definition to *sancti* than that of ancient Christian tradition. We must remember, too, that the fourth century saw the beginnings of decline in frequent participation by the people in the Eucharistic "communion." Is it possible that this development is related in some way to the parallel rise of interest in "communion" with "the saints" by way of relics, pilgrimages, and such devotions?

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

Das kirchliche Benefizialwesen Schwedens während des Mittelalters. Die Periode der Landschafsrechte. By IVAR NYLANDER. Stockholm: A.-B. Nordiska Bokhandelen, 1953. 334 pp. Kr. 20.

This work would probably never have been written except for the requirement of doctoral dissertations. While the author has studied theology, his viewpoint is not theological, nor is it mainly, as one might imagine from the title of the work, economic. A doctorate in law is involved, and the viewpoint is mainly legal. The thesis has been deemed worthy of publication in a series of works dealing with research in judicial history. The influence of the yeomanry and the absence of true feudalism made conditions in Sweden different from those on the continent, and the canon law was not always followed in Sweden. Such differences are noted.

Modern theses are often written in one of the leading languages. The author has judged that the German medium would attract the greatest number of interested readers. In this case you wonder. The German reader may ascertain the author's conclusions, but he cannot always follow his reasoning. Aside from numerous footnotes, the author incorporates more than fifty pages of quotations from the sources in the text itself. These quotations are sometimes in Latin but generally in the pithy language of Swedish laws from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and they are left untranslated. A grasp of Swedish and Finnish geography is also presupposed.

The author confines himself, in the main, to the period between 1200 and 1350. He admits that it would have been more natural to deal with the whole of the later medieval period, but this would have been too vast a field for a doctor's thesis. The preceding period is excluded because of the lack of legal sources. It is, however, discussed briefly, largely by way of conjecture.

The property of the cathedrals and of the individual parishes is discussed and how it is divided between that which appertains to the episcopal or priestly "table" and the part which must be applied to the upkeep of the churches themselves or other purposes. Then follows a discussion of other sources of income besides property. Rights of hospitality played a large role in the case of the bishops and needed to be defined. Tithes were very important and were divided between the priests (who received the largest portion), the bishop, the churches, and the poor (who were often deprived of their share) in a somewhat different manner than on the continent. The property and income of the numerous monasteries is left almost completely out of the study.

The reader is left pretty much in the dark as to how large and sufficient, or vice versa, the wealth and income of the Church was and as to its rate of growth by numerous bequests. There is no inkling of the popular opposition which sought to limit bequests to the Church by the dying, etc. The struggle in regard to the celibacy of the clergy, which went on in Sweden during the period under discussion, is not referred to, although it makes a difference if priests are allowed to marry, and if their children may become their legitimate heirs, or not.

CONRAD PETERSON

The Reformation in England. By PHILIP HUGHES. 2 Vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951, 1954. Vol. I, xxi, 404 pp. $6.00. Vol. II, xxv, 366 pp. $7.50.

Philip Hughes at the outset makes his own position unambiguous toward the Reformation in England. The frontispiece is a facsimile of the signatures of sixty-six prelates who signed the Repudiation of Papal Supremacy. The caption is "The Fort Betrayed." Nevertheless, the tone is not polemical. The English Reformation was, in fact, the most Catholic phase of Protestantism, and under Henry VIII the break with Rome was not doctrinal. Even in the treatment of Luther the tone is dispassionate; he is portrayed as both a protest against and a result of Occamist perversions.

In the beginning, an extensive account is given of the political and social conditions in England on the eve of the Reformation. The monasteries were guilty not of enormities but of succumbing to the frailities of human nature. The parish clergy were divided into the learned and the unlearned, with the latter prevailing. Among high ecclesiastics, Wolsey introduced a shameless pluralism. The divorce proceedings of Henry VIII were dragged out inexcusably because the Pope was utterly lacking in decisiveness. Yet, in the end, he rightly insisted that he could not settle the case without having heard both sides. He hesitated so long, not because he was intimidated by Charles of Spain, the nephew of Catherine of Aragon, but because the Pope feared the consequences in England should Henry VIII be alienated.

In discussing the political theory of the Henrican reform, Hughes finds a great influence of the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsiglio of Padua, described as "the most mischievous book of the whole Middle Ages." Rather surprising that in this chapter the footnotes take no account of the work of Franklin Baumer, *The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship* (1940).

The fate of heretics under "Bloody Mary" receives considerable attention. There is no question that "273 were burned for heresy by the authority of Queen Mary Tudor." They were for the most part obscure peasants and craftsmen. Their barbarous treatment was only a part of the general inhumanity of the age. The Protestants, in their turn, were no more humane toward heretics. The full responsibility does not rest upon the Catholic Church, because the state rather than the church took the initiative in the prosecutions, and the victims were not only heretics but also constituted a political menace. Such is the point of view here presented.

This second volume carries only through the reign of Mary. The work is abundantly documented and handsomely illustrated.

R. H. B.

Tudor Prelates and Politics. By LACEY BALDWIN SMITH. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (Princeton Studies in History, VIII), 1953. x, 333 pp. $5.00.

In England, as on the Continent, the opening years of the sixteenth century were marked by the flourishing of a liberal, humanist Catholicism intent upon reform, tolerant of criticism but bent upon no extremes. The emergence of a passionate Protestantism compelled sharp choices, and the moderates were driven eventually to choose between Wittenberg and Trent. This book traces the development in England under the Tudors up to the reign of Elizabeth. The author seeks to deal dispassionately with all of the parties but avows a certain penchant for the moderates. They were men trained in humanism and law, ready enough at the outset to correct abuses, but with no mind to tear down the old house before the new one was ready. Many of the conservative bishops were also civil servants and had frequently been employed on ambassadorial missions. They appreciated the necessity in political life for compromises, diplomacy, and even dissimulation. The intractable temper and the absolute choices demanded by the reformers appeared to them to presage not only the disruption of the church but also the dissolution of the civil order. Protestantism was a social revolution. For that reason the moderates recoiled and came, in the end, to discountenance even mild reforms; and because the Papacy appeared to be the only bond of unity integrating alike church, state, and society, they were ready to see Papal jurisdiction restored.

The book is ponderous in documentation and spritely in style.

R. H. B.

Social and Political Forces in the English Reformation. By Conyers Read. Houston: The Elsevier Press, 1953. 88 pp. $2.00.

To recount the story of the religious development in England throughout the entire sixteenth century in so brief a compass is an achievement in selection and condensation. A fine balance is achieved with regard to the interplay of political, economic and religious forces. A deft hand highlights the significant.

R. H. B.

The New England Mind: From Colony to Province. By Perry Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. xiii, 513 pp. $6.50.

When Perry Miller's *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* was first published, in 1939, it was widely heralded as a most competent and thorough study of Puritan theology. Readers also noted that Miller took his subject literally and narrowly; he wrote of the content of the mind—the ideas of Puritan New England as expressed by theological leaders—not of the economic and social context in which those ideas flourished. At that time, too, Professor Miller himself promised a continuation of his work beyond the founding generation and its immediate successor in whom the memory of the founders was still green. Many years have intervened, and it is a maturer scholar who now presents that long-deferred continuation.

The story is still told, largely, in theological terms. The remarkable thing is the clarity with which these theological terms reveal a secular state of mind. Under Professor Miller's skillful guidance the reader seems to be audience at the transformation of Puritan into Yankee, the transformation of a theocracy into an aristocracy that held promise of becoming a democracy. The magnificent misadventures of the Mathers in trying to lead an adjustment of theology to a life they did not understand provides a thread of continuity for this book. When Increase and Cotton Mather were right, one might say after reading Miller's work, it was invariably for the wrong reasons. So that, although there is more of the Mathers here than of any others of their time (with their logorrhea it could scarcely be otherwise!), it is neither of them that is the "hero" of the story. The hero, though his place is less voluminous, is John Wise.

Miller's study of the sermons of New England ministers from 1657 to 1730 reveals the prominence of the jeremiad. In pointing out the frequency with which the burden of the sermons was the falling away of the children from the spirit of the fathers, in emphasizing that each formula of accommodation, of compromise, was the occasion for the negativity of the jeremiad rather than the proposal of positive programs for maintaining the ancestral faith and spirit, Miller has made a real contribution to our understanding of the intellectual history of New England. The leaders of thought did not lead, because they could not lead; they could not lead, because their ideas were inadequate to their life-situation. Failing to realize this inadequacy, they could

explain the unwillingness of others to accept their leadership only as contumaciousness. This created an opportunity to preach another jeremiad, and thereby to lose more of the attention of the public.

No summary can indicate the richness of Miller's book. It is better than the first volume of the series, and, though philosophically less rewarding, it has more to teach us of the reasons for the downfall of the Puritan spirit in New England.

J. L. B.

Psalmboksarbetet i Sverige vid slutet av 1800-talet. By ALLAN ARVASTSON. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1954. 236 pp. Kr. 15.

The position of the Psalmbook in the Swedish Church is in many respects unique. It was for centuries the most important devotional book among the Swedish people. The cost of a Bible was for a large class prohibitive, but a psalmbook was found in every home. It was not only a hymnbook, it was a book of common prayer and devotion, it contained the liturgical Scripture texts, the catechism, and other materials suitable for all occasions and situations in the life of the Church, the home, and the nation. It was part of the life in every home. No wonder, then, that changes and revisions were difficult. It meant an operation on the vital religious nerve of the people. The Psalmbook of 1695 continued in use until 1819, when it was superseded by the so-called Wallin Hymnal. Wallin was a poet as well as a churchman, and, from a literary point of view, it has been considered among the best in Christendom. But among large sections of the Church it was unacceptable as reflecting the rationalism and moralism of the period. Hence there was a demand for a revision. Such a revision appeared in 1849, known as the Thomander-Wieselgren Psalmbook, which presented some changes in an evangelical spirit. This revision, however, was never made official in the Church of Sweden, but was adopted as the official hymnbook of the Augustana Lutheran Church in America. Dr. Arvastson, the author of the book which is the subject of this review, has given an exhaustive treatment of this revision in a book published in 1949. For the benefit of English readers the book contains an excellent summary. The present volume may in a way be considered as a continuation of the former, bringing the treatment of the work of revision up to the end of the nineteenth century. The 1819 Psalmbook bears the literary stamp of J. O. Wallin, one of Sweden's outstanding poets. Also, there were other men of high literary standing represented in the book. But with the rising tide of the evangelical movement and spiritual revival that characterized the religious life in Sweden in the middle of last century, there appeared a type of hymn more subjective and popular, which in many places crowded out the official hymnal. There was a crying need of revision to meet the changing religious atmosphere and new phases of religious activities, such as missions and the like.

But the conservation of the established Church resisted change, and, besides, there were few religious poets of the caliber of a Wallin, Franzén, and others. C. D. af Wirsén is perhaps the most outstanding of the later hymn-writers. In his examination of the efforts of revision, Dr. Arvastson gives valuable presentation of the labors of such men as C. A. Torén, S. Cavallin, U. L. Ullman, and A. F. Beckman. While not noted poets themselves, they possessed a fine sense of evaluation of what constitutes a Christian and Lutheran hymn. They had a keen ear for esthetic values, but also a deep understanding of the evangelical and devotional needs the hymns were expected to supply. The book is the fruit of thorough research, keen insight and evaluation. There is a summary in German, for those who do not read Swedish. An English summary, like that in his previous volume, would have been appreciated by those who understand neither Swedish nor German.

OSCAR N. OLSON

Sören Kierkegaard. By JOHANNES HOHLENBERG. Translated by T. H. CROXALL. Pantheon Books Inc., New York: 1954, x, 321 pp. $5.00.

Dr. Croxall's accurate and readable translation makes available to us a biography of Kierkegaard which has certain advantages over its competitors in the field. Coming from an old Copenhagen family, the book's author knows minutely the history, manners, and speech of Kierkegaard's city. Sly allusions in Kierkegaard's writings, the significance of which is sometimes missed by non-Danish interpreters of Kierkegaard, are not lost on Mr. Hohlenberg. The same is true of subtle nuances in the language. In this book we are offered a fuller description of Kierkegaard's *milieu* and a closer acquaintance with Kierkegaard's contemporaries, their life, their literature, and their influence on him, than is to be found in any single volume currently available in English. It is also to be accounted an advantage that Mr. Hohlenberg makes liberal use of unpublished and/or hitherto untranslated source materials.

But there are also disadvantages. Some of the interpretations are, in my opinion, extremely questionable, and some of the theorizing is fantastic. It is to the credit of Dr. Croxall that he refused to give the book the benefit of his expert translation until he got permission from author and publisher to leave a good bit of the theorizing out. What is left? A book profusely illustrated, well printed, and attractively bound, whose purely historical and biographical sections are fairly rewarding. Even so, parts of the book are superficial, and the book as a whole—I regret so harsh a judgment—is superfluous. The wealth of historical detail to the contrary notwithstanding, I cannot see that the book goes beyond its competitors in contributing to our understanding of Kierkegaard as a person; and if we wish to understand Kierkegaard as thinker, far better books—in at least four languages, including English—are available.

HOWARD A. JOHNSON

The Unfinished Reformation. By Charles Clayton Morrison. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. xvi, 236 pp. $3.00.

Dr. Morrison is one of the most prominent of the religious journalists of our generation, and under his editorship *The Christian Century* has achieved the position of one of the leading inter-denominational journals of Protestant opinion. It was inevitable that he be asked to deliver one of the series of William Henry Hoover Lectures on Christian Unity at the Disciples Divinity House of the University of Chicago, for he has consistently, in his editorials, supported the cause of Christian unity, or as some prefer to call it, Christian reunion. The result is a vigorous and trenchant attack on denominationalism. The familiar idea that the Reformers of the sixteenth century never contemplated the shattering of the *corpus Christianum* into a multitude of competing denominations is here re-affirmed. Dr. Morrison is at his best in revealing the inherent absurdities of denominationalism. He shows quite conclusively that the denomination has wrongly arrogated to itself functions and responsibilities that can only properly be the function of the whole Church. What does it mean to be baptized as a Congregationalist or ordained as an Episcopalian? Surely these sacramental rites belong to the whole Church in its fullness and catholicity. His chapters on "A Critique of Denominationalism" and "The Churchism of the Denomination" are bound to disturb complacency and to point up the need for re-dedication to the ecumenical ideal.

The weakness of the book derives from Dr. Morrison's own low estimate of the role of theological and creedal affirmation in a re-united Church. He insists that creeds have always been divisive, and no re-united Church can possibly include creedal agreement in its platform. In the same vein, he would forbid the Bible a place in the "constitution" of the Church, although it would have its place within the "fellowship" of the Church, with the understanding of the right of each Christian to his private interpretation. The true authority in the Church, says Dr. Morrison, is Christ Himself. "The new ecumenical spirit . . . demands a new ecclesiastical order of inclusiveness and comprehension . . . a church which embraces all who in their love of Christ acknowledge him as divine Lord and Saviour" (p. 195). It is difficult to know what Dr. Morrison really means to say here. If he is contending against the tendency of some Protestant bodies to define with precision the deeper paradoxes of the Christian life and experience and to fix this standard of definition upon the Church as a test of membership, many would think he is on sound ground. But the process of developing creedal formula has not always been directed toward this sort of precise definition, but rather toward the broader task of defining the area of legitimate speculation within which Christian thought may continue loyal to what Dr. Morrison rightly points to as the basic Christian affirmation, "their love of Christ" and an acknowledgment of Him "as divine Lord and Saviour." The difference between Dr. Morrison's creed—admittedly a simple and primitive one—and the findings of the Synod of Dort, for example, ought not to obscure the fact that both are creedal affirmations. Two movements—

not one—are characteristic of modern Protestantism, theological revival *and* the ecumenical movement. Dr. Morrison seems quite unaware of the depth and reality of the first one, and of the extent to which it has been linked to the ecumenical movement. A reunited Church which ignored creedal and theological affirmation would have no chance whatever of commending itself to large numbers of American Protestants, nor to the overwhelming majority of British and Continental Protestants. Dr. Morrison has given us a pointed critique of the present situation in a divided Christian Church; he is less satisfactory in defining the solution.

JOHN M. KRUMM

The World's Religions. By CHARLES S. BRADEN. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1954. 256 pp. $3.00.

In this small, inexpensive book, newly revised, Professor Braden, of Northwestern University, offers a non-technical account of world religions for the completely uninitiated reader. His task is a difficult one and raises the question of how such a study should be approached. One thinks of existing books presenting religions in classified groups, or making use of literary samples, or interpretive essays. Professor Braden chooses to write a brief independent history of each religion. Happily, his selection adds ancient American religion and that of pre-Christian north Europe to those usually found in general introductions to the subject. Both the virtues and shortcomings of his approach are quite evident to the reader. It is well that he allows each religion to stand alone, presented in its own context and terms, unconfused by easy "comparative" or evaluative remarks. But the longest treatment (Christianity) is only thirty-three pages of fairly large type, and the religions of contemporary primitives are disposed of in three pages. Even the most felicitous handling by an accurate scholar of so much material in so little compass seems to demonstrate that there is no short cut in a historical or phenomenological approach. Not enough matter is here presented for even the briefest college survey. But since the book has been popular already for fifteen years, it apparently meets the layman's need for basic information, and does so, within its small scope, in an irenic and judicious manner. It will lead no one astray, and its bibliographies are more than adequate guides to further study by readers for whom it is intended.

EDWARD J. DOWEY, JR.

Short Dictionary of Mythology. By PERCIVAL GEORGE WOODCOCK. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 156 pp. $3.75.

This comparatively small book makes the claim that it contains "every name of importance encountered in the ordinary course of reading," in the field of classical and mythological studies. It would be impossible, in a cursory perusal, either to substantiate or refute so large a claim, but it does seem, to this re-

viewer, that its sense of proportion is not infallible. For example, Atalanta rates fifteen lines, and Apis only one (in which, incidentally, he is called "the miraculous ox *(sic)* worshipped in Egypt." Another, even more egregious, error is the description of Buddha (in four words) as "Vishnu of the Hindoos." These examples do not inspire much confidence.

The Golden Book of Immortality. Edited by THOMAS CURTIS CLARK and HAZEL DAVIS CLARK. New York: Association Press, 1954. xxi, 232 pp. $2.50.

This "book of comfort" is an anthology of selections from some 200 writers—poets, philosophers, scientists, religious leaders, etc.—affirming their belief in immortality. Perhaps the most subtly touching of these testimonies is that of the philosopher, George Herbert Palmer, who wrote of his wife: "Though no regrets are proper for the manner of her death, who can contemplate the fact of it and not call the world irrational if, out of deference to a few particles of disordered matter, it excludes so fair a spirit?"

Tibetan Tales: Stories from the Dsangs Blun. Translated by ANTOINETTE K. GORDON. London: Luzac and Co., Ltd., 1953. 72 pp. 7*s*.6*d*.

This charming little book contains translations of six brief stories from a Tibetan Buddhist canonical writing, purporting to be parables told by the Buddha to his disciples to illustrate important aspects of doctrine, and to point a moral. The doctrine emphasized in all of them is karma in its positive aspect, that is, the reward in this life for pious deeds and sacrifices performed in some previous incarnation. The stories are told with delightful simplicity, and illustrated with attractive line drawings, presumably by the author herself. There are also very helpful notes and an excellent brief bibliography—altogether a valuable contribution to an understanding of Buddhism, by a well-known scholar and in a most readable form.

The Student's New Testament. Edited by EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. x, 1055 pp. $7.50.

In this tremendously valuable book, Dr. Goodspeed publishes his own famous American Translation opposite the Westcott-Hort Greek Text from which he made his translation. This enables the student of even very modest competence in the Greek language to read the original text without the annoyance of constant use of a glossary or dictionary. It should, therefore, result in a much wider use of and love for the original Greek, not only among clergy and seminarians, but among the educated general public as well.

The Book of Ezekiel. Edited by JULIUS A. BEWER. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. Vol. I, Chs. 1-24. 72 pp. $.75. Vol. II, Chs. 25-48. 82 pp. $.75.

These two small volumes appear as Numbers 8 and 9 in Harper's Annotated Bible Series, a most commendable project, notable for high scholarship combined with practicality. The two Introductions contain an interesting section on the life and times of the prophet, and the significance of his work as both prophet and priest; and a study of the text, its plan and composition, and a chapter by chapter outline. The text is further enriched by copious footnotes, sometimes more than half the page in length, in the thorough tradition of German scholarship.

A Good and a Bad Government—According to the New Testament. By JEAN HÉRING. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1954. 68 pp.

This monograph by Professor Héring, of the Protestant Theological School, University of Strasbourg, and published simultaneously at Oxford and Toronto, appears as No. 221 in the American Lecture Series, edited by Marvin Farber, of the University of Buffalo. It is an attempt to present the problem of Church and State entirely from the texts of the New Testament, "with the purpose of examining whether they furnish a criterion enabling us to distinguish between a government acceptable from a theological point of view, and another which is not" (p. 3). The Conclusions (p. 68) find that the function of the state is to preserve Justice; that it is not necessary for a state to be Christian to be a servant of God; that force is justified if it is "put at the service of Right"; that a state which persecutes the innocent and demands "a total adhesion of consciences" is a servant of Satan; that religious persecution is contrary to the "mission of the State"; and that, though the New Testament gives no prescription for foreign policy, "in prolonging certain lines of the Pauline doctrine, interesting results are obtained."

Le ciel, c'est les autres. By YVAN DANIEL and GILBERT LE MOUEL. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1954. 302 pp. 495 frs.

La Nouvelle que vous attendez. By YVAN DANIEL. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1954. 328 pp. 450 frs.

La Religion du Christ. By ABBÉ PIERRE DANSE. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1954. 94 pp. 225 frs.

These three doctrinal and devotional books are intended for the general reader, and especially for young adults and college students. They are composed mainly of texts from the New Testament, in the first book grouped under headings such as "The World of Illusions," "The Will of God," "True Reli-

gion," "As I Have Loved You," etc. In the second book, the selections from the Four Gospels are grouped together under their authors, sometimes in the form of direct quotation, sometimes by means of a free paraphrase. The translation uses the ordinary French of today, to make it more intelligible. The third little book is embellished with a remarkable variety of pictures with appropriate texts and descriptions, for example, the "marvels of nature" are illustrated by a rosebud and the Palomar telescope! The other illustrations include a map of Palestine, a statue of the Emperor Tiberius, the source of the Jordan, a crucifix, a spring of running water, a bunch of grapes, an acolyte with a candle, and a statue of the Virgin and Child.

The value of such books as these for the student of religion is obvious, for they give us a picture of Catholicism in France, as it is presented to the young with clarity and dignity, free from the excessive sentimentality which mars so much of this type of literature in America.

The Christian Gospel and the Parish Church. By CHARLES DUELL KEAN. Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1953. xi, 142 pp. $2.50.

The subtitle of this book, "An Introduction to Parish Dynamics," reveals its essentially Protestant nature, for here the Christian life appears, not as a vertical relationship between the worshiper and his God, a vertical line which is represented in Catholicism by the Church itself, but as a dynamic, three-dimensional structure, a functioning fellowship of believers working in co-operation with their "Great Companion." In fact, the matter is stated quite flatly: "The normal setting for living the Christian faith and life 'as this Church hath received the same' is in parish life"; and again, "The parish is a channel for the Gospel." This is a far cry from the religion which, as Whitehead said, is "what a man does with his solitude"! Nowhere does the essentially extravert character of the American people reveal itself as clearly as in the uniquely *social* quality of its Protestantism.

Vision and Action: Essays in Honor of Horace M. Kallen on His 70th Birthday. Edited by SIDNEY RATNER. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953. xvii, 277 pp. $5.00.

This *Festschrift* is composed of essays by a list of distinguished contributors: T. V. Smith, Benjamin V. Cohen, Paul H. Douglas, Jerome Frank, Sidney Ratner, George Boas, Sidney Hook, C. I. Lewis, T. S. Eliot, John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Hu Shih, and Adelbert Ames, Jr. As Professor Ratner puts it in his Preface: "The diversity of the men who have come together in this undertaking—diversity not only in fields of thought and action represented, but also in philosophic positions—reflects the readiness to welcome individuality, difference, freedom, on the part of the man they honor." The essays themselves are of unusual interest and excellence.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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